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I. Introduction
The dispute settlement system of the World Trade Organization (WTO) has
been described by the first Director-General of the WTO, Renato Ruggiero, as
„in many ways the central pillar of the multilateral trading system“,1 and it is one
of the most active dispute settlement systems in international law. From its
inauguration in 1995 until August 2019, WTO member states have filed alto-
gether 586 complaints, which have resulted so far in more than 250 panel
reports and about 140 Appellate Body reports.2
Compared to its predecessor, the GATT dispute settlement system (1948 –
1994),3 the WTO dispute settlement system is more effective and more lega-
lized. Under the old system, both the establishment of a dispute settlement
panel and, following the panel proceedings, the adoption of the panel report
required the consensus of all member states (positive consensus), which gave
each member state, including the respondent in the case, the power to block
the establishment of a panel or later the adoption of the panel report. This
problem of blockage, and, more generally, insufficient enforcement mecha-
nisms within the GATT system developed into a major issue for the United
States in the 1980s and early 1990s. The US reacted with the threat of unilateral
trade sanctions, which in turn seriously worried its trading partners.4 The new
WTO dispute settlement that emerged from the Uruguay Trade Round (1987 –
1994), embodied in the Understanding on Dispute Settlement (DSU), ad-
dressed these concerns. The Dispute Settlement Body (DSB), in which all
member states are represented, now establishes panels and adopts their re-
ports unless all members disagree (negative consensus),5 meaning that the
establishment of panels and the adoption of reports have become quasi-au-
tomatic. In addition, if a member state does not comply with the recomm-
endations of a report, the complaining party can request the DSB to authorize
1 Ruggiero (1997).
2 See https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_e.htm for statistical data on
WTO dispute settlement.
3 On GATT dispute settlement, see WTO (2018a) (overview and one-page summaries of all
disputes), WTO (2018b) (dispute settlement rules), WTO (2007), pp. 261 – 266, and Hudec
(1993) (most comprehensive and detailed account of the development of the GATT
dispute settlement system).
4 See, for instance, WTO (2007), pp. 265 – 266; see also infra, fn. 475 and accompanying text
5 Arts. 6.1 (establishment of a panel) and 16.4 (adoption of panel report) of the DSU.
trade sanctions, which are also subject to the negative consensus rule.6 In
return for this more powerful multilateral enforcement mechanism, the US
accepted a prohibition of unilateral sanctions.7 Finally, and most importantly
in our context, since panel reports could no longer be blocked, and a number
of panel reports had been criticized in the past for the low quality of their legal
reasoning, the member states sought another way to deal with legally faulty
reports. To that end, they created a standing review body, the Appellate Body,
to which a party can appeal for a review of legal interpretations of a panel.8
The reports of the Appellate Body, like those of the panels, are adopted by the
DSB by negative consensus.9
Despite its successes, this effective and binding dispute settlement system is
today under an existential threat. Since mid-2017 the US has blocked all ap-
pointments of new members to the Appellate Body, and it shows no signs of
changing this policy. As a consequence, only three of the seven seats on the
Appellate Body are currently occupied. If nothing unexpected happens, the
number of sitting Appellate Body members will drop to only one in December
2019, when the terms of two of the three sitting members will end.10 Since
three Appellate Body members are required for the disposition of an appeal,11
this means that from December 2019 onwards the Appellate Body will no
longer be able to hear new appeals. In that situation, by filing a notice of
appeal a party could suspend dispute settlement proceedings indefinitely. In
effect, this would give each party the power to block the adoption of a panel
report, thus returning the dispute settlement system to pre-WTO times.
6 Art. 22 of the DSU.
7 Art. 23 of the DSU; see further on this provision supra, fn. 477 and accompanying text.
8 Art. 17 of the DSU; on the reasons for creating the Appellate Body, see Cossy (2015),
pp. 302 – 303; Steger (2015), p. 468; and Lacarte-Muró/Castro (2004), p. 45; further on the
negotiating history of the Appellate Body, see infra, Section V.A.
9 Art. 17.14 of the DSU.
10 The terms of Appellate Body members Ujal Singh Bhatia and Thomas R. Graham end on
10 December 2019 (see minutes of the DSB meeting of 25 November 2015 [WT/DSB/M/
370], paras. 7.3 – 7.4). The only remaining member will then be Zhao Hong, whose term
runs until 30 November 2020 (see minutes of the DSB meeting of 23 November 2016 [WT/
DSB/M/389], paras. 13.3 – 13.4).
11 Art. 17.1 of the DSU.
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Various aspects of this grave crisis of the WTO dispute settlement system have
already been discussed in the literature.12 This study adds three elements. First,
it describes, based on a detailed review of the minutes of the DSB meetings
since 2017, how a dispute that seemed initially to be about obscure issues of
appointment procedure, baffling many observers, turned into the most severe
crisis of the WTO dispute settlement system yet. It gives an account of the
shifting reasons offered by the US for its blockage, culminating, in August 2018,
in broad accusations of judicial overreach and disregard of WTO rules by the
Appellate Body. The US alleges that the Appellate Body has been engaging in
such overreach, on the one hand, in the area of substantive law, and, on the
other hand, concerning six distinct issues of procedure and interpretive ap-
proach. Its focus in the DSB, however, has been on the latter, and it has
presented to the member states extensive statements on all of these six issues.
Second, and foremost, the study analyzes each of the six procedural and in-
terpretative issues raised by the US, and asks, from a legal point of view,
whether the Appellate Body has indeed overstepped its mandate with regard
to any of these issues, and whether the Appellate Body’s jurisprudence on
these issues, either individually or as a whole, can justify the blockage of
appointments to the Appellate Body. For that purpose, it takes a particularly
close look at the statements of the US in the DSB, and the reactions of other
WTOmembers to these statements. Third, it places the detailed analysis of the
reasons stated by the US for its blockage in a larger legal and political context
in order to gain a better understanding of the motives driving the US.
The structure of the study follows this outline of its main contributions.
Chapter II lays the basis by briefly explaining the rules on appointments to the
Appellate Body and discussing past experiences with the appointment proc-
ess. Chapter III chronicles the development of the current crisis, from early
2017 until the summer of 2019.13 Chapter IV, the central part of the study,
contains a detailed analysis of the issues of procedure and interpretative
approach that the US has invoked as reasons for its blockage and answers the
question whether these reasons can legally justify the blockage. Chapter V
12 See, for instance, Ansong (2019); Bacchus (2018); Bahri (2019); Bhala/Gantz/Keating/
Witmer (2019), pp. 257 – 274; Claussen (2018); Creamer (2019); Fabry/Tale (2018); Hillman
(2018a); Hoekman/Mavroidis (2019); Kong/Guo (2019); Kuiper (2017); McDougall (2018);
Pauwelyn (2019); Payasova/Hufbauer/Schott (2018); Petersmann (2018) and (2019); Raina
(2018); Shaffer (2018); Steinberg (2018); and Vidigal (2018) and (2019).
13 For the purposes of this study, events, case law, and publications up to the end of August
2019 were considered.
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puts the often narrow and technical legal issues analyzed in Chapter IV in a
broader explanatory framework. Chapter VI concludes with a summary of the
main results and a few thoughts on whether a better understanding of the
legal reasons stated by the US for its blockage might contribute to a resolution
of the appointment crisis or otherwise be of practical value.
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II. Appointments to the
Appellate Body: Legal rules
and past controversies
The basic rules on the composition of the Appellate Body and the appoint-
ment of its members are stipulated in Arts. 17.1 to 17.3 of the DSU. According to 
Art. 17.1 of the DSU, the Appellate Body is composed of seven persons, three of 
whom (a so-called division) serve on any one case. Pursuant to Art. 17.2,
„[t]he DSB shall appoint persons to serve on the Appellate Body for a four-year 
term, and each person may be reappointed once“, and, moreover, „[v]acancies 
shall be filled as the arise.“ Decisions by the DSB on appointments and reap-
pointments have to be made by consensus (Art. 2.4 of the DSU). The expected 
qualifications of Appellate Body members are prescribed in Art. 17.3 of the 
DSU, which names three criteria, namely, they have to be, first, „of recognized 
authority, with demonstrated expertise in law, international trade and the 
subject matter of the covered agreements generally“, second, „unaffiliated with 
any government“, and, third, „broadly representative of membership in the 
WTO.“
The DSU provides no further details on the appointment process. Based on 
recommendations for the establishment of the Appellate Body by the Pre-
paratory Committee for the WTO, which were approved by the DSB in early 
1995,14 the following practice emerged:15 For first-term appointments a selec-
14 Establishment of the Appellate Body, Recommendations by the Preparatory Committee
for the WTO approved by the Dispute Settlement Body on 10 February 1995 (WT/DSB/1).
15 See the description of the processes in the DSB on the occasion of the appointment and
reappointment decisions: Minutes of the DSB meetings of 1 and 29 November 1995 (WT/
DSB/M/9), pp. 1 – 8 (appointment of Bacchus, Beeby, Ehlermann, El-Naggar, Feliciano,
Lacarte-Muró, and Matsushita); 25 June 1997 (WT/DSB/M/35), pp. 6 – 7 (reappointment
of Ehlermann, Feliciano, and Lacarte-Muró); 27 October and 3 November 1999 (WT/DSB/
M/70), pp. 32 – 35 (reappointment of Bacchus and Beeby); 7 April 2000 (WT/DSB/M/78),
paras. 70 – 94 (appointment of Abi-Saab and Ganesan); 25 May 2000 (WT/DSB/M/82),
paras. 1 – 12 (appointment of Taniguchi); 25 September 2001 (WT/DSB/M/110), paras. 22 –
39 (appointment of Baptista, Lockhart, and Sacerdoti); 7 November 2003 (WT/DSB/M/
157), paras. 58 – 71 (appointment of Janow; reappointment of Taniguchi, Abi-Saab, and
Ganesan); 31 July 2006 (WT/DSB/M/2018), paras. 1 – 12 (appointment of Unterhalter); 19
tion committee consisting of the Director-General and the chairpersons of the
Goods Council, Services Council, TRIPS Council and General Council would be
established by the DSB. Member states could submit nominations of candi-
dates, and the selection committee would then interview the candidates,
consult with interested member states, and finally submit one candidate to
the DSB for decision. If a sitting Appellate Body member was willing to serve
for a second term, the chairperson of the DSB would consult with member
states, and, if no objection was raised, would propose the sitting member for
reappointment to the DSB.
Since 1995, the DSB has appointed altogether 27 persons to the Appellate
Body, and reappointed 17 of these for a second term.16 Although most of these
appointments and reappointments proceeded more or less smoothly, there
were a number of noteworthy incidents and controversies.17 The appointment
of the first seven Appellate Body members in 1995 took almost a year, mainly
because the US and the EU initially each insisted on two Appellate Body
members, which was opposed by most of the other member states. Eventually,
first the US and then, at the eve of the DSB’s appointment decision, the EU
gave in and accepted, in the case of the EU only very grudgingly, to have only
one member each on the Appellate Body (for the US James Bacchus, and for
the EU the German Claus-Dieter Ehlermann).18 A second controversy occurred
in November 2007, when Taiwan blocked the Chinese candidate Yuejiao
and 27 November 2007 (WT/DSB/M/242), paras. 1 – 30 (appointment of Bautista, Hillman,
Oshima, and Zhang); 19 June 2009 (WT/DSB/M/270), paras. 82 – 91 (appointment of
Ramírez Hernández and Van den Bossche; reappointment of Unterhalter); 18 November
2011 (WT/DSB/M/307), paras. 1 – 14 (appointment of Bhatia and Graham); 24 May 2012
(WT/DSB/M/316), paras. 1 – 14 (appointment of Chang; reappointment of Zhang); 26
March 2013 (WT/DSB/M/330), paras. 4.1 – 4.4 (reappointment of Ramírez Hernández); 25
November 2013 (WT/DSB/M/339), paras. 1.1 – 1.10 (reappointment of Van den Bossche); 26
September 2014 (WT/DSB/M/350), paras. 2.1 – 2.23 (appointment of Servansing); 25 No-
vember 2015 (WT/DSB/M/370), paras. 7.1 – 7.17 (reappointment of Bhatia and Graham);
and 23 November 2016 (WT/DSB/M/389), paras. 13.1 – 13.27 (appointment of Zhao and
Kim).
16 For a list of all Appellate Body members and their terms, see the Appellate Body Annual
Report for 2018, March 2019 (WT/AB/29), pp. 148 – 151.
17 On the appointment and reappointment processes since 1995 in general, see Elsig/Pollack
(2014) and Appleton (2016).
18 See Steger (2015), pp. 449 – 450, and Elsig/Pollack (2014), p. 403; on the criticism of the
first appointment process by the EU and other members, notably India, Brazil, and
Switzerland, see minutes of the DSB meeting of 1 and 29 November 1995 (WT/DSB/M/9),
pp. 3 – 6.
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Zhang, presumably because of the long-running political conflict between
China and Taiwan, and only relented after intensive consultations.19 These first
two controversies were about national representation, reflecting the fact that,
although Appellate Body members are required to be „independent and im-
partial“20 and, as mentioned, „unaffiliated with any government“,21 national
representation is still considered important by most member states. By con-
trast, the major appointment conflicts after that did not concern the natio-
nality, but rather the attitude and performance (but not qualification) of the
disputed candidates, and it was always the US who had objections.
A first harbinger of what was to come were two incidents that did not cause
much stir at the time, but, with hindsight, were telling. As a matter not of law
but of political practice, the US is entitled to one seat on the Appellate Body.
However, the US was not satisfied with the two US Appellate Body members
that followed James Bacchus (1995 – 2003), namely Merit Janow (2003 – 2007)
and Jennifer Hillman (2007 – 2011), and refused to support their reappoint-
ment, forcing both to declare that they were not available for a second term.
This was contrary to the prevailing convention at the time to reappoint Ap-
pellate Body members who wished to continue. In both cases, the US believed
that, once in office, its candidate had not lent sufficient support to the US, in
particular in trade remedy disputes.22
The US also became more scrutinizing of reappointments of Appellate Body
members nominated by other delegations. When the DSB chairman anno-
19 See Lester (2007); minutes of the DSB meeting of 19 and 27 November 2007 (WT/DSB/M/
242), pp. 2 – 4 and 7.
20 Para. 1 of sect. II in conjunction with para. 1 of sect. IV of the Rules of Conduct for the
Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (WT/DSB/
RC/1), adopted by the DSB on 3 December 1996.
21 Art. 17.3 of the DSU.
22 On Merit Janow, see minutes of the DSB meeting of 22 May 2007 (WT/DSB/M/232), para.
87; Dunoff/Pollack (2017), pp. 267 – 268; and Elsig/Pollack (2014), p. 412 (quoting a former
US Trade Representative as saying on Janow: „We were not happy with US AB members
who bend over backwards to show their independence by ruling against the US“). On
Jennifer Hillman, see minutes of the DSB meeting of 21 April 2011 (WT/DSB/M/295), para.
91; Hillman (2017), p. 367 (mentioning „the United States Trade Representative (USTR)’s
apparent expression of hope that a new U.S. AB member ,will be more willing to boldly
defend U.S. interests in Geneva than Hillman‘ and observers noting that ,USTR perceived
outgoing Appellate Body member Jennifer Hillman as not being sufficiently aggressive in
issuing dissenting opinions on trade remedy cases‘“); Blumstein (2017), pp. 11 – 13; Dunoff/
Pollack (2017), p. 268; Elsig/Pollack (2014), p. 409; and Hufbauer (2011).
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unced in March 2013 that he would start informal consultations on the pos-
sible reappointment of the EU Appellate Body member Peter Van den Bos-
sche,23 whose first term would expire in December 2013, the US demanded
interviews with the candidate. Apparently, Van den Bossche refused to be
questioned by the US only, and, as a compromise, other members, too, were
given the opportunity to talk with Van den Bossche.24 At the DSB meeting at
which Van den Bossche was subsequently reappointed, in November 2013,
some members voiced concerns that this more probing process might affect
the integrity and independence of the Appellate Body.25 Again primarily on the
initiative of the US, the investigative nature of the reappointment process was
taken one step further with the simultaneous reappointments of Ujal Singh
Bhatia from India and Thomas R. Graham from the US in November 2015, who
were only reappointed after they had been questioned at a meeting open to all
interested delegations.26
The until then most serious appointment crisis came about when the South
African Appellate Body member David Unterhalter, whose second term ended
in December 2013, had to be replaced. The selection committee had tacitly
23 See minutes of the DSB meeting of 26 March 2013 (WT/DSB/M/330), para. 4.3.
24 See Bentes (2017), p. 2: „Then, we had a situation when Peter Van den Bossche was about to
be reappointed, the United States requested … one-on-one interviews with Peter Van den
Bossche before deciding whether or not to reappoint him. … So, Peter Van den Bossche said,
well, I’m not going to consult bilaterally with the U.S. about specific cases. And then a
decision was made informally that, if there were to be any consultations, it should have been
with a broader group of members, not only the United States. So you had the most frequent
users of the Appellate Body coming in: Brazil, EU, U.S., China, Korea, Japan, and then
consulting with Peter prior to his re-appointment, which finally went through.“
25 See minutes of the DSB meeting of 25 November 2013 (WT/DSB/M/339), paras. 1.1 – 1.8; for
an earlier expression of such concerns, see minutes of the DSB meeting of 25 September
2013 (WT/DSB/M/337), para. 9.3.
26 See minutes of the DSB meeting of 25 November 2015 (WT/DSB/M/370), paras. 7.1 – 7.15;
see on the background of that process Sacerdoti (2016), pp. 5 – 6: „For the first time in this
instance some WTO members, principally the US, asked a previous meeting with the two
Appellate Body members. This request prompted formal and informal discussions, within the
DSB, the Appellate Body and between the chairs of the two bodies on a format and type of
questioning that would safeguard on the one hand the independence of the Appellate Body
members and the confidentiality of its deliberations, and respond positively to the interest of
the WTO members to meet the two judges. At the end a compromise was found in that it was
agreed that the encounter, where only questions on general issues concerning the functio-
ning of the Appellate Body could be put to them, would take place at an informal meeting of
the DSB.“
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selected James Thuo Gathii from Kenya, a professor of international law at the
Loyoloa University Chicago School of Law, who was apparently backed by the
vast majority of member states. His appointment was opposed, though, by the
US because Gathii had complained in his academic writings about a bias in
the WTO in favor of rich and against developing countries.27 As a consequence,
the appointment process, which had been timely launched in May 2013,28 had
to be relaunched a year later, in May 2014,29 and could only be concluded in
September 2014, with the appointment of Shree Baboo Chekitan Servansing
from Mauritius,30 after Unterhalter’s seat had been vacant for more than nine
months.31
Whereas the opposition of the US to Mr. Gathii was only known to insiders at
the time, the next controversy, which directly preceded the current crisis, was
a different matter. It concerned public accusations leveled by the US against a
sitting Appellate Body member, the Korean Seung Wha Chang. Chang’s first
term expired at the end of May 2016, and he had indicated his willingness to
stay on for a second term. Following established practice, the DSB had re-
quested the DSB chairman in January 2016 to carry out consultations on the
possible reappointment of Chang.32 The reappointment decision was sche-
duled for the DSB meeting of 23 May 2016. At that meeting, however, the US
declared that „it did not support reappointing“ Chang and „would object to any
proposal to reappoint him.“33 This was the first time that an Appellate Body
member seeking reappointment with the support of his or her home country
had been blocked by another member state.34 The US explained that it „had
27 See, for instance, Gathii (2006) and (2004).
28 See Appointment/Reappointment of Appellate Body Members, decision adopted by the
DSB on 24 May 2013 (WT/DSB/60).
29 See Appellate Body Selection Process, decision adopted by the DSB on 23 May 2013 (WT/
DSB/63).
30 See minutes of the DSB meeting of 26 September 2014 (WT/DSB/M/350), paras. 2.1 – 2.23.
31 On the background of this appointment crisis, see Shaffer/Elsig/Puig (2016), p. 271; Howse
(2014), pp. 71 – 72; Sacerdoti (2015), p. 5; and Bhala/Gantz/Keating/Simoes (2014),
pp. 478 – 479.
32 Appointment/Reappointment of Appellate Body Members, decision adopted by the DSB
on 25 January 2016 (WT/DSB/70), item 5.
33 Minutes of the DSB meeting of 23 May 2016 (WT/DSB/M/379), para. 6.2; a few days before
the meeting, on 11 May 2016, the US had informed the DSB chairman and the press about
its opposition, see idem, para. 6.1.
34 Until that time, out of 23 Appellate Body members who had been eligible for reap-
pointment (up to and including Bhatia and Graham), 17 had been reappointed; four had
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reviewed carefully the member’s service on the divisions for the various appeals“
and „had concluded that his performance did not reflect the role assigned to the
Appellate Body by Members in the DSU“,35 clarifying that its „position on this
issue was not one based on the results of those appeals in terms of whether a
measure was found to be inconsistent or not. … Instead, the concerns raised were
important, systemic issues that went to the adjudicative approach and proper
role of the Appellate Body and the dispute settlement system.“36 More than 20
members took the floor in that DSB meeting in reaction to the US statement,
most of them criticizing the US and warning that refusal to reappoint a
member because of dissatisfaction with his or her performance would end-
anger the independence and impartiality of the Appellate Body. The point was
made most forcefully by Chang’s home country, Korea, which stated that „this
opposition was, to put it bluntly, an attempt to use reappointment as a tool to
rein in Appellate Body members for decisions they made on the bench. Its
message was loud and clear: ,If Appellate Body members made decisions that did
not conform to US perspectives, they were not going to be reappointed‘.“37 In an
unprecedented step, all current Appellate Body members except Chang, and,
separately, all living former Appellate Body members wrote letters warning of
the dangers posed by the US action to the Appellate Body as an institution.38
Nevertheless, the US would not budge, and therefore a selection process for
Chang’s replacement had to be started, which led, half a year after the end of
Chang’s term, to the appointment of the Korean Hyun Chong Kim in No-
vember 2016.39
not sought a second term for personal reasons (El-Naggar, Matsushita, Bautista and
Oshima) and, as mentioned, the two US Appellate Body members Janow and Hillman
had been forced by the US to forego reappointment.
35 Minutes of the DSB meeting of 23 May 2016 (WT/DSB/M/379), para. 6.2.
36 Minutes of the DSB meeting of 23 May 2016 (WT/DSB/M/379), para. 6.9.
37 Minutes of the DSB meeting of 23 May 2016 (WT/DSB/M/379), para. 6.12; other parti-
cularly critical members were, for instance, the EU (para. 6.14), Mexico (para. 6.15), Brazil
(paras. 6.16 – 6.19), Switzerland (para. 6.22) and Chinese Taipei (para. 6.25); more un-
derstanding (although not necessarily support) for the US decision was expressed by
Argentina (paras. 6.30 – 6.31), Australia (para. 6.33), Japan (para. 6.35), and Canada (paras.
6.41 – 6.42).
38 Communications to the DSB from current Appellate Body members, dated 18 May 2016,
and from former Appellate Body members, dated 31 May 2016, both reprinted in the
Appellate Body Annual Report for 2016, March 2017 (WT/AB/27), pp. 102 – 104.
39 See minutes of the DSB meeting of 23 November 2016 (WT/DSB/M/393), paras. 13.1 – 13.27.
Together with the first term of Chang, the second term of Appellate Body member
Yuejiao Zhang had also ended in May 2016, and a process for the selection of a successor
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to Zhang had been started at the same time as the process for the reappointment of
Chang. As a reaction to the blocking of Chang by the US, Korea had blocked the selection
of a successor to Zhang (see Sacerdoti [2017], p. 8), and the two processes were finally
concluded at the same time, with the appointment of Zhao Hong together with Kim.
Consequently, not one, but two seats had been vacant from the end of May until the end
of November 2016.
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III. Chronology of the crisis
A. FEBRUARY TO JULY 2017: APPARENT CONFLICT ABOUT
APPOINTMENT PROCEDURE
The current crisis started in early 2017 with the upcoming endings of the se-
cond terms of the Appellate Body members Ricardo Ramírez Hernández of
Mexico, whose term expired on 30 June 2017, and Peter van den Bossche of
Belgium (nominated by the EU), whose term expired about five months later,
on 11 December 2017. The seat of Ramírez Hernández was informally con-
sidered to be the South American seat (his predecessors being Luiz Olavo
Baptista from Brazil and Julio Lacarte-Muró from Uruguay) and that of Van
den Bossche the EU seat (which had previously been held by Giorgio Sacerdoti
from Italy and Claus-Dieter Ehlermann from Germany), and therefore initially
some assumed (wrongly, as it turned out) that a conflict between the South
American states and the EU was driving the conflict.
In the DSB meeting of 16 December 2016, the chairman of the DSB drew at-
tention to the ending of the terms of Ramírez Hernández and Van den Bossche
in 2017, and proposed to carry out one selection process for both positions,
with a view to completing the process by the end of June 2017, given that
members would be busy in the second half of 2017 with the preparations for
the Ministerial Conference in December 2017.40 He announced that he would
submit a formal proposal with further details at the beginning of 2017. At the
next DSB meeting, on 25 January 2017, the chairman outlined not one, but two
approaches for the appointment process.41 In addition to a single appointment
process, to be completed by June 2017, he mentioned the possibility of two
separate processes, one for each position and each with its own time line, one
to be completed by June 2017 and the other by December 2017. He declared
that he would consult with members on these approaches.
40 Minutes of the DSB meeting of 16 December 2016 (WT/DSB/M/390), para. 10.1.
41 Minutes of the DSB meeting of 25 January 2017 (WT/DSB/M/391), para. 8.1.
In the subsequent DSB meeting of 20 February 2017, the chairman reported on
his consultations.42 A majority of delegations, including the EU and at least
two South American states, Argentina and Peru, supported a single process. By
contrast, two delegations (one of them being Guatemala and the other, pos-
sibly, Panama)43 preferred two separate processes. Finally, one delegation
(based on later events most likely the US) suggested that one should, for the
time being, only start the process for the more urgent replacement of Ramírez
Hernández, and that more time should be given to decide on when to start the
process of replacing Van den Bossche. However, those in favor of a single
selection process were only willing to consent to two separate processes if
both processes could be completed before the summer break, which, in effect,
meant that not only the process for the replacement of Ramírez Hernández,
but also that for the later vacancy caused by the end of the term of Van den
Bossche had to be started right away. In summary, there was no consensus to
start the appointment process because a number of members, most notably
the EU, insisted that the processes for both vacancies had to start simulta-
neously, while one member, most likely the US, was only willing to agree to
start the process for the replacement of Ramírez Hernández, or, in other
words, required delaying the process for the replacement of Van den Bossche.
During the following five months, from the DSB meeting of 21 March 2017 to
that of 20 July 2017, the dispute about the procedure for filling the two vac-
ancies crystallized into a conflict between the EU, which would not agree to
the start of the procedure for replacing Ramírez Hernández without also
starting the process for replacing Van den Bossche, and the US, which would
only agree to starting the process for the first, but not the second vacancy.44
This became obvious in the DSB meeting of 22 May 2017, in which the DSB
discussed two formal proposals on the appointment proposals, one by the
42 Minutes of the DSB meeting of 20 February 2017 (WT/DSB/M/392), para. 11.1, with sub-
sequent statements by Peru (para. 11.2), the EU (para. 11.3), Brazil (para. 11.4) and Ar-
gentina (para. 11.5).
43 See the later statement of Guatemala in the minutes of the DSB meeting of 21 March 2017
(WT/DSB/M/394), para. 9.5, and that of Panama in the minutes of the DSB meeting of 19
June 2017 (WT/DSB/M/398), para. 9.11.
44 See minutes of the DSB meetings of 21 March 2017 (WT/DSB/M/394), paras. 9.1 – 9.15; 19
April 2017 (WT/DSB/M/396), paras. 6.1 – 6.13; 22 May 2017 (WT/DSB/M/397), paras. 10.1 –
10.5 and 11.22; 19 June 2017 (WT/DSB/M/398); paras. 8.1 – 8.6 and 9.1 – 9.33; and 20 July
2017 (WT/DSB/M/399), paras. 4.1 – 4.4 and 5.1 – 5.23.
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EU45 and the other by seven South American states under the leadership of
Mexico.46 The EU proposed that the DSB should start two independent ap-
pointment processes for the two vacancies, but that both should start and end
at the same time. By contrast, the South American group proposed only the
start of one selection process, that for the replacement of Ramírez Hernández,
in order to get at least that process going in the absence of a consensus on
starting both. The US was the only member which opposed the EU proposal,
and in turn the EU was the only one which opposed the South American
proposal.47 As to the other member states which made statements on the
issue, while a few expressed a preference for the EU proposal,48 all would have
been willing to go along with either proposal.
At the time, the reasons for the intransigence of both the US and the EU were
difficult to understand, and indeed a number of members said, in DSB mee-
tings between March and July 2017, that they would like to know the reasons
for the delay.49 The stated reasons of the US and the EU did not seem able to
explain the blockage. The US expressed an explicit position on the appoint-
ment process for the first time in the DSB meeting of 22 May 2017. Its rep-
resentative „said that, given the ongoing transition in the United States’ political
leadership and the very recent confirmation of a new US Trade Representative
[Robert Lighthizer was confirmed by the US Senate as US Trade Representative
on 11 May 2017], the United States was not in a position to support the proposed
45 Communication of 11 May 2017 from the EU, Appointment of Appellate Body, Proposal by
the European Union (WT/DSB/W/597), with later revisions of 8 June 2017 (Rev. 1), 7 July
2017 (Rev. 2), 18 August 2017 (Rev. 3), 19 September 2017 (Rev. 4), and 12 October 2017
(Rev. 5).
46 Communication of 8 May 2017 from Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Chile, Guatemala,
Mexico and Peru, Proposal regarding the Appellate Body selection process (WT/DSB/W/
596), with later revisions of 8 June 2017 (Rev. 1), 7 July 2017 (Rev. 2), 18 August 2017
(Rev. 3), 18 September 2017 (Rev. 4), and 12 October 2017 (Rev. 5).
47 Minutes of the DSB meeting of 22 May 2017 (WT/DSB/M/397), paras. 10.3 (statement of
the US on the EU proposal) and 11.3 (statement of the EU on the South American
proposal).
48 Norway, Hong Kong and Switzerland, see minutes of the DSB meeting of 22 May 2017
(WT/DSB/M/397), paras. 11.9, 11.10 and 11.12.
49 See, for instance, statements in the minutes of the DSB meetings of 21 March 2017 (WT/
DSB/M/394), paras. 9.4 (Chile) and 9.13 (India); 19 April 2017 (WT/DSB/M/396), paras. 6.2
(Mexico on behalf of itself and Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Chile, Guatemala, and Peru)
and 6.7 (India); 22 May 2017 (WT/DSB/M/397), paras. 11.5 (India) and 11.14 (Chinese
Taipei); 19 June 2017 (WT/DSB/M/398), para. 9.18 (India); and 20 July 2017 (WT/DSB/M/
399), paras. 5.11 (Ecuador) and 5.18 (Venezuela).
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decision to launch a process to fill a position on the Appellate Body that would
only become vacant in December 2017. Nevertheless, the United States was willing
to join a consensus for the DSB to take the decision proposed by Argentina, Brazil,
Colombia, Chile, Guatemala, Mexico, and Peru.“50 It repeated this position more
or less verbatim in the subsequent two DSB meetings of June and July 2017.51
The mere fact that top officials had only recently entered office did not seem a
particularly plausible reason not even to start the appointment process, and
the argument became even less plausible with the passage of time.
The EU’s position appeared to be, if anything, even less explicable. In the DSB
meeting of 20 February 2017, the EU gave two reasons for choosing a single
process,52 namely, first, that it followed past practice because for the ap-
pointments of Ramírez Hernández and Van den Bossche in 2009 a single
process had also been used,53 and, second, that a single process was more
efficient. It referred to or repeated these reasons in all subsequent DSB
meetings between March and July 2017.54 In the DSB meetings of May, June
and July 2017, the EU added that it failed to see why one process should be
singled out. While these were perfectly good reasons for starting both proc-
esses rather than just one, they do not explain why, in the face of the US
opposition to starting both processes, the EU should prefer starting no process
at all to starting at least one process.
With hindsight, the US blockage of the Van den Bossche replacement process
was just a precursor of its complete blockage of the appointment process from
August 2017 onwards. From today’s perspective, it might be more surprising
that the US at the time consented at least to the launch of the process to
replace Ramírez Hernández than that it blocked the process to replace Van
den Bossche. As to the motives for the EU’s blockage of the process to replace
Ramírez Hernández, one can only speculate. Maybe the EU feared or had
indications that the US planed to delay the replacement of Van den Bossche
50 Minutes of the DSB meeting of 22 May 2017 (WT/DSB/M/397), para. 10.3.
51 See minutes of the DSB meetings of 19 June 2017 (WT/DSB/M/398), para. 8.3, and 20 July
2017 (WT/DSB/M/399), para. 4.3.
52 See minutes of the DSB meeting of 20 February 2017 (WT/DSB/M/392), para. 11.3.
53 See on that appointment process the minutes of the DSB meeting of 22 December 2008
(WT/DSB/M/261), paras. 74 – 77.
54 See minutes of the DSB meetings of 21 March 2017 (WT/DSB/M/394), para. 9.3; 19 April
2017 (WT/DSB/M/396), para. 6.3; 22 May 2017 (WT/DSB/M/397), paras. 10.2 and 11.3; 19
June 2017 (WT/DSB/M/398), paras. 8.2 and 9.3; and 20 July 2017 (WT/DSB/M/399), paras.
4.2 and 5. 3.
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for an indefinite period, given the widely diverging views of the EU and the US
on the role of the Appellate Body, and that it hoped that by linking the two
appointment processes the pressure of the other member states on the US to
end its resistance would increase.
B. SINCE AUGUST 2017: US BLOCKAGE OF ALL
APPOINTMENTS
On 1 August 2017, Appellate Body member Hyun Chong Kim unexpectedly
tendered his resignation55 because he had been nominated as, and was shortly
afterwards appointed as, Korean trade minister.56 He resigned with immediate
effect, i.e., as of 1 August 2017, despite the fact that Art. 14(2) of the Appellate
Body Working Procedures requires that such a resignation should take effect
only 90 days after the notification unless the DSB decides otherwise, which
would allow a resigning member to finish any appeal he or she might be still
serving on within the 90-day period of Art. 17.5 of the DSU. With the term of
Ramírez Hernández having ended on 30 June 2017, there were now two
vacancies on the Appellate Body, with a third, that of Van den Bossche, to
follow only four months later.
In that situation, the US pointed out at the DSB meeting of 31 August 2017 that
Kim and Ramírez Hernández were sitting on the division of the pending
appeal EU – Fatty Alcohols (Indonesia), and that Ramírez Hernández served on
the divisions of two further pending appeals, EC and certain member States –
Large Civil Aircraft (Article 21.5 – US) and Indonesia – Import Licensing Re-
gimes.57 The participation of Ramírez Hernández in these pending appeals was
55 Communication of 1 August 2017 from Appellate Body member Hyun Chong Kim to the
chair of the Appellate Body (WT/DSB/73).
56 See WTO, Appellate Body member Hyun Chong Kim resigns, 1 August 2017 (https://
www.wto.org/english/news_e/news17_e/ab_01aug17_e.htm); for further background, see
Reuters, South Korea names new trade minister amid U.S. push to amend FTA, 30 July
2017 (https://www.reuters.com/article/us-southkorea-usa-trade-idUSKBN1AF091); Center
for Strategic & International Studies, Impact Player: trade Minister Kim Hyun-chong, 4
August 2017 (https://www.csis.org/analysis/impact-player-trade-minister-kim-hyun-
chong).
57 See minutes of the DSB meeting of 31 August 2017 (WT/DSB/M/400), paras. 5.3 – 5.5.
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based on Rule 15 of the Appellate Body’s Working Procedures,58 which states
that „[a] person who ceases to be a Member of the Appellate Body may, with the
authorization of the Appellate Body and upon notification to the DSB, complete
the disposition of any appeal to which that person was assigned while a Member,
and that person shall, for that purpose only, be deemed to continue to be a
Member of the Appellate Body.“ The Working Procedures had been drawn up
by the Appellate Body, in accordance with Art. 17.9 of the DSU. The US now
argued that under Art. 17.2 of the DSU, which gives the DSB the power to
appoint Appellate Body members, it was the sole authority of the DSB, and not
the Appellate Body, to decide whether someone whose term had expired
should continue to serve on appeals. It then stated that it would not consent to
the start of any appointment processes before the DSB had not addressed the
issue of continued service of former Appellate Body members without DSB
authorization.59
For the next nine months, from the DSB meeting of 29 September 2017 to that
of 28 May 2018, the US invoked the Rule 15 issue as the sole reason for blocking
the appointment process.60 This blockage meant that after the expiration of
Van den Bossche’s term on 11 December 2017, the number of vacancies on the
Appellate Body had risen to three. The US further stoked the conflict by
claiming that any Appellate Body report which had been issued by a division
on which a former Appellate Body member had served based on Rule 15 was
not an Appellate Body report at all, and therefore its adoption was not subject
to the negative consensus rule of Art. 17.4 of the DSU, but rather the positive
consensus rule of Art. 2.4 of the DSU,61 thus striking at one of the core inno-
58 See Appellate Body reports EU – Fatty Alcohols (Indonesia), para. 1.15; EC and certain
member States – Large Civil Aircraft (Article 21.5 – US), para. 1.35; and Indonesia – Import
Licensing Regimes, para. 1.17.
59 See minutes of the DSB meeting of 31 August 2017 (WT/DSB/M/400), paras. 7.3 and 7.11.
60 See minutes of the DSB meetings of 29 September 2017 (WT/DSB/M/402), paras. 6.2 and
8.6; 23 October 2017 (WT/DSB/M/403), para. 8.6; 22 November 2017 (WT/DSB/M/404),
para. 7.6; 22 January 2018 (WT/DSB/M/407), para. 8.7; 28 February 2018 (WT/DSB/M/409),
paras. 7.4 – 7.8 and 7.33; 27 March 2018 (WT/DSB/M/410), paras. 9.4 – 9.6; 27 April 2018
(WT/DSB/M/413), para. 9.3; and 28 May 2018 (WT/DSB/M/413), paras. 11.4 – 11.6.
61 See the minutes of the following DSB meetings: 29 September 2017 (WT/DSB/M/402),
para. 5.11 concerning EU – Fatty Alcohols (Indonesia) (Ramírez Hernández serving based
on Rule 15; Kim serving after resignation on 1 August 2017); 22 November 2017 (WT/DSB/
M/404), paras. 5.6 and 5.7 concerning Indonesia – Import Licensing Regimes (Ramírez
Hernández serving based on Rule 15); and 28 May 2018 (WT/DSB/M/413), para. 8.4
concerning EC and certain member States – Large Civil Aircraft (Article 21.5 – US) (Ramírez
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vations of the DSU compared to the earlier GATT dispute settlement system,
the removal of the power to veto the adoption of dispute settlement reports.
Even assuming, for argument’s sake, that the US was right to claim that the
Appellate Body did not have the power under the DSU to adopt and apply
Rule 15, it was never very plausible that this issue was the only or even the
main reason of the US for its open-ended blockage and thus, as the former
Appellate Body member Ramírez Hernández put it in his farewell speech of 28
May 2018, the threat to let the Appellate Body „die through asphyxiation“.62 To
begin with, even the US did not criticize the substance of Rule 15, but only the
fact that it had been adopted by the Appellate Body rather than the DSB. As
the US had stated in the August 2017 DSB meeting, in which it had first made
the Rule 15 argument, „it appreciated that the approach of Rule 15 could con-
tribute to efficient completion of appeals. As a party in two pending appeals, the
United States said that it would welcome Mr. Ramírez’s continued service on the
appeals to which he had been assigned as of 30 June 2017.“63 Moreover, blocking
appointments only aggravated the asserted problem, namely that persons
were serving on the Appellate Body without authorization of the DSB because
with fewer Appellate Body members each Appellate Body member has to
work on more appeals, meaning, first, that appeals will take longer, and thus
former Appellate Body members working on such appeals based on Rule 15
would have to stay on for longer, and second, that at the end of his or her term
Hernández and Van den Bossche serving based on Rule 15) and paras. 10.8, 10.9 and 10.17
concerning EC – PET (Pakistan) (Van den Bossche serving based on Rule 15). In the DSB
meeting of 22 June 2018, the US added that issuance of an Appellate Body report beyond
the 90-day deadline of Art. 17.5 of the DSU would also make such a report subject to the
positive consensus rule of Art. 2.4 of the DSU rather than the negative consensus rule of
Art. 17.14 of the DSU (minutes [WT/DSB/M/414], para. 5.21; see also infra, fn. 184 and
accompanying text). See further the following DSB meetings: 11 January 2019 (WT/DSB/
M/424), para. 3.19 concerning US – Tuna II (Article 21.5 – US) (report issued beyond the
90-day deadline of Art. 17.5 of the DSU); 11 April 2019 (WT/DSB/M/427), para. 4.4 con-
cerning US – Large Civil Aircraft (2nd complaint) (Article 21.5 – EU) (Servansing and Van
den Bossche serving based on Rule 15; report issued beyond the deadline of Art. 17.5 of the
DSU); and 15 August 2019, statement of the US (https://geneva.usmission.gov/2019/08/16/
statements-by-the-united-states-at-the-august-15-2019-dsb-meeting), pp. 27 – 28, concer-
ning US – Countervailing Measures (China) (Article 21.5 – China) (Servansing serving based
on Rule 15; report issued beyond the 90-day deadline of Art. 17.5 of the DSU).
62 Ramírez Hernández (2019), p. 120.
63 Minutes of the DSB meeting of 31 August 2017 (WT/DSB/M/400), para. 5.5; this view was
repeated by the US at the DSB meetings of 29 September 2017 (see minutes [WT/DSB/M/
402], para. 6.2) and 23 October 2017 (see minutes [WT/DSB/M/403], para. 8.6).
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an Appellate Body member is likely to be sitting on more running appeals and
thus Rule 15 will apply in more cases.64 Finally, and most importantly, if only
the lack of DSB authorization and not the continued service as such was the
problem, this problem could have been easily resolved, either by an ad-hoc
authorization by the DSB in each specific instance, or, preferably, by an
amendment of the DSU. Such an amendment could have been adopted by the
General Council,65 which meets several times each year.66 However, the US
never made any specific proposals for either an ad-hoc authorization or a DSU
amendment,67 nor did it offer any other suggestion on how the DSB should
address the alleged problem. Also, when one member state, Honduras, in July
2018 finally outlined specific ideas on how to address the Rule 15 issue and
submitted them to the DSB,68 the US never engaged with them substantively,
basically ignoring them.69
With its argument that the Rule 15 issue justified the blocking of any further
appointments to the Appellate Body the US stood alone in the DSB. After the
DSB meeting of 31 August 2017, the South American states revised their pro-
posal to include not only the replacement of Ramírez Hernández, but, like the
EU proposal, also those of Kim and Van den Bossche. Since there were no
longer any substantive differences between the EU and the South American
proposals, these proposals were replaced in November 2017 by a common
64 Similar arguments were made by Japan, Canada and Australia in the DSB meeting of 31
August 2017 (see minutes [WT/DSB/M/400], paras. 5.11, 7.5 and 7.7) and by China in the
DSB meeting of 29 September 2017 (see minutes [WT/DSB/M/402], para. 6.10); see also
communication from the Appellate Body of 27 November 2017, Background note on Rule
15 of the Working Procedures for Appellate Body Review (published in the Appellate
Body Annual Report 2017 of February 2018 [WT/AB/28], pp. 74 – 75), paras. 6 – 7.
65 Art. X:8 in conjunction with Art. IV:2 of the WTO Agreement.
66 In the relevant time period from August 2017 to May 2018, the General Council met four
times, on 26 October and 30 November 2017 as well as 7 March and 8 May 2018.
67 Twice, in the DSB meetings of October and November 2017, the US suggested that the
DSB should „adopt an appropriate decision“ to enable the continued service of Hernández
Ramírez after the expiration of his term (minutes of the DSB meetings of 23 October 2017
[WT/DSB/M/403], para. 8.6, and 22 November 2017 [WT/DSB/M/404], para. 7.6), but it
made no concrete proposals and did not repeat this suggestion after November 2017.
68 Communication of 20 July 2018 from Honduras, Fostering a Discussion on the Functio-
ning of the Appellate Body (JOB/DSB/2); the communication was tabled and discussed at
the DSB meetings of 20 July 2018 (minutes [WT/DSB/M/415], paras. 8.1 – 8.6) and 26
September 2018 (minutes of meeting [WT/DSB/M/419], paras. 10.1 – 10.28).
69 See minutes of the DSB meetings of 20 July 2018 (WT/DSB/M/415), para. 8.2, and 26
September 2018 (WT/DSB/M/419), paras. 10.18 and 10.25.
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proposal for the filling of all three vacancies, submitted by the EU, the seven
South American states and 15 other proponents.70 With further revisions of this
common proposal the number of its official proponents grew until June 2018
to 66 members, including, among others, the EU states, China, Brazil, Russia,
India, Canada and Korea.71 Only the US opposed these proposals. In the DSB
meetings between August 2017 and June 2018, in which these proposals were
discussed, altogether 40 delegations, some of them on behalf of larger groups,
made statements on the appointment crisis, and all called for an immediate
start of the appointment process.72 A significant number explicitly rejected the
link made by the US between the Rule 15 issue and the appointment process.
While many expressed a willingness to engage in a discussion of the Rule 15
issue, almost no one acknowledged it as a problem in itself, let alone a pro-
blem of such magnitude that it could call into question the further existence of
the Appellate Body. Finally, various members complained that the US did not
make any specific demands or proposals on how to resolve the alleged Rule 15
problem and thus to unblock the appointment process.73
To understand the true motives of the US for the blockage of the appoint-
ments, one had to rely on US statements made outside the DSB. Focusing on
official statements, we will briefly look at the statement of United States Trade
70 Communication of 9 November 2017 from 23 delegations, Appellate Body Appointments
(WT/DSB/W/609).
71 Revision 1 of 11 January 2018, revision 2 of 15 February 2018, revision 3 of 16 April 2018 and
revision 4 of 17 May 2018; 66 includes the EU counting as 28.
72 See minutes of the DSB meetings of 31 August 2017 (WT/DSB/M/400), paras. 5.1 – 5.21 and
7.1 – 7.17; 29 September 2017 (WT/DSB/M/400), paras. 6.1 – 6.11 and 8.1 – 8.29; 23 October
2017 (WT/DSB/M/400), paras. 8.1 – 8.38; 22 November 2017 (WT/DSB/M/400), paras. 7.1 –
7.33; 22 January 2018 (WT/DSB/M/400), paras. 8.1 – 8.25; 28 February 2018 (WT/DSB/M/
400), paras. 7.1 – 7.35; 27 March 2018 (WT/DSB/M/400), paras. 9.1 – 9.32; 27 April 2018
(WT/DSB/M/400), paras. 9.1 – 9.33; 28 May 2018 (WT/DSB/M/400), paras. 11.1 – 1.34; and
22 June 2018 (WT/DSB/M/400), paras. 9.1 – 9.29.
73 As to such complaints, see minutes of the DSB meetings of 29 September 2017 (WT/DSB/
M/400), paras. 6.3 (Canada), and 6.5 (Dominican Republic); 23 October 2017 (WT/DSB/M/
400), paras. 8.22 (China), and 8.23 (Korea); 22 November 2017 (WT/DSB/M/400), paras.
7.17 (Brazil); 22 January 2018 (WT/DSB/M/400), paras. 8.5 (China), 8.10 – 8.11 (Brazil), and
8.23 (EU); 28 February 2018 (WT/DSB/M/400), paras. 7.14 (Brazil), 7.22 (China), 7.26
(Kazakhstan), and 7.35 (chairman); 27 March 2018 (WT/DSB/M/400), paras. 9.15 (Indo-
nesia), 9.17 (China); 27 April 2018 (WT/DSB/M/400), paras. 9.8 (Russia), 9.11 (Thailand),
9.20 (Panama), 9.26 (China), and 9.30 (Guatemala); 28 May 2018 (WT/DSB/M/400), paras.
11.7 (Canada), 11.16 (Russia), 11.19 (Brazil), 11.23 (China), 11.28 (Guatemala), and 11.30
(Turkey); and 22 June 2018 (WT/DSB/M/400), paras. 9.18 (Hong Kong), and 9.23 (China).
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Representative (USTR) Robert Lighthizer on 11 December 2017 at the 11th
biannual Ministerial Conference in Buenos Aires, the President’s 2018 Trade
Policy Agenda of 1 March 2018, prepared by the Office of the USTR, and, finally,
the statement of Deputy USTR Dennis Shea at the General Council meeting of
8 May 2018.
In his brief opening plenary statement on 11 December 2017 at the 11th Mi-
nisterial Conference in Buenos Aires, USTR Lighthizer identified four challen-
ges facing the WTO. The first he mentioned was dispute settlement: „[M]any
are concerned that the WTO is losing its essential focus on negotiation and
becoming a litigation-centered organization. Too often members seem to believe
they can gain concessions through lawsuits that they could never get at the
negotiating table. We have to ask ourselves whether this is good for the institution
and whether the current litigation structure makes sense.“74
Lighthizer’s concern with concessions gained through litigation rather than
negotiation, or, in other words, lawmaking by the WTO dispute settlement
institutions, was spelt out at some length in the President’s 2018 Trade Policy
Agenda of March 2018, under the heading „U.S. Concerns with WTO Dispute
Settlement.“75 It stated that „[i]t has been the longstanding position of the United
States that panels and the Appellate Body are required to apply the rules of the
WTO agreements in a manner that adheres strictly to the text of those agree-
ments, as negotiated and agreed by its Members. Over time, U.S. concerns have
increasingly focused on the Appellate Body’s disregard for the rules as set by
WTO Members. Successive Administrations and the Congress have voiced those
concerns, and the United States called for WTO adjudicators to follow their role
as laid out in the DSU. But the problem has been growing worse, and not bet-
ter.“76 The Agenda identified „disregard for the rule as set by WTO Members“
concerning, first, substantive law, and, second, procedural questions and in-
terpretative approaches, i.e., rules governing dispute settlement itself. Con-
cerning substantive law, the Agenda mentioned trade remedies (anti-dumping
duties, countervailing duties and safeguards), subsidies and the interpretation
of the non-discrimination principle under the TBT Agreement.77 Procedural
74 WT/MIN(17)/ST/128, p. 1.
75 Office of the United States Trade Representative, The President’s 2018 Trade Policy
Agenda, March 2018, pp. 22 – 29.
76 The President’s 2018 Trade Policy Agenda (supra, fn. 75), p. 24.
77 The President’s 2018 Trade Policy Agenda (supra, fn. 75), pp. 23 – 24. The following
Appellate Body reports were referred to, directly or indirectly: US – Offset Act (Byrd
III. Chronology of the crisis
22
questions and interpretative approaches were addressed in more detail. More
specifically, six distinct issues were discussed:78 (1) disregard for the 90-day
deadline for appeals (Art. 17.5 of the DSU); (2) continued service by persons
who are no longer Appellate Body members (i.e., the Rule 15 issue); (3) issuing
advisory opinions on issues not necessary to resolve a dispute; (4) appellate
review of facts; (5) appellate review of a member’s municipal law;79 and (6)
treatment of Appellate Body reports as precedents.
Finally, at the General Council meeting of 8 May 2018, China had placed the
appointment process on the agenda, and urged the US, supported by many
other member states, to end its blockage.80 In response, the representative of
the US, Deputy USTR Shea, did not focus narrowly on the Rule 15 issue, but
rather echoed the broad allegations made in the 2018 Trade Policy Agenda
when he said, for instance, that „something had gone terribly wrong in the
system when those charged with adjudicating the rules were so consistently
disregarding those very rules. … [T]he Appellate Body had not only rewritten
Members’ agreements to impose new substantive rules they had never negotiated
or agreed upon but had also been ignoring or rewriting the rules governing the
dispute settlement system – expanding its own capacity to write and impose new
rules.“81
The fact that the Rule 15 issue was not the sole or even main reason for the US
blockage of the appointment process, contrary to the US statements in the
DSB meetings between September 2017 and May 2018, was at long last also
acknowledged by the US in the DSB meetings itself, starting with the meetings
of 22 June and 20 July 2018, in which the US referred to the Rule 15 issue only as
an example of its broader „systemic concerns“,82 without, though, explaining
Amendment) and US – Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties (China) (on anti-dumping
and countervailing duties); US – Lamb and US – Line Pipe (on safeguards); US – FSC (on
subsidies); and US – Tuna II (Mexico) and US – COOL (on the TBT Agreement).
78 The President’s 2018 Trade Policy Agenda (supra, fn. 75), pp. 24 – 29.
79 In the Agenda as well as in subsequent discussions before the DSB the US usually treated
appellate review of facts and appellate review of municipal law together. However,
although these two issues are related, they present quite different legal questions (see for
more details infra, Section IV.B.4), and are therefore counted here as two separate issues.
80 See minutes of the General Council meeting of 8 May 2018 (WT/GC/M/172), paras. 4.1 –
4.86.
81 See minutes of the General Council meeting of 8 May 2018 (WT/GC/M/172), para. 4.90.
82 See minutes of the DSB meetings of 22 June 2018 (WT/DSB/M/414), para. 9.3, and 20 July
2018 (WT/DSB/M/415), para. 6.3. As a matter of fact, the US had already once before
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what these „systemic concerns“ were. The explanation followed in the DSB
meeting of 27 August 2018. In that meeting, the chair of the DSB had tabled the
reappointment of Appellate Body member Shree Baboo Chekitan Servansing,
whose first term ended on 30 September 2018, and who had indicated his
willingness to serve for a second term.83 The US opposed his reappointment
and referred for its reasons to the President’s 2018 Trade Policy Agenda. It
summarized the concerns listed in the Agenda, namely that, in the area of
substantive law, „appellate reports have gone far beyond the text setting out
WTO rules“, particular concerning trade remedies, subsidies and the TBT
agreement and, on questions of procedure and interpretative approach, the six
distinct issues including, but not limited to, Rule 15.84 From the DSB meeting of
29 October 2018 onwards, the US repeated these broad allegations as reasons
for its continued blockage.85 Moreover, it made extended separate statements,
each running to several pages in the minutes of the DSB meetings, on the five
procedural and interpretative concerns it had identified in addition to the
Rule 15 issue, namely disregard for the 90-day deadline for appeals (DSB
meeting of 22 June 2018),86 appellate review of facts and of municipal law (27
August 2018),87 issuance of advisory opinions (29 October 2018),88 and treating
Appellate Body reports as precedents (18 December 2018).89
Going beyond Rule 15 and adding broader concerns made the discussion more
forthright, but did not lessen the support of the other members for an im-
mediate launch of the appointment process for the now four vacancies. To the
contrary, the number of members formally sponsoring the common proposal
described the Rule 15 issue in the DSB as merely an example of broader (but unspecified)
concerns, namely in the DSB meeting of 31 August 2017, when it had first raised that issue
(see para. 7.11 of the minutes of that meeting [WT/DSB/M/400]), but, as explained, had
afterwards relied on the Rule 15 issue only.
83 See minutes of the DSB meeting of 27 August 2018 (WT/DSB/M/417), par. 12.1.
84 Minutes of the DSB meeting of 27 August 2018 (WT/DSB/M/417), par. 12.2.
85 See minutes of the DSB meetings of 29 October 2018 (WT/DSB/M/420), paras. 20.5 and
20.28; 21 November 2018 (WT/DSB/M/421), para. 21.4; 18 December 2018 (WT/DSB/M/423),
para. 9.4; 28 January 2019 (WT/DSB/M/425), para. 7.5; 25 February 2019 (WT/DSB/M/426),
paras. 5.6 and 5.25; 26 April 2019 (WT/DSB/M/428), para. 11.3; 28 May 2019 (WT/DSB/M/
429), para. 8.3; and 24 June 2019 (WT/DSB/M/430), para. 8.4.
86 Minutes of the DSB meeting of 22 June 2018 (WT/DSB/M/414), paras. 5.2 – 5.22.
87 Minutes of the DSB meeting of 27 August 2018 (WT/DSB/M/417), paras. 4.2 – 4.17.
88 Minutes of the DSB meeting of 29 October 2018 (WT/DSB/M/423), paras. 4.2 – 4.19.
89 Minutes of the DSB meeting of 18 December 2018 (WT/DSB/M/414), paras. 4.2 – 4.25.
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to start the appointment process rose from 66 in June 2018,90 just before the US
had begun its broad attack against the Appellate Body, to 114 in its latest re-
vision of August 2019,91 and not one member joined the US blockage. At the
same time, some members developed proposals to address the US concerns
with the aim of unblocking the appointment process. Apart from the already
mentioned suggestions of Honduras in July 2018 on the Rule 15 issue, the
European Commission and Canada each issued papers on WTO reform in
September 2018, including reforms of the dispute settlement system.92 In
November 2018, three different proposals addressed to the General Council
followed, one from 11 delegations, among them the EU, China, India and
Canada, on DSU amendments regarding the US concerns on procedural
questions and interpretative approaches,93 another one from the EU, China
and India on DSU amendments aimed at strengthening the Appellate Body,94
and a final one from Australia and Singapore regarding the initiation of a
solution-focused process of discussions on dispute settlement issues.95 How-
ever, at the General Council meeting of 12 December 2018, the US rejected all
proposals on DSU amendments outright as insufficient, without engaging with
them substantively, and without offering any alternative proposals, either on
substance or on how to proceed with further discussions.96
90 See supra, fn. 71 and accompanying text.
91 WT/DSB/W/609/Rev.13 (communication of 2 August 2019 from 87 delegations on Ap-
pellate Body appointments); 114 includes the EU counting as 28.
92 European Commission, Concept paper on WTO modernisation, 18 September 2018 (see in
particular pp. 13 – 17 on „proposals on dispute settlement“); communication of 21 Sep-
tember 2018 from Canada, Strengthening and modernizing the WTO: Discussion paper
(JOB/GC/201), in particular pp. 3 – 4 on „Safeguarding and strengthening the dispute
settlement system“.
93 Communication of 23 November 2018 from the EU China, Canada, India, Norway, New
Zealand, Switzerland, Australia, South Korea, Iceland, Singapore and Mexico to the Ge-
neral Council (WT/GC/W/752) (with revisions of 7 and 10 December 2018 Costa Rica and
Montenegro, respectively, were added as co-sponsors).
94 Communication of 23 November 2018 from the EU, China, and India to the General
Council (WT/GC/753) (with revision of 10 December 2018 Costa Rica was added as co-
sponsor).
95 Communication of 29 November 2018 from Australia and Singapore to the General
Council, Adjudicative bodies: Adding to or diminishing rights or obligations under the
WTO Agreement (WT/CG/W/754) (with revisions of 1 and 11 December 2018 first Costa
Rica and then Canada and Switzerland were added as co-sponsors).
96 See minutes of the General Council meeting of 12 December 2018 (WT/GC/M/175), paras.
6.159 – 6.172; see further on the response of the US at this meeting infra, Section V.B,
fn. 496 and accompanying text.
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In an attempt to find a way out of the impasse, the chair of the General
Council launched an „informal process on Appellate Body matters“ in January
2019 and appointed a facilitator, New Zealand’s WTO ambassador David
Walker, to coordinate the discussions.97 Ambassador Walker reported regul-
arly on the results of these discussions to the General Council.98 As part of this
informal process a number of further proposals were tabled by various
members on ways to address the concerns of the US and to overcome the
blockage.99 However, none of these efforts moved the US in any way toward
giving up its resistance against new appointments. Moreover, apart from re-
peating its accusations against the Appellate Body and vaguely calling for
members „to engage in a deeper discussion of why the Appellate Body has felt
free to depart from what Members agreed to“,100 it also continued to refuse to
offer any proposals of its own. Therefore, unless something quite unexpected
happens, one has to assume that the US will not end its blockage for the time
being, which means that in December 2019, when the terms of two of the three
97 WTO, General Council Chair appoints facilitator to address disagreement on Appellate
Body, 18 January 2019 (https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news19_e/gc_18jan19_e.htm).
98 First report of 28 February 2019 (JOB/GC/2015), discussed at the General Council Meeting
of 28 February 2019 (minutes [WT/GC/M/176], paras. 4.1 – 4.151); second report of 7 May
2019 (JOB/GC/217), discussed at the General Council meeting of 7 May 2019 (minutes
[WT/GC/M/177], paras. 4.1 – 4.161); and third report of 23 July 2019 (JOB/GC/220), dis-
cussed at the General Council meeting of 23 July 2019.
99 Several proposals from Honduras on the 90-day deadline of Art. 17.5 of the DSU (com-
munication of 18 January 2019 [WT/GC/W/758]), Rule 15 (communication of 18 January
2019 [WT/GC/W/759]), alleged judicial activism (communication of 28 January 2019 [WT/
GC/W/760]), and precedent (communication of 1 February 2019 [WT/GC/W/761]);
communication of 12 February 2019 from Taiwan, Guideline development discussion
(WT/GC/W/763) (revised on 5 April 2019); communication of 28 March 2019 from Brazil,
Guidelines for the work of the panels and the Appellate Body (WT/GC/W/767) (revised
on 25 April 2019); communication of 17 April 2019 from Japan and Australia, Informal
process on matters related to the functioning of the Appellate Body (WT/GC/W/768)
(revised on 25 April 2019); communication of 25 April 2019 from Thailand, General
Council decision on the dispute settlement system of the DSU (WT/GC/W/769); and
communication of 25 June 2019 from the African Group, Appellate Body Impasse (WT/
GC/W/776).
100 Statement of the US at the General Council meeting of 23 July 2019 (https://geneva.us-
mission.gov/2019/07/23/statements-delivered-by-ambassador-dennis-shea-wto-general-
council-meeting-july-23-2019); almost identical statements were made by the US at the
earlier meetings of the General Council of 12 December 2018 (minutes [WT/GC/175], para.
6.169]), the DSB of 25 February 2019 (WT/DB/M/426), para. 5.25, and the General Council
of 7 May 2019 (minutes [WT/GC/M/177], para. 4.156]).
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remaining Appellate Body members, Ujal Singh Bhatia and Thomas R. Gra-
ham, end, the Appellate Body will cease to be able to hear new appeals.
Recognizing this, members have begun to plan for a time without a functio-
ning Appellate Body. For instance, in July 2019 the EU and Canada announced
their intention that, in the absence of a functioning Appellate Body, they
would, in disputes between them, as a temporary measure, „resort to arbi-
tration under Article 25 of the DSU as an interim appeal arbitration procedure“,
which should „replicate as closely as possible all substantive and procedural
aspects as well as the practice of Appellate Review pursuant to Article 17 of the
DSU“.101 Other members have agreed regarding pending disputes that they will
not appeal panel reports if the Appellate Body does not have at least three
members at the time of the circulation of such reports.102
101 Communication of 25 July 2019 from Canada and the EU, Interim appeal arbitration
pursuant to Article 25 of the DSU (JOB/DSB/1/Add.11), paras. 1 and 2. On 4 September 2019
the European Commission adopted a decision enabling it to enter into similar agree-
ments with other countries (https://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=2059).
For early proposals of using arbitration under Art. 25 of the DSU as a temporary means to
sidestep the blocking of appointments, see Anderson et al. (2017) and Hillebrand Pohl
(2017) (further developed in Hillebrand Pohl [2019]).
102 Communication of 22 March 2019 from Indonesia and Viet Nam, Indonesia – Safeguard
on Certain Iron or Steel Products, Understanding between Indonesia and Viet Nam re-
garding procedures under Articles 21 and 22 of the DSU (WT/DS496/14), para. 7; com-
munication of 11 April 2019 from Indonesia and Chinese Taipei, Indonesia – Safeguard on
Certain Iron or Steel Products, Understanding between Indonesia and Viet Nam regarding
procedures under Articles 21 and 22 of the DSU (WT/DS490/13), para. 7.
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IV. Analysis of the reasons
stated by the US for the
blockage
A. OVERVIEW
In the following, we will analyze the six issues the US has presented as the
prime examples of judicial overreach by the Appellate Body in the area of
procedure and of interpretative approach, namely Rule 15, the 90-day deadline
of Art. 17.5 of the DSU, appellate review of facts and of municipal law, advisory
opinions and the role of precedent. By contrast, we will not address the
corresponding US allegations in the area of substantive law, in particular trade
remedies, subsidies, and the TBT Agreement because, first, this would go far
beyond the scope of the present study, and, second, the focus of the US in its
justification of its blockage in the DSB has been on the procedural and in-
terpretative issues. Whereas the US has put forward in the DSB since the start
of the appointment crisis detailed arguments on all six procedural and in-
terpretative points, it has mentioned its substantive law reasons for the blo-
ckage only in passing, without providing any details. Further information on
US criticism of the Appellate Body on substantive law can be found elsewhere,
for instance in DSB meetings in which Appellate Body reports with which the
US disagreed were adopted,103 but not in DSB discussions in the context of the
appointment crisis. One can only speculate about why the US chose to stress
the procedural and interpretative rather than the substantive law issues. This
103 See for examples the President’s 2018 Trade Agenda 2018 (supra, fn. 75), pp. 23 – 24; see
for more recent examples statements of the US at the DSB meetings of 10 April 2019, on
the Appellate Body report in US – Tuna II (Mexico) (Article 21.5 – US) / US – Tuna II
(Mexico) (Article 21.5 – Mexico II) (minutes [WT/DSB/M/424], paras. 3.2 – 3.15); and 15
August 2019, on the Appellate Body report in US – Countervailing Measures (China)
(Article 21.5 – China) (https://geneva.usmission.gov/2019/08/16/statements-by-the-united-
states-at-the-august-15-2019-dsb-meeting, pp. 12 – 29).
choice might be puzzling because policy-wise Appellate Body reports flouting
WTO rules concerning substantive law would seem to be more important to
the US, given the US claim that these „reports … restrict the ability of the United
States to regulate in the public interest or protect U.S. workers and businesses
against unfair trading practices.“104 A possible reason might be that the Ap-
pellate Body’s decisions on substantive law that are characterized by the US as
overreach are typically cases which the US lost, while the procedural and
interpretive issues affect cases across the board, some with the US on the
losing and some with the US on the winning side, and some even without US
participation. Therefore, it is more difficult to disregard US criticism of these
latter type of issues as simply self-interested and result-driven („sore loser“).
The purpose of the subsequent analysis is, first, to determine with regard to
each of the six issues mentioned above whether the Appellate Body breached
WTO law, and in particular the DSU, and, second, to the extent that such
breaches can be found, whether any such breach individually or all breaches
taken together can justify blocking all appointments to the Appellate Body. As
far as the second purpose is concerned, one has to bear in mind that Art. 17.2 of
the DSU prescribes that „[v]acancies [on the Appellate Body] shall be filled as
they arise.“ In other words, under the DSU member states have a legal obli-
gation to appoint a new Appellate Body member as soon as a position
becomes vacant. Moreover, the DSU provides no exemption from this obli-
gation. Consequently, by blocking all appointments to the Appellate Body the
US clearly violates the DSU. In addition, this violation does not just cause
some procedural inconvenience, but it is already severely hampering the work
of the Appellate Body and, if the blockage continues, will soon bring the
operation of the Appellate Body, and possibly, by extension, the whole dispute
settlement system, to a complete standstill. Although there are no rules on the
kinds of DSU breaches that might justify other DSU breaches, in light of the
obviousness of the breach of Art. 17.2 of the DSU and the severity of its con-
sequences, only clear and serious breaches on the part of the Appellate Body,
and not just debatable interpretations, could possible justify the obstruction
by the US.
Since the evaluation of the US criticism turns to a large extent on the inter-
pretation of the DSU and related provisions of other WTO agreements, a few
104 Minutes of the DSB meeting of 27 August 2018 (WT/DSB/M/417), para. 12.2.
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introductory remarks on the method of interpreting the WTO agreements105
will facilitate the task. On this issue, Art. 3.2 of the DSU states that „[t]he
dispute settlement system of the WTO … serves … to clarify the existing provisions
of those agreements in accordance with customary rules of interpretation of
public international law.“ Regarding the meaning of these „customary rules of
interpretation of public international law“, the Appellate Body explained in its
very first report, in the case US – Gasoline, that the general rule of interpre-
tation of Art. 31(1) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT)
„has attained the status of a rule of customary or general international law. As
such, it forms part of the ,customary rules of interpretation of public interna-
tional law‘ which the Appellate Body has been directed, by Article 3(2) of the DSU,
to apply“ when it interprets the WTO agreements.106 It later extended this
reasoning to all provisions of the VCLT on interpretation, that is, Arts. 31 to
33.107 The general rule of interpretation of Art. 31(1) of the VCLT prescribes that
„[a] treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary
meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of
its object and purpose.“ As one of the founding Appellate Body members,
Claus-Dieter Ehlermann, observed, „[a]mong these three criteria [of Art. 31(1) of
the VCLT], the Appellate Body has certainly attached the greatest weight to the
first, i.e., ,the ordinary meaning of the terms of the treaty‘. … The second criterion,
i.e., ,context‘ has less weight than the first, but is certainly more often used and
relied upon than the third, i.e., ,object and purpose‘.“108 This „highly textual
approach“109 is a distinctive feature of the Appellate Body110 compared with
other international tribunals.111 It has been criticized by some as too forma-
105 See in general on the method applied by the Appellate Body to the interpretation of the
WTO agreements the in-depth study Van Damme (2009).
106 US – Gasoline, p. 16.
107 See the following Appellate Body reports: Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II, p. 104 (extension
to the whole of Art. 31 and to Art. 32 of the VCLT); United States – Softwood Lumber IV,
para. 59 (extension to Art. 33(3) of the VCLT); Chile – Price Band System, para. 271
(application of Art. 33(4) of the VCLT).
108 Ehlermann (2002), pp. 615 – 616.
109 Former Appellate Body member Ganesan (2015), p. 535.
110 There are, however, some who note a trend away from textualism in the more recent
jurisprudence of the Appellate Body; see, e.g., Rubini (2017), p. 311 (criticizing the change),
and Sadurski (2015), pp. 415 – 417 (welcoming the change).
111 See Pauwelyn/Elsig (2013), pp. 449 – 459, for a comparison of the interpretative styles and
methods of different international tribunals, including the Appellate Body.
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listic,112 but has been consistently defended by former and current Appellate
Body members.113
For the purposes of the present analysis it is noteworthy that on a basic level
there is considerable agreement between the US and the Appellate Body on
the interpretative approach. The US accepts that the interpretation of the
WTO agreements is governed by Arts. 31 to 33 of the VCLT,114 which it most
recently confirmed in a DSB meeting of December 2018.115 Moreover, like the
Appellate Body, the US puts particular emphasis on the text as the foremost
interpretive element. For example, when it first announced its blocking of all
appointments to the Appellate Body in August 2018, the US invoked „concerns
that appellate reports have gone far beyond the text setting out WTO rules in
varied areas“.116 And more recently, in May 2019, the US argued in a General
Council meeting, after a brief summary of its overreach allegations, „that the
Appellate Body had been acting contrary to the unambiguous text of the DSU.“117
So the disagreement is less about the basic criteria which should guide the
interpretation of WTO law, but more about the application of these criteria.
112 See, e.g., Bond/Trachtman (2016); Davies (2015), pp. 546 – 547; Magnuson (2010), pp. 124 –
129; Irwin/Weiler (2008), pp. 94 – 95; Diamond (2008); Bhala/Gantz (2006), p. 285; Horn/
Weiler (2005), pp. 251 – 253; Picciotto (2005); and Steinberg (2004), p. 261.
113 See Bhatia (2018), p. 126; Bacchus (2005), pp. 503 – 507, and (2015), pp. 515 – 516; Ganesan
(2015), p. 518, 533 – 537; Matsuhita (2012), pp. 526 – 529.
114 Even though the US has not ratified the VCLT (see for the state of ratification of the VCLT
the United Nations Treaty Collection, https://treaties.un.org/Pages/Home.aspx), and for
that reason had also opposed referring to the VCLT in the DSU; see Kuijper (2018), fn. 20:
„A direct reference to Arts. 31 and 32 could not be agreed during the Uruguay Round, as
France and the US among others had not (and have not) ratified the 1969 Vienna Con-
vention.“
115 See minutes of the DSB meeting of 18 December 2018 (WT/DSB/M/423), statement of the
US, para. 4.5: „And for purposes of understanding the ,existing provisions‘ of the covered
agreements – namely, their text – the DSU directed WTO adjudicators to apply ,customary
rules of interpretation of public international law‘, reflected in Articles 31 to 33 of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties.“
116 Minutes of the DSB meeting of 27 August 2018 (WT/DSB/M/417), para. 12.2.
117 Minutes of the General Council meeting of 7 May 2019 (WT/GC/M/177), para. 4.154.
IV. Analysis of the reasons stated by the US for the blockage
32
B. ISSUES OF PROCEDURE AND INTERPRETIVE APPROACH
1. Rule 15 of the Working Procedures of Appellate Review
As already mentioned above, Rule 15 of the Working Procedures of Appellate 
Review provides that „[a] person who ceases to be a Member of the Appellate 
Body may, with the authorization of the Appellate Body and upon notification to 
the DSB, complete the disposition of any appeal to which that person was as-
signed while a Member, and that person shall, for that purpose only, be deemed 
to continue to be a Member of the Appellate Body.“ The Working Procedures, 
including its Rule 15, are based on Art. 17.9 of the DSU, which states that 
„[w]orking procedures shall be drawn up by the Appellate Body in consultation 
with the Chairman of the DSB and the Director-General, and communicated to 
the Members for their information.“ The first version of these Working Proc-
edures, which contained Rule 15 in its present form, were drawn up by the first 
seven Appellate Body members at the beginning of 1996 and, after consulta-
tions with the chairman of the DSB, the Director-General and various mem-
bers, entered into effect and were communicated to the members on 15 Fe-
bruary 1996.118 Transition rules similar to Rule 15 are followed by other 
international adjudicatory bodies,119 including the International Court of Jus-
tice,120 the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea,121 and the European
118 On the process of drawing up the Working Procedures, see Steger (2015), pp. 450 – 451,
and Ehlermann (2015), pp. 489 – 491; on the reactions of members, see the minutes of the
DSB meeting of 21 February 1996 (WT/DSB/M/11), pp. 9 – 13.
119 Rule 15 might very well have been inspired by the corresponding rules for the Interna-
tional Court of Justice (ICJ) and the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), set out
below (fn. 120 and 122), since the first draft of the Working Procedures had been based on
an analysis of the procedural rules of other international tribunals, which included the
ICJ and the ECtHR; see Steger (2015), p. 451, fn. 13, and infra, fn. 411 and accompanying
text.
120 See Art. 13(3) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice: „The members of the
Court shall continue to discharge their duties until their places have been filled. Though
replaced, they shall finish any cases which they may have begun.“ According to Art. 92 of
the Charter of the United Nations, the Statute forms an integral part of the Charter.
121 See Art. 5(3) of the Statute of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea: „The
members of the Tribunal shall continue to discharge their duties until their places have been
filled. Though replaced, they shall finish any proceedings which they may have begun before
the date of their replacement.“ The Statute is annexed to the United Nations Conventions
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Court of Human Rights.122 Before the appointment crisis of 2017, Rule 15 had
been applied eleven times in altogether nine appeals,123 without any objections
either by the parties to these appellate proceedings or by member states in the
DSB meetings at which the corresponding reports had been adopted. Not at
least due to vacancies caused by the appointment crisis, Rule 15 was more
frequently applied from 2017 onward, e.g., three times to Ramírez Hernández124
and five times to Van den Bossche.125
The US claims that Rule 15 violates Art. 17.2 of the DSU, according to which
„[t]he DSB shall appoint persons to serve on the Appellate Body for a four-year
term, and each person may be reappointed once.“ It argues that since Art. 17.2 of
the DSU gives the DSB the power to appoint and reappoint Appellate Body
members, it is also the DSB who has the „responsibility to decide whether a
person whose term of appointment had expired, should continue serving, as if a
member of the Appellate Body“,126 and, conversely, that „the Appellate Body
simply did not have the authority to deem someone who was not an Appellate
Body member to be a member“.127 To arguments by other members that the
Working Procedures are based on the DSU, namely Art. 17.9 of the DSU, and
that the Rule represents long-standing practice, the US replied that „[n]either
the Appellate Body’s authority to draw up its Working Procedures nor ,practice‘
could amend the DSU.“128
on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), and forms an integral part of the Convention (Art. 318
of the UNCLOS).
122 See Art. 23(3) of the European Convention on Human Rights: „The judges shall hold office
until replaced. They shall, however, continue to deal with such cases as they already have
under consideration.“
123 See https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/ab_members_descrp_e.htm: US – Lead
and Bismuth II (Appellate Body members El-Naggar and Matsushita); US – Section 211
Appropriations Act (Ehlermann and Lacarto-Muro); US – FSC (Article 21.5 – EC) (Felici-
ano); US – Line Pipe (Lacarte-Muro); US – Shrimp (Thailand) / US – Customs Bond
Directive (Ganesan); US – Continued Suspension / Canada – Continued Suspension (Abi-
Saab); Colombia – Textiles (Zhang); India – Solar Cells (Chang); EU – Biodiesel (Argentina)
(Zhang).
124 Supra, fn. 58.
125 Appellate Body reports, EC and certain member States – Large Civil Aircraft (Article 21.5 –
US), para. 1.35; EC – PET (Pakistan), para. 1.19; Indonesia – Iron or Steel Products, para. 1.11;
Brazil – Taxation (Japan), para. 1.22; and US – Large Civil Aircraft (2nd Complaint) (Article
21.5 – EU), para. 1.46.
126 Minutes of the DSB meeting of 31 August 2017 (WT/DSB/M/400), para. 5.5.
127 Minutes of the DSB meeting of 22 January 2018 (WT/DSB/M/407), para. 8.7.
128 Minutes of the DSB meeting of 28 February 2018 (WT/DSB/M/409), para. 7.5.
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On 24 November 2017, the same day it authorized the continued service of Van
den Bossche after the expiry of his term in an unprecedented number of five
appeals,129 the Appellate Body issued a Background Note on Rule 15.130 In that
Note, the Appellate Body explained, among other things, the adoption of the
Rule as part of the Working Procedures in 1996, the unchallenged practice of
the Rule until the US objections in 2017, the fact that other international
adjudicatory bodies follow similar rules, and some of the policy reasons be-
hind the Rule. The US discussed and criticized this Note at some length in the
DSB meetings of 28 February and 27 March 2018.131 It complained, inter alia,
that the Note had not addressed how the Rule related to the DSB’s appoint-
ment power in Art. 17.2 of the DSU, that it had failed to mention that one
member state, India, had criticized Rule 15 as a breach of Art. 17.2 of the DSU in
the DSB meeting of February 1996 in which the Working Procedures had been
discussed right after its adoption, and that transition rules similar to Rule 15 of
other international tribunals were explicitly provided for in the international
treaties which had created these tribunals,132 whereas the founding treaty of
the Appellate Body, the DSU, contained no such rule.
How are the US arguments to be evaluated? The US relies heavily, if not ex-
clusively, on the wording of Art. 17.2 of the DSU, believing, apparently, that this
wording leaves no room for any other interpretation than that it prohibits Rule
15. And, indeed, reading Art. 17.2 of the DSU as prohibiting a practice like that
of Rule 15 seems at least plausible and, if only the wording of this provision is
considered, might even be the best interpretation of this provision. However, it
has to be acknowledged at the same time that the wording of Art. 17.2 of the
DSU does not explicitly address or answer the question whether a transition
rule like Rule 15 is permissible. Art. 17.2 of the DSU states that the DSB should
appoint (or reappoint) persons to serve on the Appellate Body for a four-year
term, which obviously implies that no one else can appoint Appellate Body
members. Rule 15 of the Working Procedures, though, does not purport to give
the Appellate Body the power to appoint Appellate Body members. Rather, it
authorizes the Appellate Body to assign to a former Appellate Body member a
129 Supra, fn. 125.
130 Communication of 24 November 2017 from the Appellate Body, Background Note on Rule
15 of the Working Procedures for Appellate Body Review (JOB/AB/3), published in the
Appellate Body Annual Report 2017 (WT/AB/28), pp. 74 – 75.
131 See minutes of the DSB meetings of 28 February 2018 (WT/DSB/M/409), paras. 7.6 – 7.8,
and 27 March 2018 (WT/DSB/M/410), paras. 9.4 – 9.5.
132 See supra, fn. 120-122.
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limited task of an Appellate Body member, namely completing the work on an
appeal that he or she was assigned during his or her term, and to do so for a
very limited time, that is, usually less than 90 days, given the 90-day deadline
of Art. 17.5 of the DSU for appellate proceedings. From other tasks of an Ap-
pellate Body member, such as taking part in the exchange of views on appeals
to which he or she was not assigned, that former member is excluded.
Moreover, as China has pointed out in the DSB,133 the wording of Rule 15 itself
recognizes that such a person has ceased to be an Appellate Body member,
and is, for the limited purpose of completing the appeal, merely deemed to be
a member. The obvious counterargument to this reading is that even though
Rule 15 does not explicitly speak of appointing, and only allows a very limited
extension of the work an Appellate Body member, the Appellate Body’s aut-
horization under Rule 15 is, for this limited extension, still functionally equi-
valent to an appointment decision.
Interpretation of a provision does not end with its wording, though. As noted
above, Art. 31(1) of the VCLA requires a treaty to be interpreted in good faith in
accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to its terms in their context
and in the light of its object and purpose. An important part of the context of
Art. 17.2 of the DSU is the whole of Art. 17 of the DSU. The first noteworthy
point in this respect is that Art. 17 of the DSU is the only article within the DSU
that deals in any detail with the Appellate Body. In other words, on the level of
the WTO treaties there is only a relative skeletal regulation of the Appellate
Body. This contrasts markedly with other international tribunals, like the
International Court of Justice, whose statute is an integral part of the Charter
of the United Nations134 and runs to 70 articles, and the Court of Justice of the
European Union, whose statute is an integral part of the founding treaties of
the EU135 and contains 64 articles. The second point to note is that according to
Art. 17.9 of the DSU the necessary procedural details which are lacking in the
DSU are to be added not by the WTO membership, but by the Appellate Body
itself, through the adoption of working procedures. Approval of the working
procedures by the members had been considered during the drafting of the
133 Minutes of the DSB meetings of 22 January 2018 (WT/DSB/M/407), para. 8.4, and 28 Fe-
bruary 2018 (WT/DSB/M/409), para. 7.21.
134 Art. 92 of the Charter of the United Nations.
135 The Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union is annexed as Protocol No. 3 to
the Treaties, i.e. the Treaty on the European Union (TEU) and the Treaty on the Func-
tioning of the European Union (TFEU). Pursuant to Art. 51 of the TEU the Protocols to the
Treaties form an integral part thereof.
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DSU, but then consciously rejected.136 Accordingly, the Appellate Body has
been given wide discretion to regulate its own procedures, a fact that Claus-
Dieter Ehlermann, one of the first seven Appellate Body members, described
as „simply stunning“, particularly compared with the EU system, and which he
ascribed to the potential difficulties to get any working procedures approved
by the membership following the traditional consensus principle.137 In light of
the skeletal regulation of the Appellate Body and the wide discretion given to
the Appellate Body to fill in the necessary procedural details, Rule 15 does not
seem to be a transgression of this wide discretion: First, as the mentioned
examples of other international tribunal demonstrate, it is not an unusual rule.
Second, as even the US acknowledges, it is not an unreasonable rule.138 And,
third, it is very unlikely that the drafters of the appointment rule of Art. 17.2 of
the DSU had wanted to implicitly prohibit a transitional rule like Rule 15, or
had even thought about transition rules when they drafted this rule. We will
return to the last point, the intentions of the drafters, below.
Another relevant part of Art. 17 of the DSU is the last sentence of Art. 17.1 of the
DSU, which reads: „Persons serving on the Appellate Body shall serve in rotation.
Such rotation shall be determined in the working procedures of the Appellate
Body.“ This provision was proffered by China in the DSB as an argument in
favor of the compliance of Rule 15 with the DSU, stating that „Rule 15 clearly
guaranteed the rotation, which was required by the DSU, and should, thus, form
part of the Working Procedures for Appellate Review.“139 Rotation is the only
aspect which the DSU explicitly requires to be included in the Working
Procedures, i.e., it was obviously important to the drafters.140 However, in
136 See Draft Text on Dispute Settlement of 21 September 1990 (MTN.GNG/NG13/W/45), p. 3:
„Working procedures shall be drafted by the appellate body [and approved by the Council].“
Texts in brackets in such draft documents indicate that there is not yet consensus on the
issue. In the final text of the DSU the proposed approval by the Council was removed.
137 Ehlermann (2002), pp. 610 – 611.
138 See supra, fn. 63 and accompanying text.
139 Minutes of the DSB meeting of 22 January 2018 (WT/DSB/M/407), para. 84; see also
minutes of the DSB meeting of 28 February 2018 (WT/DSB/M/409), para. 7.21.
140 In line with this emphasis on rotation in the DSU, when the then chair of the Appellate
Body, Julio Lacarte-Muró, submitted the Working Procedures after its adoption in Fe-
bruary 1996 to the chairman of the DSU, he named „the need for rotation in the esta-
blishment of divisions along with the advantages of collegiality“ as the second of the main
concerns which the Appellate Body had in mind when drafting the Working Procedures
(Letter of 7 February 1996 of Appellate Body Chairman to the Dispute Settlement Body
Chairman, fourth paragraph, https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/pres96_e/ab2.htm).
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response to this argument by China, the US said that it „failed to see how this
rotation had any relevance to the question raised by Rule 15“.141 And, indeed, on
first sight the relationship between rotation and Rule 15 is not self-evident. On
closer inspection, though, there is such a nexus. According to Art. 6(2) of the
Working Procedures rotation serves to ensure „random selection, unpredicta-
bility and opportunity for all Members to serve regardless of their national
origin.“ Without a transitional rule like Rule 15, the objectives of random se-
lection and unpredictability142 would have been endangered during times of
transition of the Appellate Body’s membership. That is most obvious from the
viewpoint of 1995, when the first seven Appellate Body members were ap-
pointed. Whereas the normal term of an Appellate Body member is four years,
the second sentence of Art. 17.2 of the DSU stipulates that the terms of three of
the seven persons appointed immediately after the entry into force of the
WTO Agreement are to expire at the end of two years, to be determined by lot.
This had the effect that not all seven Appellate Body members would be up for
reappointment or replacement at the same time, but that only the terms of
groups of three of four members would end simultaneously, thus ensuring a
certain continuity within the Appellate Body’s membership. However, in the
absence of a transition rule like Rule 15, this would also have meant that if a
party appealed a report less than 90 days before the end of the final terms of a
three- or four-member group, the Appellate Body would, in effect, only have a
choice between four or three members. In other words, in such a situation a
party would know for certain (in case of four retirements) or almost for certain
(in case of three retirements) who would sit on the division deciding its ap-
peal. Rule 15 avoids this by allowing the Appellate Body to choose from all of
141 Minutes of the DSB meeting of 28 February 2018 (WT/DSB/M/409), para. 7.33.
142 On how the Appellate Body ensures random selection and unpredictability, see Steger
(2015), p. 456 – 457: „In order to ensure that the selection process would meet all these
requirements and be completely secret and unpredictable, an Appellate Body member
devised a mathematical formula that allowed the members to select a certain number of
divisions at once. These meetings were held in secret, with only the Appellate Body members
in the room, and each of them only drew specific numbers, telling him or her what appeals
he or she would be on, not by case name (because it was not predictable whether or not an
appeal would be filed) but by the order in which the appeals were filed. Each Appellate Body
member only knew his or her own numbers, he or she did not know anyone else’s, and the
Secretariat was not given any information. When an appeal was filed, the three members
who were on that appeal would contact the Director of the Secretariat to advise him or her
that they were on that division. They only drew so many numbers at one time, because
mathematically if too many were drawn, the sequence would become predictable.“
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its seven members, even if the terms of some of these members will run out
during the appeal. The fact that rotation was the cause of the application of
Rule 15 was in at least two instances explicitly mentioned by the Appellate
Body.143
In the above, we have already briefly surmised about the intentions of the
drafters of the DSU regarding Rule 15. One way to shed light on the intent of
the drafters is to look at the parties’ practice under their agreement. According
to Art. 31(3)(b) of the VCLT, „[t]here shall be taken into account, together with
the context, … any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which
establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation.“144 The-
refore, although the US is right in arguing that subsequent practice cannot
amend the DSU, it can nevertheless be relevant for determining what it means
in the first place. The fact that, as stated above, before the first objection of the
US in August 2017, Rule 15 had been applied eleven times in the previous more
than 20 years without any objection from any member state indicates that the
member states did not believe that Rule 15 violates the DSU. However, what
about the fact that, as pointed out by the US, one member state, India, had
objected to Rule 15 at the time the Working Procedures had been adopted in
1996, arguing, like the US does today, that Rule 15 is in breach of Art. 17.2 of the
DSU? India made this criticism in the DSB meeting of 21 February 1996,145 at
which the Working Procedures, which had entered into force a few days
earlier, were discussed by the members, following an earlier informal dis-
cussion among members on 1 February 1996. At the meeting of 21 February,
seven members made statements on the Working Procedures, including the
US.146 Apart from India none of them commented on Rule 15. So, even though
India’s intervention had made the membership aware of a potential conflict
between Rule 15 and Art. 17.2 of the DSU, none of the other members had
expressed support for India’s view. So, if anything, this is an indication that in
1996, shortly after the conclusion of the WTO agreements and the DSU, with
memories of the drafting still fresh, the membership at large did not see a
143 Appellate Body reports, US – Shrimp (Thailand) / US – Customs Bond Directive, para. 16
(application of Rule 15 to Ganesan) and US – Continued Suspension / Canada – Continued
Suspension, para. 27 (application of Rule 15 to Abi-Saab).
144 On the interpretation of Art. 31(3)(b) of the VCLT, see Gardener (2008), pp. 225 – 249.
145 See minutes of the DSB meeting of 21 February 1996 (WT/DSB/M/11), pp. 11 – 12.
146 See minutes of the DSB meeting of 21 February 1996 (WT/DSB/M/11), pp. 9 – 13.
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problem with Rule 15, which is confirmed by its subsequent unchallenged
practice until the objection of the US in August 2017.
Even if the unchallenged application of Rule 15 is not considered sufficient for
purposes of Art. 31(3)(b) of the VCLT, it is still relevant for another element of
interpretation under the VCLT, namely the requirement that, according to
Art. 31(1) of the VCLT, a treaty has to be interpreted in good faith. Given that
neither the US nor any other member ever challenged the application of Rule
15 until August 2017, and that, as the account of the development of the ap-
pointment crisis has shown, invoking Rule 15 for almost a year as the sole
reason for blocking the appointments was only a pretext,147 the US interpre-
tation of Art. 17.2 of the DSU as clearly prohibiting Rule 15 can hardly be called
an interpretation in good faith.
In conclusion, although one can plausibly argue that, when read in isolation,
the wording of the Art. 17.2 of the DSU prohibits a transition rule like Rule 15,
an interpretation of Art. 17.2 in its context – in particular the brevity of the
procedural rules on the Appellate Body in the DSU, the powers given to the
Appellate Body in Art. 17.9 of the DSU to add the procedural details through
the adoption of working procedures, and the requirement in Art. 17.1 of the
DSU to include rules in the working procedures that ensure rotation – and in
light of the intention of the parties as revealed by their unchallenged practice
of Rule 15 until August 2017, leads to the opposite conclusion. The US argu-
ments to the contrary further suffer from a lack of good faith. In any event,
even if one should reach a different conclusion when weighing these different
elements of interpretation and find a breach of Art. 17.2 of the DSU, such a
breach would certainly not be a clear or egregious one that could justify
bringing down the Appellate Body by blocking all appointments.
2. 90-day deadline of Art. 17.5 of the DSU
Art. 17.5 of the DSU provides that „[a]s a general rule, the [appellate] procee-
dings shall not exceed 60 days from the date a party to the dispute formally
notifies its decision to appeal to the date the Appellate Body circulates its report.
… When the Appellate Body considers that it cannot provide its report within 60
days, it shall inform the DSB in writing of the reasons for the delay together with
147 See supra, fn. 82 and accompanying text.
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an estimate of the period within which it will submit its report. In no case shall the
proceedings exceed 90 days.“
From the very beginning, the Appellate Body almost never met the 60-day
deadline considered by Art. 17.5 of the DSU to be the general rule.148 However,
until and including 2010 the Appellate Body complied with the 90-day
deadline in the large majority of appeals. Out of 95 reports circulated between
the beginning of 1996 and the end of 2010, only nine were circulated outside
the 90-day deadline.149 Put differently, in this period the Appellate Body
complied with Art. 17.5 of the DSU in more than 90 % of the cases, with an
average delay of about 35 days in the nine cases outside the 90-day deadline.
With regard to each of the nine delayed reports, with the exception of the very
first one, the Appellate Body sought and received the agreement of the parties
to the extension of time for circulating the report, and mentioned that
agreement both in the communication to the DSB required by Art. 17.5 of the
DSU and in the report itself.150 Moreover, in the case US – Upland Cotton in
2004 and in the next four appeals with delayed reports, the parties to the
148 Since its first report in 1996, the Appellate Body has circulated only four reports within 60
days, namely Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II (appeal notified on 8 August 1996, report
circulated on 4 October 1996), US – Wool Shirts (24 February to 25 April 1997), Brazil –
Aircraft (Article 21.5 – Canada) and Canada – Aircraft (Article 21.5 – Brazil) (the latter two
both 22 May to 21 July 2000).
149 In the following nine cases the 90-day deadline was not met (in chronological order; with
the time from notification of the appeal to the circulation of the report in brackets): EC –
Hormones (114 days), US – Lead and Bismuth II (104 days), EC – Asbestos (140 days),
Thailand – H-Beams (140 days), US – Upland Cotton (136 days), EC – Export Subsidies on
Sugar (105 days), Mexico – Anti-Dumping Measures on Rice (132 days), US – Upland Cotton
(Article 21.5 – Brazil) (111 days), and US – Continued Suspension / Canada – Continued
Suspension (140 days).
150 See EC – Hormones (communications WT/DS26/11 and WT/DS48/9 of 10 December 1997),
US – Lead and Bismuth II (communication WT/DS138/6 of 27 March 2000; Appellate Body
report, para. 8), EC – Asbestos (communication WT/DS135/10 of 20 December 2000;
Appellate Body report, para. 8), Thailand – H-Beams (communication WT/DS122/5 of 20
December 2000; Appellate Body report, para. 7), US – Upland Cotton (communication
WT/DS267/18 of 20 December 2004; Appellate Body report, para. 8), EC – Export Subsidies
on Sugar (communication WT/DS265/26, WT/DS266/26 and WT/DS283/7 of 24 January
2005; Appellate Body report, para. 7), Mexico – Anti-Dumping Measures on Rice (com-
munication WT/DS295/7 of 14 September 2005; Appellate Body report, para. 7), US –
Upland Cotton (Article 21.5 – Brazil) (communication WT/DS267/35 of 25 April 2008;
Appellate Body report, para. 14), US – Continued Suspension / Canada – Continued
Suspension (communication WT/DS320/14 and WT/DS321/14 of 24 July 2008; Appellate
Body reports, para. 29).
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dispute confirmed that they would deem the report issued outside the 90-day
deadline nevertheless to be an Appellate Body report circulated pursuant to
Art. 17.5 of the DSU (so-called „deeming letters“).151
The situation changed markedly from 2011 onwards, concerning the number
and length of delays as well as the way in which the Appellate Body dealt with
those delays. In 2011, five out of six reports were delayed, and looking at the
whole period from 2011 to the end of 2018 only six out of 42 reports observed
the 90-day deadline.152 Since May 2015, all reports have been delayed, usually
by a large margin. The average delay for late reports increased from about
55 days in 2011 to 300 days in 2018.153 As to the way in which the Appellate
Body handled these delays, even if the Appellate Body had consulted with the
parties about the delay or had received their agreement, it no longer men-
tioned these consultations or any agreement in either its communication to
the DSB or its reports. Moreover, for the first time in the case US – Tyres,
circulated in September 2011, and subsequently with increasing frequency, it
no longer even consulted the parties on the delays or sought their agreement,
but rather determined the date of circulation on its own. The fact that the
Appellate Body changed its practice around the same time as the number of
delays started to increase substantially is probably no coincidence. One can
assume that as delays became more and more unavoidable, the Appellate
Body concluded that it would no longer be meaningful to ask for the consent
of the parties because in the absence of consent the delay would occur any-
way.
Reasons for the increasing delays in the WTO dispute settlement system154
were discussed by the Appellate Body in a communication of May 2013,155 in
151 See references in fn. 150.
152 The reports in the period from 2011 to 2018 that were circulated within 90 days are (date
of circulation in brackets) Philippines – Distilled Spirits (21 December 2011), US – Clove
Cigarettes (4 April 2012), China – GOES (18 October 2012), Canada – Renewable Energy /
Canada – Feed-in Tariff Program (6 May 2013), US – Countervailing and Anti-Dumping
Measures (China) (7 July 2014) and US – Shrimp II (Vietnam) (7 April 2015).
153 Calculations by the author based on data available on the WTO website.
154 See Raghu Ram (2018) for a detailed statistical analysis of delays in the WTO dispute
settlement system (pp. 310 – 338), and a discussion of their reasons (pp. 343 – 363).
155 Communication of 30 May 2013 from the Appellate Body, The Workload of the Appellate
Body (JOB/AB/1), published in the Appellate Body Annual Report for 2013, March 2014
(WT/AB/20), pp. 32 – 40. In the appellate proceedings in the case US – Cool (Article 21.5 –
Canada and Mexico), the Appellate Body in a letter of 2 March 2015 to the parties referred
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two presentations by Director-General Roberto Azevédo before the DSB in
September 2014156 and October 2015,157 and in a speech by the US-appointed
Appellate Body member Thomas R. Graham, then chairman of the Appellate
Body, in November 2016,158 all of which focus on the increasing workload.
Updates on some of the figures put forward at the time can be found in regular
WTO publications159 and on the WTO website.160 As far as the Appellate Body
is concerned, one has to look not only at the appellate level itself, but also at
the panel level because increases at the panel level lead to increases at the
appellate level, given that, on average, about two thirds of all panel reports are
appealed.161
In order to determine workload, the obvious starting point is the number of
cases. If one looks, for instance, at the overall number of active cases at any
given time, one sees a surge of cases at the start of the system, with a rise from
two cases in 1995 to 27 in 1999, then a period between roughly 2000 and 2012
where the numbers oscillate around 20 (with a high of 27 in 2005 and a low of
15 in 2009), and then, from 2012, a more or less continuous rise to a record
to this communication when it rejected a request of the parties to meet and discuss the
date of circulation of the report (see Appellate Body report, US – Cool (Article 21.5 –
Canada and Mexico), para. 1.27).
156 Speech by Roberto Azevédo of 26 September 2014 before the DSB, minutes of meeting
(WT/DSB/M/350), para. 1.2; also available at http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/spra_e/
spra32_e.htm, including tables mentioned in the speech, but not contained in the mi-
nutes.
157 Speech by Roberto Azevédo of 28 October 2015 before the DSB, minutes of meeting (WT/
DSB/M/369), para. 11.2; also published in the Appellate Body Annual Report for 2015,
March 2016 (WT/AB/26), pp. 124 – 127, including an Annex with statistical data men-
tioned in the speech, but not contained in the minutes.
158 Graham (2016), in particular pp. 112 – 115; see also former Appellate Body member Sa-
cerdoti (2017), pp 153 – 158.
159 For instance in the annual reports of the DSB and of the Appellate Body (e.g., DSB,
Annual Report 2018, 30 November 2018 [WT/DSB/76], paras. 13.1 – 13.2; Appellate Body,
Annual Report for 2018, March 2019 [WT/AB/29], pp. 13 – 15, 141 – 143). Furthermore, from
the DSB meeting of 25 November 2015 until that of 27 March 2018, the DSB chairperson
had reported in the regular DSB meetings on the dispute settlement workload (e.g.,
minutes of the DSB meetings of 25 November 2015 [WT/DSB/M/370], paras. 8.1 – 8.3, and
27 March 2018 [WT/DSB/M/410], paras. 12.1 – 12.2).
160 See, for instance, https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispustats_e.htm, Dis-
pute settlement activity – some figures.
161 See Appellate Body Annual Report for 2018, March 2019 (WT/AB/29), p. 142 (Annex 8:
Percentage of panel reports appealed by year of adoption: 1996 – 2018).
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number of 42 cases in 2018.162 Focusing on appellate proceedings, a similar
pattern emerges. With regard to the number of appeals filed each year, at the
beginning the numbers rose sharply from four in 1996 to 13 in 2000, followed
by a general downward trend until 2013 (which saw only two appeals) in-
terrupted by a few spikes (in 2005, 2008 and 2011), and after that, since 2014, a
consistently high level of appeals (13 in 2014, eight a year from 2015 to 2017, and
12 in 2018).163
The recent upsurge in dispute settlement activity that is expressed in these
figures goes some way to explain why the delays in appellate proceedings have
grown worse since 2011, the year in which the practice of the Appellate Body
regarding the 90-day deadline changed. However, they cannot explain the
change in 2011 itself because at that time the number of appeals was not higher
than in many years in the earlier period (compare, for instance, the years 1999
and 2000, in which nine and 13 appeals were filed, respectively, with 2010 and
2011, which saw three and nine appeals, respectively). To explain that change,
one has to consider not only the total number of cases but also their com-
plexity. Indicators of complexity include, among others, the number of claims
as well as requests for procedural rulings (legal complexity), the number of
exhibits (factual complexity), the number of parties (main parties and third
parties), the length of submissions, and the length of reports. The commu-
nication of the Appellate Body of May 2013 mentioned above looks at these
(and other) figures and compares the first 10 appeals filed at the start of the
system with the last 10 appeals decided by the end of 2012, i.e., only a year after
the change of 2011.164 As to the panels whose reports were appealed, the
communication states, for instance, that the average number of exhibits rose
from 62 to 552 and that the average length of panel reports more than doubled
to 364 pages. On the appellate level, the average number of issues raised
increased from about eight to more than 13, the average number of third
parties almost tripled to eight, the average number of pages of submissions
filed more than doubled to 450, and the average length of Appellate Body
reports more than quadrupled to almost 210.
162 https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispustats_e.htm, Dispute settlement ac-
tivity – some figures, Chart 9: Average annual number of active proceedings per month
1995 – 2018.
163 Appellate Body, Annual Report for 2018, March 2019 (WT/AB/29), p. 140.
164 All the following figures can be found in the communication from the Appellate Body
(supra, fn. 155), pp. 33 – 38.
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With these facts on the practice under Art. 17.5 of the DSU and the workload of
the dispute settlement system in mind, we now turn to the criticism by the US.
From the very beginning of the Appellate Body’s new approach to delays,
namely first not mentioning consultations or agreements with the parties in
its communications to the DSB and the report, and then no longer even
consulting with or seeking the agreement of the parties, the US denounced
this new approach. In the meetings in which the delayed Appellate Body
reports circulated between June 2011 and June 2015 were adopted, the US
criticized, in some cases sharply, that the Appellate Body no longer involved
the parties in its decisions regarding the delays, demanding a return to the pre-
2011 practice.165 Some member states, such as Japan, supported the position of
the US, whereas others, such as the EU, argued that the Appellate Body had no
obligation to consult the parties or seek their agreement.166 Importantly,
though, the US did not criticize the delays as such, but only the lack of con-
sultation and the failure to seek the agreement of the parties. Indeed, the US
usually expressed understanding for the delays and emphasized that it would
have agreed to a circulation of the report outside the 90-day deadline.167
165 See the minutes of the DSB meetings of 15 July 2011 (WT/DSB/M/299), para. 11; 28 July 2011
(WT/DSB/M/301), para. 11; 5 October 2011 (WT/DSB/M/304), paras. 4 – 6; 22 February 2012
(WT/DSB/M/312), para. 106; 23 March 2012 (WT/DSB/M/313), para. 74; 13 June 2012 (WT/
DSB/M/317), para. 17; 23 July 2012 (WT/DSB/M/320), para. 97; 18 June 2014 (WT/DSB/M/
346), para. 7.8; 19 December 2014 (WT/DSB/M/354), para. 1.12; 16 January 2015 (WT/DSB/
M/355), paras. 1.16 – 1.17; 26 January 2015 (WT/DSB/M/356), para. 5.6; 29 May 2015 (WT/
DSB/M/362), para. 1.19; and 19 June 2015 (WT/DSB/M/364), para. 7.8.
166 See, for instance, minutes of the DSB meetings of 5 October 2011 (WT/DSB/M/304), paras.
11 – 14 (Japan); 23 July 2012 (WT/DSB/M/313), paras. 101 (EU) and 103 (Japan); and 26
January 2015 (WT/DSB/M/356), paras. 5.9 (Japan) and 5.23 (EU).
167 See, for instance, minutes of the DSB meetings of 18 June 2014 (WT/DSB/M/346), para. 7.8
(„While the 90-day deadline in the DSU text was categorical, Members had an under-
standing of the workload challenges faced by the Appellate Body, and had been willing to
agree to receive a report after this deadline“); 19 December 2014 (WT/DSB/M/354), para.
1.13 („The Appellate Body, of course, had good reason to go beyond 90 days in this dispute.“);
16 January 2015 (WT/DSB/M/355), para. 1.16 („Given the size and complexity of this dispute,
as well as many other ongoing appeals, the United States of course would have been willing
to positively consider a request from the Appellate Body to exceed the time-limit.“); 29 May
2015 (WT/DSB/M/362), para. 1.19 („The United States fully understood the difficulty that the
Appellate Body had in meeting this 90-day deadline in this dispute, which was in part due to
the fact that the disputing parties had requested a modified timeline for their submissions,
among other legitimate reasons.“).
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Then, for a period of almost three years, between June 2015 and May 2018, the
delays were no longer criticized or discussed in the DSB meetings, neither by
the US nor by any other member states (with one exception concerning the
reasons stated by the Appellate Body for a delay),168 despite the fact that delays
were still continuously increasing. This changed in the DSB meeting of June
2018, when the US made an extended statement, which runs to six pages in the
minutes of the meeting, on the 90-day deadline.169 Subsequently, starting with
the DSB meeting of 27 August 2018, the US cited the disregard of the 90-day
deadline regularly as one of the reasons for blocking the appointment of
Appellate Body members.170 Moreover, in its statement of June 2018 the US
altered the basic thrust of its criticism regarding Art. 17.5 of the DSU. While it
repeated its earlier criticism that the Appellate Body no longer sought the
agreement of the parties to a delay, the US now focused on the delays itself,
and, contrary to its earlier statements in the DSB, no longer accepted that the
delays were justifiable: „The Appellate Body has for many years apparently
considered that it is not possible to issue reports within the 90-day deadline. The
United States has two reactions to that notion: first, we do not see objective
evidence to support it; second, and more importantly, that it is not within the
Appellate Body’s authority to disregard or amend the DSU.“171 Concerning the
first point the US did not mention any of the reasons for delays discussed
above, but instead explained that it would have been well within the power of
the Appellate Body to comply with the 90-day deadline if it had limited itself
to dealing only with issues necessary to resolve the specific dispute rather than
with all issues raised by the parties.172 In other words, the US claimed that the
main, if not the only reason for the delays was the Appellate Body’s failure to
refrain from unnecessary considerations.
In sum, the US criticism is based on three arguments: first, the Appellate Body
could have avoided the delays if it had limited itself to addressing the issues
necessary to resolve the dispute, second, regardless of the reasons of the delays
the Appellate Body does not have the power to disregard Art. 17.5 of the DSU,
168 See minutes of the DSB meeting of 28 October 2015 (WT/DSB/M/369), paras. 9.4 – 9.6 and
9.9 – 9.12.
169 Minutes of the DSB meeting of 22 June 2018 (WT/DSB/M414), paras. 5.1 – 5.22.
170 See supra, fn. 84 – 85 and accompanying text.
171 Minutes of the DSB meeting of 22 June 2018 (WT/DSB/M414), para. 5.16.
172 Minutes of the DSB meeting of 22 June 2018 (WT/DSB/M414), paras. 5.16 – 5.19.
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and, third, it should in any case have sought the agreement of the parties for
issuing a report beyond the stipulated deadline.
The first argument is not only plainly implausible in the face of all the evid-
ence discussed above, none of which the US even mentions in its statement of
June 2018, but is also belied by the statements the US had made itself in the
past. Before June 2018, it had never questioned that the delays were justified by
legitimate reasons to a large degree beyond the control of the Appellate Body,
and sometimes even had said so explicitly.173 Similarly, when the Director-
General made his presentation in September 2014 before the DSB on the
increased workload of the dispute settlement system, in which he concluded,
as far as the Appellate Body is concerned, that „[a]ll these factors explain… why
the Appellate Body will need more than 90 days to complete some appeals over
the coming months“,174 the US supported the presentation and said that „[i]t
demonstrated in a graphical and numerical way what Members had known
intuitively“.175 And, again, after the presentation of the Director-General in
October 2015 on the same topic before the DSB, in which he mentioned,
among other things, that „[t]he increased breadth and complexity of disputes
over the last 20 years has changed the face of WTO dispute settlement com-
pletely“,176 the US did not object, but rather commented that „[g]iven resource
constraints on the WTO and the projected level of activity for the WTO dispute
settlement system going forward, it was the US sense that Members would all
need to be creative in considering solutions to the problem of delays, in order to
maintain an efficient and high-quality mechanism.“177
Concerning the second argument, i.e., that it is not for the Appellate to decide
whether to comply with the DSU’s deadline, suffice it to say no one, including
the Appellate Body, can be obligated to do the impossible („ultra posse nemo
obligatur“). As Brazil put it in the DSB meeting of June 2018, „[i]f Members were
to add too much weight to the work of the Appellate Body and simply requested
,prompt compliance‘, but would not compensate it with either additional time,
better institutional conditions or a change in the way Members themselves would
173 See for examples supra, fn. 167.
174 Minutes of the DSB meeting of 26 September 2014 (WT/DSB/M/350), para. 1.2, p. 3.
175 Minutes of the DSB meeting of 26 September 2014 (WT/DSB/M/350), para. 1.7.
176 Minutes of the DSB meeting of 28 October 2015 (WT/DSB/M/369), para. 11.2, p. 22.
177 Minutes of the DSB meeting of 28 October 2015 (WT/DSB/M/369), para. 11.16.
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conduct their cases, Members would find out that something would have to gi-
ve.“178
The third argument, i.e., that an extension of the 90-day deadline should only
be possible with the consent of the parties, has two problems. First, it would
not address the ostensible concern of the US about strict compliance with the
DSU because even with the consent of the parties Art. 17.5 of the DSU would
still not be complied with. Neither Art. 17.5 of the DSU nor any other provision
of the DSU provides for an exemption from the deadline if the parties so agree.
Only a formal amendment of the DSU by the Ministerial Council or the Ge-
neral Council deciding with unanimity could accomplish that.179 Second, as
pointed out by the EU, Brazil and China in the DSB meeting of June 2018,180
requiring that the parties would have to consent to any delay would under-
mine the negative consensus rule of Art. 17.14 of the DSU, i.e., the rule that
panel and Appellate Body reports will be adopted unless there is a consensus
of all members not do so. If a party would refuse to consent after the 90-day
deadline had passed, it could in effect block the adoption of the report.
Moreover, knowing that, a party who is threatened to lose its case before the
Appellate Body would have an incentive to delay the appellate proceedings in
order to get them past the 90-day deadline and thus enable it to veto the
report. Already before June 2018, the possible impact on Art. 17.14 of the DSU
had been one of the reasons for a number of member states to reject the US
demand for party consent.181 Additionally, in 2012 it had forced the US, Canada,
and Mexico as parties in the appellate proceedings in the case US – COOL to
withdraw a proposal for a DSB decision authorizing a delay that had occurred
in those proceedings,182 even though these three countries had tried to allay
178 Minutes of the DSB meeting of 22 June 2018 (WT/DSB/M/414), para. 5.30.
179 Art. X:8 of the WTO Agreement, second sentence, in conjunction with, as far as the
General Council is concerned, Art. IV:2 of the WTO Agreement, second sentence.
180 Minutes of the DSB meeting of 22 June 2018 (WT/DSB/M/414), paras. 5.25 (EU), 5.31
(Brazil), and 5.56 (China).
181 See minutes of the DSB meetings of 23 July 2012 (WT/DSB/M/320), paras. 101 (EU), 106
(Brazil) and 108 (China); 18 June 2014 (WT/DSB/M/346), paras. 7.9 (Guatemala) and 7.9
(EU); 26 January 2015 (WT/DSB/M/356), para. 5.23 (EU); and 19 June 2015 (WT/DSB/M/
364), para. 7.14 (India).
182 See communication of 28 June 2012 from Canada, Mexico and the US, US – COOL, Joint
request for a decision by the DSB (WT/DS/384/15 and WR/DS386/14); minutes of the DSB
meeting of 10 July 2012 (WT/DSB/M/319), p. 1 (withdrawal of the draft decision) and
paras. 10 – 16 (statements by the US, Canada and Mexico on the draft decision); minutes
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fears about Art. 17.14 of the DSU by stating that „[t]o be clear, there had never
been any question that the three sponsors of the draft decision wished to cast
doubt on one of the most important features of the WTO dispute settlement
system – negative consensus for the adoption of reports.“183 By contrast, in the
DSB meeting of June 2018 the US attacked Art. 17.14 of the DSU head-on, by
claiming, for the first time, that „[t]he consequence of the Appellate Body
choosing to breach DSU rules and issue a report after the 90-day deadline would
be that this report no longer qualifies as an Appellate Body report for purposes of
the exceptional negative consensus adoption procedure of Article 17.14 of the
DSU.“184 Of the 14 members who took the floor at the meeting in response to
the US statement, not one supported the US position that a failure to meet the
90-day deadline would change the adoption procedure, and nine explicitly
rejected it.185 The opponents rightly observed that Art. 17.5 of the DSU does not
specify any consequence for failing to comply with the deadline, and Art. 17.14
of the DSU does not make the negative consensus rule dependent on any
conditions, such as meeting the deadline of Art. 17.5 of the DSU. In any event,
the „conclusions [drawn by the US regarding Art. 17.14 of the DSU] were vastly
disproportionate to the issue at hand“, i.e., the failure to observe the deadline of
Art. 17.5 of the DSU.186
In summary, the Appellate Body has indeed failed to comply with the 90-day
deadline of Art. 17.5 of the DSU, rarely until 2010, frequently between 2011 and
2015, and consistently since 2015. However, the reasons for this failure were
largely beyond the control of the Appellate Body, namely the increased
workload due to the increased number and especially the increased com-
plexity of disputes. This has been repeatedly acknowledged by the member-
ship, including the US. It was only in June 2018 that the US changed course and
of the DSB meeting of 22 June 2018 (WT/DSB/M/414), para. 5.48 (statement of Mexico on
the reasons for the withdrawal of the draft decision in 2012).
183 Minutes of the DSB meeting of 10 July 2012 (WT/DSB/M/319), para. 14 (statement of
Canada).
184 Minutes of meeting (WT/DSB/M/414), paras. 5.21. On the US arguments and actions
regarding Art. 17.14 of the DSU, see further supra, fn. 61 and accompanying text.
185 Minutes of the DSB meeting of 22 June 2018 (WT/DSB/M/414), paras. 5.23 – 5.62; the nine
members who explicitly opposed the US view on Art. 17.14 of the DSU were the EU (para.
5.25), Brazil (para. 5.32), New Zealand (para. 5.34), Canada (para. 5.40), Norway (para.
5.41), Mexico (para. 5.51), Uruguay (para. 5.59), Guatemala (para. 5.60) and Thailand
(para. 5.62).
186 Minutes of the DSB meeting of 22 June 2018 (WT/DSB/M/414), para. 5.32 (statement of
Brazil).
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suddenly claimed, without even mentioning the workload problems, that the
Appellate Body could have complied with the deadline if only it had wanted
to. Before June 2018, the only complaint of the US had been that the Appellate
Body in 2011 had changed its practice of asking the parties to consent to an
extension of the deadline. However, the DSU does not allow the parties to
extend the deadline, so their consent would not address the alleged concern of
the US with strict compliance with the DSU. For all these reasons, the failure of
the Appellate Body to observe the 90-day deadline of Art. 17.5 of the DSU
cannot justify the blockage of appointments to the Appellate Body.
3. Advisory opinions
In the DSB meeting of 29 October 2018, the US made an extended statement
on the issuance of advisory opinion on issues not necessary to resolve the
dispute.187 It defined advisory opinion as „a non-binding statement on a point of
law given by [an adjudicator] before a case is tried or with respect to a hypo-
thetical situation.“188 It argued that advisory opinions „breached WTO rule“189
and that the Appellate Body had repeatedly issued such advisory opinions in
violation of WTO law.190 In case a party should appeal an issue that is not
necessary to resolve the dispute, the Appellate Body is, according to the US,
under an obligation to exercise judicial economy, that is, to refuse to rule on
the issue. The US raised the question of advisory opinions not only in the
187 Minutes of the DSB meeting of 29 October 2018 (WT/DSB/M/420), paras. 4.2 – 4.19.
Sometimes the US also uses the term obiter dicta instead of advisory opinions (see, e.g.,
idem, para. 4.17). For a discussion of the concept of obiter dicta in the context of WTO
dispute settlement, see Gao (2018) and Sacerdoti (2018) (both arguing against the US
position on obiter dicta).
188 Minutes of the DSB meeting of 29 October 2018 (WT/DSB/M/420), para. 4.2, quoting
Oxford Dictionaries, „advisory opinion“ (https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/ad-
visory_opinion).
189 Minutes of the DSB meeting of 29 October 2018 (WT/DSB/M/420), para. 4.2.
190 Minutes of the DSB meeting of 29 October 2018 (WT/DSB/M/420), paras. 4.2 and 4.13 –
4.18; as examples of such alleged breaches the US names five Appellate Body reports,
namely US – Continued Suspension / Canada – Continued Suspension (paras. 4.15 – 4.16),
China – Publications and Audiovisual Products (para. 4.17), Argentina – Financial Services
(para. 4.17), Indonesia – Import Licensing Regimes (para. 4.17) and EC – PET (Pakistan)
(para. 4.18).
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current appointment crisis, it was also one of the major reasons why the US
had vetoed the reappointment of Appellate Body member Chang in 2016.191
For a better understanding of the US criticism, we will briefly set out three of
the instances that the US considers to be illegitimate advisory opinions. In
China – Publications and Audiovisual Products,192 the US had challenged certain
Chinese measures regulating the importation and distribution of publications
and audiovisual products.193 In particular, the US had claimed that some of
these measures violated trading commitments undertaken by China in its
Accession Protocol. In its defense, China had argued that any inconsistency of
its measures with the trading commitments under its Accession Protocol
could be justified as being necessary to protect public morals pursuant to Art.
XX(a) of the GATT. The US in turn had stated that Art. XX of the GATT could
not be invoked as a defense to a breach of the trading commitments under
China’s Accession Protocol. The panel had left open the question whether Art.
XX of the GATT was available as a defense and had instead addressed the
question whether, assuming the availability of the defense (ad arguendo ar-
gument), the conditions of Art. XX(a) of the GATT were met in this case.
Finding that these conditions were not met anyway, it then declared that it
would not be necessary to rule on the availability of Art. XX of the GATT as a
defense, that is, it exercised judicial economy. On Art. XX of the GATT, China
appealed the panel’s finding that the conditions of Art. XX(a) of the GATT
were not satisfied, and, furthermore, asked the Appellate Body to complete the
analysis and find that Art. XX of the GATT was available for justifying breaches
of trading commitments of China’s Accession Protocol. Unlike the panel, the
Appellate Body decided to start its analysis with the availability of Art. XX of
191 See minutes of the DSB meeting of 23 May 2016 (WT/DSB/M/379), statement of the US,
paras. 6.2 – 6.7 („The role of the Appellate Body as part of the WTO’s dispute settlement
system was to decide appeals of panel reports to help achieve ,[t]he aim of the dispute
settlement mechanism … to secure a positive solution to a dispute‘, as set out in DSU Article
3.7. … Yet the reports on which this member [i.e., Chang] had participated did not accord
with the role of the Appellate Body.“ [para. 6.3]; „WTO adjudicators should be focused on
addressing those issues necessary to resolve the dispute.“ [para. 6.7]); see further on the US
veto of the reappointment of Chang supra, Chapter II.
192 For US criticism of the Appellate Body report in this case, see minutes of the DSB
meetings of 29 October 2018 (WT/DSB/M/420), para. 4.17; and 19 January 2010 (WT/DSB/
M/278), para. 77.
193 For a summary of the facts of the case and the decision of the panel, see Appellate Body
report, China – Publications and Audiovisual Products, paras. 1 – 10.
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the GATT as a defense,194 and only afterwards addressed the conditions of Art.
XX(a) of the GATT. It found that the defense was available,195 but, like the
panel, concluded that its conditions were not met.196 In light of this conclusion,
the finding on the availability of the defense was not relevant for the question
whether China had violated its WTO obligations.
The second example is the report of the Appellate Body in the case Argentina –
Financial Services.197 In that case, Panama had challenged a number of me-
asures by Argentina which restricted certain financial services from Panama.198
According to Argentina, these measures were aimed at preventing tax evasion,
tax avoidance and fraud, and Panama had been subject to these measures
because it had been qualified by Argentina as non-cooperative in Argentina’s
campaign to protect its tax base. Panama claimed that the measures violated
Art. II:1 of the GATS (most-favored nation principle) and Art. XVII of the GATS
(national treatment) because its services were treated less favorably than like
services from countries qualified as cooperative and like domestic Argentinian
services. Argentina not only denied a violation of Arts. II:1 and XVII of the
GATS, but also argued that even if there were such violations, they could be
justified either by Art. XIV(c) of the GATS as measures necessary to secure
compliance with its tax laws or by the prudential carve-out of Paragraph 2(a)
of the GATS Annex on Financial Services. The panel found that although there
was no violation of Art. XVII of the GATS, all measures were inconsistent with
Art. II:1 of the GATS, and that these inconsistencies could not be justified by
either Art. XIV(c) of the GATS or by Paragraph 2(a) of the GATS Annex on
Financial Services. The parties appealed the panel’s findings on „likeness“ and
„treatment no less favorable“ under Arts. II:1 and XVII of the GATS as well as on
the justifications of Art. XIV(d) of the GATS and Paragraph 2(a) of the GATS
Annex on Financial Services. On „likeness“, the Appellate Body reversed the
panel’s findings that the financial services and service suppliers of non-co-
operative countries, such as Panama, were like such services and services
suppliers from cooperative countries, in the sense of Art. II:1 of the GATS, or
194 China – Publications and Audiovisual Products, paras. 205 – 213.
195 China – Publications and Audiovisual Products, paras. 214 – 233.
196 China – Publications and Audiovisual Products, paras. 234 – 337.
197 For US criticism of this Appellate Body report, see minutes of the DSB meetings of 29
October 2018 (WT/DSB/M/420), para. 4.17; 23 May 2016 (WT/DSB/M/379), para. 6.4; and 9
May 2016 (WT/DSB/M/378), para. 2.6.
198 For a summary of the facts of the case and the decision of the panel, see Appellate Body
report, Argentina – Financial Services, paras. 1.1 – 1.7.
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from Argentina, in the sense of Art. XVII of the GATT.199 Since there was no
likeness, there could be no violation of Art. II:1 of the GATS or Art. XVII of the
GATT. Consequently, any findings on „treatment no less favorable“ under Art.
II:1 or Art. XVII of the GATS as well as on the justifications for inconsistencies
with Art. II:1 or Art. XVII of the GATS were no longer required for the overall
conclusion that there was no breach of WTO law by Argentina. Accordingly,
the Appellate Body explicitly declared moot all findings of the panel on
„treatment no less favorable“ and on the justifications pursuant to Art. XIV of
the GATS and Paragraph 2(a) of the GATS Annex on Financial Services.200
However, it then moved on and ruled on the appeals of all these moot panel
findings anyway.201
The first two examples were about cases in which the Appellate Body made
findings on issues that were not necessary for determining whether a member
state had violated WTO law. The final example, EU – PET (Pakistan), pertains
to a situation in which, despite a finding of a breach of WTO law, no re-
commendation under Art. 19.1 of the DSU that the member state concerned
should bring the WTO-inconsistent measure into compliance with WTO law is
required. In that dispute, Pakistan had challenged the imposition of count-
ervailing duties on PET from Pakistan by the EU as being inconsistent with the
WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCMA).202 After
the panel in this case had been established by the DSB in March 2015, the EU
in March 2016 had asked the panel to cease its work because the challenged
measure had expired in September 2015. Pakistan had acknowledged the
expiration of the measure, but still insisted that the panel rule on whether the
199 Argentina – Financial Services, paras. 6.1 – 6.80.
200 Argentina – Financial Services, para. 6.83.
201 Argentina – Financial Services, paras. 6.84 (explanation why it addressed an appeal of
findings which it had declared to be moot) and 6.85 – 6.272 (analysis of „treatment no less
favorable“, Art. XIV(c) of the GATS, and Paragraph 2(a) of the GATS Annex on Financial
Services). Pablo Bentes, who was one of the attorneys representing Argentina in this
appeal, later claimed that in the oral hearing of this appeal it had been the US that had
urged the Appellate Body to rule on Paragraph 2(a) of the GATS Annex on Financial
Services, a ruling the US later condemned as an advisory opinion (Bentes [2017], p. 2).
However, according to that oral hearing’s opening statement by the US that is made
available on the USTR website, the US explicitly asked the Appellate Body not to rule on
that issue (https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/enforcement/DS/US.3rd.Ptcpt.Oral.State
ment.pdf, paras. 1 – 5).
202 For a summary of the facts of the case and the decision of the panel, see Appellate Body
report, EU – PET (Pakistan), paras. 1.1 – 1.11.
B. Issues of procedure and interpretive approach
53
measure had violated the SCMA. The panel denied the EU’s request, and in its
report found a number of violations of the SCMA, but, given that the measure
had already expired, made no recommendation pursuant to Art. 19.1 of the
DSU that the EU should bring the measure into conformity with the SCMA. On
appeal, the EU argued that the panel should not have made findings on a
measure that had already expired, and asked the Appellate Body to reverse the
panel report in its entirety. The Appellate Body rejected that request, and
found that the expiration of a measure in itself is not sufficient to deprive a
panel of jurisdiction to make findings on the consistency of that measure with
WTO law.203 Then it addressed the parties’ appeals on issues regarding the
SCMA, but, although it upheld certain of the panel findings on violations of
the SCMA, it, like the panel, made no recommendation pursuant to Art. 19.1 of
the DSU because of the expiration of the challenged measure.204 Even though
in this case there was no question that the Appellate Body’s findings were
necessary for a determination whether WTO law had been breached, the US
nevertheless criticized them as illegitimate advisory opinions because due to
the expiration of the measure Pakistan had not asked for a recommendation
according to Art. 19.1 of the DSU, a fact which the US read as confirmation that
there was no longer a dispute between the parties.205
Based on these examples, what the US considers illegitimate advisory opinions
by panels and the Appellate Body can be defined as any rulings on legal issues
„that would not assist the DSB in making a recommendation [under Art. 19.1 of
the DSU] to bring a WTO-inconsistent measure into compliance with WTO ru-
les“,206 in particular rulings on issues that are not necessary for a finding on
whether a member state has violated WTO law.
Why does the US believe that such rulings are prohibited by the DSU? It offers
a number of arguments. It states that the primary purpose of the DSU is the
settlement of specific disputes between member states, rather than the ab-
stract clarification of legal issues, and in support of that proposition it invokes
203 EU – PET (Pakistan), paras. 5.1 – 5.53, followed by a dissenting opinion on this issue by
one member of the Appellate Body division, paras. 5.54 – 5.61.
204 EU – PET (Pakistan), paras. 6.10 (upholding a panel finding on violations of the SCMA)
and 6.16 (no recommendation under Art. 19.1 of the DSU).
205 See minutes of the DSB meetings of 29 October 2018 (WT/DSB/M/420), para. 4.18; and 28
May 2018 (WT/DSB/M/413), paras. 10.5 – 10.9
206 Minutes of the General Council meeting of 12 December 2018 (WT/GC/M/175), statement
of the US, para. 6.166.
IV. Analysis of the reasons stated by the US for the blockage
54
several DSU provisions that emphasize dispute resolution, in particular Art. 3.3
(„prompt settlement [of disputes] is essential to the effective function of the
WTO“), Art. 3.4 („[r]ecommendations or rulings made by the DSB shall be aimed
at a satisfactory settlement of [disputes]“) and Art. 3.7 („[t]he aim of the dispute
settlement mechanism is to secure a positive solution to a dispute“). Further-
more, the US points out that the DSU does not explicitly provide for the
possibility of advisory opinions, in contrast to founding agreements of other
international tribunals, such as the International Court of Justice207 or the
European Court of Human Rights.208 In addition, it stresses that while the
dispute settlement system, including the Appellate Body, should be focused
on settling disputes, the task of abstract interpretations has explicitly been
reserved to the Ministerial Conference and the General Council, i.e., the
members themselves.209 According to Art. IX:2 of the WTO Agreement, „[t]he
Ministerial Conference and the General Council shall have the exclusive au-
thority to adopt interpretations of this Agreement and of the Multilateral Trade
Agreements.“ This exclusive power of the members under Art. XI:2 of the WTO
Agreement is confirmed in Art. 3.9 of the DSU.210 Finally, the US highlights that
in the early case US – Wool Shirts and Blouses of 1997, the Appellate Body itself
had declared that panels are allowed to practice judicial economy,211 meaning
that they are not under an obligation „to examine all legal claims made by the
complaining parties.“212 Like the US, the Appellate Body emphasized that „the
basic aim of dispute settlement in the WTO is to settle disputes“, and, even
though Art. 3.2 of the DSU states that the dispute settlement system „serves …
to clarify the existing provisions of [the WTO agreements]“, the Appellate Body
famously pronounced in that case that „[g]iven the explicit aim of dispute
settlement that permeates the DSU, we do not consider that Article 3.2 of the DSU
is meant to encourage either panels or the Appellate Body to „make law“ by
clarifying existing provisions of the WTO Agreement outside the context of re-
solving a particular dispute. A panel need only address those claims which must
207 See Art. 96 of the Charter of the United Nations and Arts. 65 – 68 of the Statute of the
International Court of Justice.
208 See Art. 47 of the European Convention of Human Rights.
209 Minutes of the DSB meeting of 29 October 2018 (WT/DSB/M/420), para. 4.3.
210 „The provisions of this Understanding are without prejudice to the rights of Members to seek
authoritative interpretation of provisions of a covered agreement through decision-making
under the WTO Agreement … .“
211 Minutes of the DSB meeting of 29 October 2018 (WT/DSB/M/420), para. 4.8.
212 US – Wool Shirts and Blouses, p. 339.
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be addressed in order to resolve the matter in issue in the dispute.“213 In addition
to these legal arguments, the US also makes policy arguments against advisory
opinions. For instance, it points out that such advisory opinions increase the
time required for appellate proceedings, which goes against the objective of
speedy dispute resolution.214
What are the merits of these arguments? To begin with, it is worth empha-
sizing that no one, including the Appellate Body, claims that panels or the
Appellate Body have the power to give advisory opinions independently of any
specific dispute. The controversy is only about the more limited question
whether the Appellate Body may make findings on legal issues that arise in a
specific dispute between member states, but that are not necessary for de-
termining whether WTO law was violated and whether a recommendation
under Art. 19.1 of the DSU should be issued. As to this more limited question,
there are at least five counterarguments to the position of the US: First,
Art. 17.12 of the DSU obligates the Appellate Body to address each issue raised
by the parties; second, contributing to a positive resolution to a dispute might
go beyond the finding of a WTO violation and making a recommendation
under Art. 19.1 of the DSU; third, according to Art. 3.2 of the DSU the dispute
settlement system is a central element in providing security and predictability
and serves to clarify the provisions of the WTO Agreements; fourth, there is no
conflict between Art. IX:2 of the WTO Agreement and Appellate Body findings
on issues not necessary to resolve a dispute; and, fifth, the US arguments
regarding recommendations under Art. 19.1 of the DSU are at least partly self-
contradictory. We will address each of these arguments in turn.
Starting with the first counterargument, the DSU provision most directly
addressing the question which issues the Appellate Body should or could deal
with is Art. 17.12 in conjunction with Art. 17.6. Art. 17.12 of the DSU stipulates
that „[t]he Appellate Body shall address each of the issues raised in accordance
with paragraph 6 during the appellate proceeding“, and Art. 17.6 of the DSU, to
which Art. 17.12 of the DSU refers, states „[a]n appeal shall be limited to issues of
law covered in the panel report and legal interpretations developed by the panel.“
A plain reading of these provision indicates that the Appellate Body is under
an obligation („shall“) to deal with any legal issue contained in a panel report
and appealed by a party. This would mean that the Appellate Body is not
213 US – Wool Shirts and Blouses, p. 340.
214 Minutes of DSB meeting of 29 October 2018 (WT/DSB/M/420), para. 4.19.
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allowed to refuse to rule on such an issue appealed by a party, even if it is not
necessary to decide that issue in order to make a finding on whether there was
a violation of WTO law. In other words, these provisions seem to prohibit the
practice of judicial economy at the appellate level. This finds support in the
history of the Uruguay Round negotiations, during which a proposal that
would have given the Appellate Body the power to decline ruling on an appeal
was considered, but not accepted.215 And, apparently, this was also the view of
the early Appellate Body. Notably, in its first ruling on the practice of judicial
economy in US –Wool Shirts and Blouses, on which the US relies, the Appellate
Body referred to the exercise of judicial economy by a panel, not by the Ap-
pellate Body itself, and, in contrast to Art. 17.12 of the DSU, there is no pro-
vision in the DSU that obliges a panel to address every issue raised by a
party.216 James Bacchus, one of the Appellate Body members who sat on the
division of US – Wool Shirts and Blouses, said in a roundtable discussion in
2005 that „there’s the issue of judicial economy and there is a very real contrast
between the discretion that is allowed under the DSU to panels not to rule on all
of the legal issues that have been raised in particular claims in a particular
dispute, and the absence of any such discretion on the part of the Appellate Body
in an automatic appeal.“217 Bacchus’s view was supported in that roundtable by
former Appellate Body member Mitsuo Matsushita, who also sat on the US –
Wool Shirts and Blouses division.218 Moreover, as far as panels are concerned,
215 See communication of 28 June 1990 from Canada (MTN.GNG/NG13/W/41), p. 4: „The
Appellate Body would examine the questions raised by the appellant and would decide
whether the case merited an appellate review.“ This proposal did not find its way into the
final agreement.
216 Art. 7.2 of the DSU states that „[p]anels shall address the relevant provisions in any covered
agreement or agreements cited by the parties to the dispute“. This obligation of panels is
narrower in at least two respects than that of the Appellate Body under Art. 17.12 of the
DSU, namely, first, it refers only to „provisions“ and not to the broader concepts of „issues“,
and, second, panels only have to address those provisions cited by the parties which are
„relevant“, whereas Art. 17.12 of the DSU does not limit the appealed issues to be ad-
dressed to the relevant ones.
217 American Society of International Law (ASIL), Annual Meeting, 1 April 2005, WTO Ap-
pellate Body Roundtable, transcript, pp. 28 – 29.
218 ASIL (supra, fn. 217), pp. 27 – 28: „Now about the judicial economy: The DSU says that the
Appellate Body needs to address each issue that was raised. Thus, compared with panels,
the Appellate Body needs to deal with every issue. So judicial economy is not a privilege of
the Appellate Body, at least in theory. But as far as the practical aspect is concerned, if you
have say 20 issues, you might deal with some important issues heavily and deal with some
other issues lightly.“
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even though the Appellate Body declared that panels are under no obligation
to address all issues raised by the parties, it did not go so far as to say that
panels are under an obligation to exercise judicial economy whenever a fin-
ding is not necessary for determining whether there was a violation of WTO
law. In its report in Australia – Salmon of 1998, the Appellate Body emphasized
that panels have discretion to decide which findings might be helpful in re-
solving a dispute between the parties219 and it warned against the use of „false
judicial economy“.220 And in its report in US – Lead and Bismuth II of 2000, the
Appellate Body explicitly rejected the argument of the US in that case that the
Appellate Body’s „[r]eport in United States – Shirts and Blouses sets forth a
general principle that panels may not address any issues that need not be ad-
dressed in order to resolve the dispute between the parties.“221 It was only in the
report in US – Upland Cotton of 2005, ten years after the establishment of the
WTO dispute settlement system, that the Appellate Body for the first time
explicitly addressed the question whether it was allowed to exercise judicial
economy of its own, and, contrary to the views of the founding Appellate Body
members mentioned above (which in 2005 were no longer on the Appellate
Body), found that it had this power (although, like the panels, no obligation to
exercise it).222 In a recent report of 2018, the Appellate Body summarized its
jurisprudence on this issue as follows: „[W]hile the Appellate Body is required to
address each issue on appeal, it has the discretion not to rule on an issue when
doing so is not necessary to resolve the dispute, but the Appellate Body may rule
219 Australia – Salmon, paras. 219 – 226.
220 Australia – Salmon, para. 223.
221 US – Lead and Bismuth II, para. 71; see also Appellate Body report, Canada – Wheat
Exports and Grain Imports, para. 133: „Although the doctrine of judicial economy allows a
panel to refrain from addressing claims beyond those necessary to resolve the dispute, it
does not compel a panel to exercise such restraint.“
222 See Appellate Body report, US – Upland Cotton, paras. 508 – 511, 743 – 748 and 761 – 762;
see on the development of the Appellate Body’s jurisprudence on judicial economy at the
appellate level Alvarez-Jimenez (2009). Even before US – Upland Cotton, there are few
cases in which the Appellate Body exercised judicial economy, without though, explicitly
addressing the question whether it was allowed to do so (see, for instance, Japan –
Agricultural Products II, paras. 139 and 143, and Canada – Diary, para. 124). Presumably, in
these early cases the parties who had appealed the issues on which the Appellate Body
exercised judicial economy had not insisted on a ruling, whereas in Upland – Cotton, the
parties, the US and Brazil, had disagreed on whether the Appellate Body was allowed (or
obligated) to exercise judicial economy (see, in particular, paras. 743 – 748 of that report).
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on such an issue in light of the specific circumstances of a given dispute.“223 This
practice of judicial economy at the appellate level has been described in the
literature as „difficult to reconcile … with the provisions of Article 17 [of the
DSU]“,224 or even as „judge-made“ and not „rest[ing] on the provisions of the
treaties“.225
The US is, of course, well aware of the requirement of Art. 17.12 of the DSU that
the Appellate Body „shall address“ each issue appealed by a party. However,
relying on the dictionary definition of the word „address“ as „to [t]hink about
and begin to deal with (an issue or problem)“,226 it argues that „to address an
issue was not necessarily to resolve that issue“, and points to the fact that
„panels and the Appellate Body had often „addressed“ an issue through the
exercise of judicial economy“.227 In support, the US quotes from the Appellate
Body report in US – Wool Shirts and Blouses that „[a] panel need only address
those claims which must be addressed in order to resolve the matter in issue in
the dispute.“228 The quoted sentence itself shows, though, that, at least at that
time, the Appellate Body understood exercising judicial economy as not ad-
dressing an issue. Put differently, addressing an issue meant for the Appellate
Body ruling on or resolving that issue. And, indeed, reading the language „shall
address“ an issue as permitting the Appellate Body to say nothing about the
issue apart from saying that it is not necessary to say anything about it seems
an exceedingly narrow understanding of that term. A more natural way to read
Art. 17.12 of the DSU is that intends to give each party to a case the right to
have any issue of law covered by the panel addressed in a meaningful fashion,
i.e., to rule on it, rather than leaving it to the Appellate Body to decide whether
223 US – Tuna II (Mexico) (Article 21.5 – US) / US – Tuna II (Mexico) (Article 21.5 – Mexico II),
para. 6.138.
224 Roessler (2017), p. 112.
225 McRea (2006), pp. 361 – 362; see also Babu (2016), p. 508.
226 Minutes of the DSB meeting of 29 October 2018 (WT/DSB/M/420), statement of the US,
para. 4.8, citing Oxford Dictionaries, „address“ (third definition) (https://en.oxforddic
tionaries.com/definition/address); other common dictionaries define the relevant mea-
ning of address not as „to begin to deal with“, but simply as „to deal with“ (see Merriam-
Webster dictionary, definition 2b, „to deal with : treat“, https://www.merriam-web
ster.com/dictionary/address; Cambridge dictionary, definition C1, „to give attention to or
deal with a matter or problem“, https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/englisch/
address).
227 Minutes of the DSB meeting of 29 October 2018 (WT/DSB/M/420), statement of the US,
para. 4.8; see for a similar argument Van den Bossche/Zdouc (2017), p. 243.
228 US – Wool Shirts and Blouses, p. 340.
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it thinks it necessary to deal with the issue. To quote again from the 2005
statement of former Appellate Body member James Buchanan referred to
above: „The parties themselves choose the legal issues that are raised on appeal.
… They make their own decisions about what issues they want to raise on appeal
and then when those issues are raised under Article 17 of the DSU. Under that
provision, the Appellate Body is required – ,shall address‘ – every legal issue that
is raised on appeal. I have heard one or two law professors argue that the Ap-
pellate Body, despite this clear language, is not required to address those issues.
But I do not know of any member of the WTO that feels that way. If the European
Union or Japan or the United States raised a legal issue on appeal and the
Appellate Body refused to rule on it, I think you would hear about that in the DSB
meeting afterwards, and rightfully so.“229 Finally, the narrow reading propa-
gated by the US can create a conflict with Art. 17.13 of the DSU, i.e., the pa-
ragraph following right after Art. 17.12 of the DSU, which states: „The Appellate
Body may uphold, modify or reverse the legal findings and conclusions of the
panel“. Upholding, modifying or reversing a legal finding requires forming a
view on whether that finding is right or wrong. However, since exercising
judicial economy means not ruling on the substance of a legal finding, there is
no such judgment. Consequently, in cases in which the Appellate exercises
judicial economy with regard to a legal finding of a panel, it does not uphold,
modify or reverse that finding, but rather declares it to be „moot and having no
legal effect“, which is contrary to the wording of Art. 17.13 of the DSU.230
Turning to the second counterargument, even if one accepts the US argument
that the Appellate Body is not allowed to rule on every issue appealed by the
parties, but only on those necessary to resolve the dispute, it does not follow
that the Appellate Body may only make findings on those issues that are
necessary for determining whether WTO law was violated and whether a
recommendation under Art. 19.1 of the DSU is called for. This would only be
true if any other finding could not make any contribution to the resolution of a
dispute. This is obviously not the case, though. The dispute China – Publica-
tions and Audiovisual Products, which has been briefly outlined above, serves
as a good illustration of this point. As explained, the question of whether Art.
229 ASIL (supra, fn. 217), p. 9. See also Bacchus (2005), p. 507: „Nor does the Appellate Body
have the authority under the DSU to refuse to ‘address’ a legal issue when it is appealed. … A
refusal by the Appellate Body to rule on a legal issue raised on appeal in dispute settlement
would not help ‘secure a positive solution to a dispute’.“
230 WTO (2017), p. 119, fn. 307; Roessler (2017), p. 112.
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XX of the GATT was available as a defense to China did not matter for a
finding of violation of WTO law, since the conditions of Art. XX of the GATT
were not met anyway. However, this question did matter for China’s imple-
mentation of the resulting DSB recommendation. The panel and the Appellate
Body had found that China had violated the trading commitments under its
Accession Protocol. If the defense was not available, the only way for China to
comply with the DSB ruling would have been to open its market and thus to
honor its trading commitments. By contrast, if the defense was available,
China could have alternatively focused on changing its restrictions in a way
that ensured compliance with the conditions of Art. XX of the GATT. And
indeed, in support of its decision to rule on the availability of the defense, the
Appellate Body emphasized that leaving this issue open „may not assist in the
resolution of this dispute, in particular because such an approach risks creating
uncertainty with respect to China’s implementation obligations.“231 Such un-
certainty might have led to a continuation of the dispute, in particular if China
had chosen to implement the ruling by adapting its measure so that it met the
conditions of Art. XX of the GATT, and the US had insisted that the defense
was not available.
The third counterargument is based on Art. 3.2 of the DSU, which provides, in
relevant part: „The dispute settlement system of the WTO is a central element in
providing security and predictability to the multilateral trading system. The
Members recognize that it serves … to clarify the existing provisions of [the WTO]
agreements“. These statements strongly indicate that the purpose of rulings of
panels and the Appellate Body is not only to resolve specific disputes, but also
to clarify the meaning of WTO law more generally, for all WTOmember states,
and thereby make WTO law and thus the multilateral trading system more
secure and predictable. Clarifying the law going forward is, indeed, a general
function of adjudicatory bodies, in addition to the function of resolving spe-
cific disputes. This is particularly true for higher adjudicatory bodies within a
hierarchical system, such as the Appellate Body as the second and final ins-
tance of adjudication within the WTO dispute settlement system. If one ac-
231 China – Publications and Audiovisual Products, para. 215. For another example see Ap-
pellate Body report, Indonesia – Import Licensing Regimes, para. 5.63: „[W]hile our ruling
on Article XI:2(c) may not directly change the recommendations and rulings by the DSB … ,
the question as to whether Indonesia can in the future invoke Article XI:2(c)(ii) … could
affect the manner in which it can comply with the recommendations and rulings by the
DSB.“
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cepts this additional function of the WTO dispute settlement system and
particular its Appellate Body, then it is entirely proper for the Appellate Body
to rule on issues that are not necessary to resolve the dispute, as long as they
have been raised by a party pursuant to Art. 17.12 of the DSU, and make a
contribution to clarifying open issues of WTO law, such as, for example, in the
case Argentina – Financial Services outlined above. It is noteworthy that even
the US itself in the past has sometimes explicitly asked for such clarification on
issues not necessary to resolve the dispute at hand. For instance, in the case US
– Steel Safeguards, the Appellate Body explained: „[N]one of the participants
appeared to disagree that … it would not be necessary for us to rule on the claims
raised on causation. Nevertheless, several participants expressed an interest in
having us rule on causation as it would provide guidance to Members on ap-
plying safeguard measures in the future consistently with their WTO obligations.
The United States expressed a strong preference for us to rule on causation,
stating that ,[it would] be important for us in terms of understanding what our
obligations are under the Agreement [on Safeguards] and what we have to do to
comply with them‘.“232
Fourth, what about the argument of the US that, pursuant to Art. IX:2 of the
WTO Agreement, only the member states, sitting as Ministerial Conference or
as General Council, have the power to adopt abstract interpretations? The US
seems to imply that rulings on issues that are not necessary for a determi-
nation of whether WTO law was breached and whether a recommendation
according to Art. 19.1 of the DSU should be made are like abstract inter-
pretations under IX:2 of the WTO Agreement and thus illegitimately interfere
with the powers of the member states. However, such Appellate Body rulings
are still made in the context of a specific dispute, based on the facts and
circumstances of that case, and are thus not abstract interpretations like those
under IX:2 of the WTO Agreement.233 Furthermore, no one, including the
Appellate Body, contends that panels and the Appellate Body would not be
bound by authoritative interpretations adopted pursuant to Art. IX:2 of the
WTO Agreement. For these reasons there is no conflict between Art. IX:2 of the
232 US – Steel Safeguards, para. 484. For another example see Appellate Body report, China –
Publications and Audiovisual Products, para. 238: „In response to questioning at the oral
hearing in this appeal, the United States clarified that it is not raising a claim of error with
respect to the way in which the Panel applied the ,necessity‘ test. Instead, the United States
stated that it would welcome clarification from the Appellate Body that an Article XX
analysis should be approached in an integrated fashion.“
233 Cf. Appellate Body report, EU – PET (Pakistan), paras. 5.31 – 5.32.
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WTO Agreement and any of the Appellate Body rulings criticized by the US as
advisory opinions. At best one can read Art. IX:2 of the WTO Agreement as an
implicit admonition to panels and the Appellate Body to interpret WTO law
only within the confines of the specific disputes before them, but, as explai-
ned, staying within the confines of a specific dispute does not mean that one
may only rule on issues necessary for the resolution of the dispute as un-
derstood by the US.
Fifth, and finally, in the case EU – PET (Pakistan), referred to above, the US
took the view that Appellate Body findings on WTO law made without the
need of a recommendation under Art. 19.1 of the DSU are impermissible ad-
visory opinions. However, the arguments of the US in support of that position
suffer from internal contradictions. To recall, in that case the EU had con-
tended that the panel should not have ruled on the measure challenged by
Pakistan because that measure had already expired before the ruling of the
panel. The reasoning of the EU bore striking similarities to that of the US
against advisory opinions. The EU called the panel report „a mere ,advisory
opinion‘“,234 posited „that WTO dispute settlement proceedings are intended to
secure a positive solution to a dispute and should not serve as a vehicle to obtain
,advisory opinions‘ on legal matters“,235 relied on the fact that Arts. 3.3, 3.4 and
3.7 of the DSU emphasized the settlement of disputes,236 and pointed to
Art. 3.9 of the DSU with its reference to Art. IX:2 of the WTO Agreement to
show „that there are other procedures that allow Members to obtain an au-
thoritative interpretation of particular provisions of a covered agreement.“237
Despite these similarities, though, the US did not support the EU, but rather
the complainant, Pakistan. As a third party in this case, the US argued that
since the measure had expired only after the panel’s establishment, the panel
was obligated to make findings on the measure’s WTO consistency, and,
furthermore, in case of a finding of inconsistency, a recommendation under
Art. 19.1 of the DSU.238 In addition, in an earlier dispute about a measure that
had expired during the panel proceedings, EU – Fatty Alcohols (Indonesia), the
234 Appellate Body report, EU – PET (Pakistan), Annex A-1, European Union’s notice of
appeal, p.1.
235 Appellate Body report, EU – PET (Pakistan), para. 5.31.
236 Appellate Body report, EU – PET (Pakistan), paras. 5.22 – 5.26.
237 Appellate Body report, EU – PET (Pakistan), para. 5.31.
238 Appellate Body report, EU – PET (Pakistan), Annex C-1, Executive summary of the United
States’ third participant’s submission, paras. 1 – 4.
B. Issues of procedure and interpretive approach
63
US had not only made similar arguments as a third party,239 but had also
harshly criticized the Appellate Body’s reliance on another prior ruling on
expired measures, US – Certain EC Products. In that report, the Appellate Body
had declared that a panel may not issue a recommendation under Art. 19.1 of
the DSU regarding a measure found to be expired, reasoning „that there is an
obvious inconsistency between the finding of the Panel that ,[the measure at
issue] is no longer in existence‘ and the subsequent recommendation of the Panel
that the DSB request that the United States bring [that measure] into conformity
with its WTO obligations.“240 In the DSB meeting at which the Appellate Body
report in EU – Fatty Alcohols (Indonesia) was adopted, the US stated „that
Article 19.1 of the DSU set out, in mandatory terms, the requirement that a panel
or the Appellate Body ,shall recommend‘ that any measure found to be WTO-
inconsistent be brought into conformity with WTO rules“, and that „[i]n the face
of [such] clear, mandatory language in the DSU“ the refusal to issue such a
recommendation regarding an expired measure amounted to adding to or
diminishing rights provided in the WTO agreements in breach of Arts. 3.2 and
19.2 of the DSU.241
In view of this insistence of the US that panels and the Appellate Body are
under a legal obligation to rule on expired measures, as long as they expired
only after the establishment of the panel, how could the US at the same time
condemn the ruling of the Appellate Body on the measure in EU – PET (Pa-
kistan), which had expired after the establishment of the panel, as an im-
permissible advisory opinion? According to the US, what turned the ruling
into an advisory opinion was the fact that Pakistan had not asked for a re-
commendation under Art. 19.1 of the DSU, thereby confirming, in the view of
the US, that there was no longer a dispute between the parties.242 However,
Pakistan had explained its failure to request a recommendation not with the
239 Appellate Body report, EU – Fatty Alcohols (Indonesia), Annex C-1, Executive summary of
the United States’ third participant’s submission, paras. 8 – 11.
240 Appellate Body report, US – Certain EC Products, para. 81; confirmed in the Appellate
Body reports in US – Upland Cotton, para. 272; EC – Bananas III (Article 21.5 – Ecuador II) /
EC – Bananas III (Article 21.5 – US), para. 271; and China – Raw Materials, para. 263. For an
analysis of WTO jurisprudence on panel recommendations for expired measures, see
Bhardwaj (2019).
241 See minutes of the DSB meeting of 29 September 2017 (WT/DSB/M/402), statement of the
US, paras. 5.9 – 5.10.
242 See minutes of the DSB meeting of 28 May 2018 (WT/DSB/M/413), statement of the US,
paras. 10.5 – 10.8.
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absence of an ongoing dispute with the EU, but rather with the argument that
„[l]ogically, measures cannot be brought into conformity if they no longer
exist“,243 following the rational of the Appellate Body in US – Certain EC
Products. It is difficult to see how that acknowledgement by Pakistan of such a
point of logic could make any difference with regard to the question whether
there was still a dispute between the parties. Moreover, in its third party
submission the US had asserted that while Pakistan was entitled under the
DSU to a ruling on the WTO consistency of the EU’s expired measure, there
was no need for a recommendation if „the parties agree[d] that not issuing a
recommendation [would] assist them in securing a positive resolution to this
dispute.“244 Such an agreement of the parties existed in this case, given that
„neither the European Union nor Pakistan question[ed] the Panel’s decision not
to make a recommendation to the DSB“.245 Therefore, according to arguments of
the US itself, the panel and the Appellate Body in this dispute were right in
ruling on the WTO consistency of the expired measure without also issuing a
recommendation after a finding of inconsistency.
In conclusion, although there might be good policy reasons for the Appellate
Body to limit itself to ruling only on those issues that are necessary for de-
termining whether WTO law was violated and whether a recommendation
pursuant to Art. 19.1 of the DSU is required, and thus to exercise judicial
economy, the practice of judicial economy as demanded by the US is difficult
to reconcile with the language of the provision that most directly deals with
the question what the Appellate Body has to address, namely Art. 17.12 of the
DSU. Other provisions, which speak indirectly to the issue, such as provisions
which emphasize the settling of specific disputes as the main function of the
dispute settlement system, at best support the view that the Appellate Body
has discretion to use judicial economy, but do not contain any clear pre-
scription that the Appellate Body has to use judicial economy whenever
possible. In addition, the emphasis of Art. 3.2 of the DSU on „security and
predictability“ and „clarif[ication] of the existing provisions“ counsels against a
strict prohibition of ruling on issues not necessary to resolve the dispute.
243 Pakistan’s response to the European Union’s preliminary ruling request, para. 4.19, as
quoted by the US in the minutes of the DSB meeting of 28 May 2018 (WT/DSB/M/413),
para. 10.5, fn. 16.
244 Appellate Body report, EU – PET (Pakistan), Annex C-1, Executive summary of the United
States’ third participant’s submission, para. 4.
245 Appellate Body report, EU – PET (Pakistan), para. 5.36.
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Consequently, the position of the Appellate Body is at the very least defensible
in light of the DSU, and certainly not a clear breach of the DSU that would
justify blocking all appointments to the Appellate Body.
4. Appellate review of facts and of municipal law
In an extended statement at the DSB meeting of 27 August 2018, the US made
two related, but legally quite distinct claims regarding Art. 17.6 of the DSU,
which limits appeals to issues of law.246 The US accused the Appellate Body of
violating Art. 17.6 of the DSU by, first, reviewing not only panel findings of law
but also panel findings of fact, and, second, characterizing panel findings on
municipal law as issues of law rather than issues of fact, and reviewing them
based on this characterization.
a. Review of facts
The first accusation of the US concerns the Appellate Body’s practice of a li-
mited review of factual findings based on Art. 11 of the DSU, which the Ap-
pellate Body introduced in 1998 in its report EC – Hormones. In that case, the
respondent, the European Communities (EC), had claimed on appeal that the
panel had disregarded or distorted certain factual evidence, thereby violating
Art. 11 of the DSU. That provision states, in relevant part, that „a panel should
make an objective assessment of the matter before it, including an objective
assessment of the facts of the case.“ The complainants, the US and Canada, had
argued that by asking the Appellate Body to review whether the panel’s fin-
dings were consistent with Art. 11 of the DSU, the EC were, in effect, asking for
a review of factual findings, which was prohibited by Art. 17.6 of the DSU.247
The Appellate Body opened its analysis by emphasizing that under Art. 17.6 of
the DSU „[fi]indings of fact, as distinguished from legal interpretations or legal
conclusions, by a panel are, in principle, not subject to review by the Appellate
246 Minutes of the DSB meeting of 27 August 2018 (WT/DSB/M/417), paras. 4.1 – 4.17
(statement by the US) and 4.18 – 4.39 (subsequent discussion within the DSB). In addition
to the discussion of the US statement at the DSB meeting of 27 August 2018, at the next
regular DSB meeting of 26 September 2018 China made a separate statement in response
to the earlier US statement (minutes [WT/DSB/M/419], paras. 4.2 – 4.6 [statement of
China] and paras. 4.7 – 4.27 [subsequent discussion within the DSB]).
247 Appellate Body report, EC – Hormones, paras. 44 (US) and 61 (Canada).
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Body.“248 It then added, though, that „[t]he consistency or inconsistency of a
given fact or set of facts with the requirements of a given treaty provision is,
however, a legal characterization issue. It is a legal question. Whether or not a
panel has made an objective assessment of the facts before it, as required by
Article 11 of the DSU, is also a legal question which, if properly raised on appeal,
would fall within the scope of appellate review.“249 As a matter of logic, this
conclusion seems not objectionable. However, it raises the problem that a
review of whether a panel has made an objective assessment of the facts under
Art. 11 of the DSU might undermine the limitation of appellate review to legal
issues under Art. 17.6 of the DSU. If every shortcoming in a panel’s fact finding
were to be considered as failure to make an objective assessment of the facts
under Art. 11, then there would be nothing left of the limitation of appellate
review to issues of law under Art. 17.6. The Appellate Body avoided this result
by narrowing the types of errors that constitute a failure of making an ob-
jective assessment of the facts in the sense of Art. 11: „Clearly, not every error in
the appreciation of the evidence … may be characterized as a failure to make an
objective assessment of the facts. … The deliberate disregard of, or refusal to
consider, the evidence submitted to a panel is incompatible with a panel’s duty to
make an objective assessment of the facts. The wilful distortion or misrepre-
sentation of the evidence put before a panel is similarly inconsistent with an
objective assessment of the facts.“250 In later cases, the Appellate Body em-
phasized that in view of the different roles of the Appellate Body and the
panels with regard to fact finding under Art. 17.6, the Appellate Body „cannot
base a finding of inconsistency under Article 11 simply on the conclusion that we
might have reached a different factual finding from the one the panel reached“251
and „will not ,interfere lightly‘ with the panel’s fact-finding authority.“252 In that
way, the Appellate Body harmonized the potentially contradictory require-
ments of Arts. 11 and 17.6 of the DSU.253
248 EC – Hormones, para. 132.
249 EC – Hormones, para. 132.
250 EC – Hormones, para. 133.
251 US – Wheat Gluten, para. 151.
252 EC and certain member States – Large Civil Aircraft, para. 881.
253 On the development of the Appellate Body’s jurisprudence on the review of factual
findings under Art. 11 of the DSU, see Oesch (2003), pp. 157 – 166; see further WTO (2017),
pp. 84 – 88 (on the review of facts by panels under Art. 11 of the DSU) and 108 (on the
review of panel fact finding by the Appellate Body under Art. 11 of the DSU); and Voon/
Yanovich (2006).
B. Issues of procedure and interpretive approach
67
In contrast to the Appellate Body’s compromise between Arts. 11 and 17.6 of
the DSU, the US argues that Art. 17.6 should trump Art. 11, i.e., that the Ap-
pellate Body should not be allowed to review at all whether a panel complied
with its obligation under Art. 11 to make an objective assessment of the facts in
order not to fall foul of Art. 17.6. Its main argument for this predominance of
Art. 17.6 over Art. 11 is the fact that Art. 11 uses the word „should“ rather than
„shall“: „Key to this text [of Art. 11] was the word ,should.‘ … [T]he decision of
WTO Members to use the term ,should‘ indicates that Members did not intend to
create a legal obligation subject to review, a conclusion that is directly reinforced
by the limitation on appeals to issues of law in Article 17.6.“254 Although „should“
and „shall“ can certainly carry different meanings, both generally255 and in the
WTO agreements,256 it seems a bit of a stretch to follow from these nuances in
meaning that Art. 11 has no legal binding effect on panels whatsoever. Fur-
thermore, in other contexts the US relies heavily on Art. 11 as support for
accusations of overreach against the Appellate Body, despite the use of
„should“ rather than „shall“.257 In that sense, the US claims are internally in-
consistent. In any event, regardless of how one might evaluate the competing
arguments of the US and the Appellate Body on Arts. 11 and 17.6, the US ar-
gument is certainly not so strong that it would justify calling the alternative
interpretation by the Appellate Body an obvious, clear breach of the DSU.
Finally, there is an even more important point to make than substance in
evaluating the argument of the US. That is that before its statement at the DSB
meeting of 27 August 2018, the US had never criticized the fact that the Ap-
pellate Body engages in a limited review of a panel’s fact finding based on
Art. 11 of the DSU, neither at the DBS meeting at which the EC – Hormones
report, which first recognized this power of the Appellate Body, was adopted,
254 Minutes of the DSB meeting of 27 August 2018 (WT/DSB/M/417), para. 4.5; see also
minutes of the DSB meeting of 26 September 2018 (WT/DSB/M/419), para. 4.8.
255 Compare, for instance, the definitions of „should“ and „shall“ on https://en.oxforddic-
tionaries.com, in particular, as far as our context is concerned, meaning 1 of „should“
(„Used to indicate obligation, duty, or correctness, typically when criticizing someone’s
actions“, https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/should) with meaning 3 of „shall“
(„Expressing an instruction, command, or obligation“, https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/
definition/shall).
256 For instance, the US points out that in the DSU „should“ is used 21 times, compared to
259 instances in which „shall“ is chosen; see minutes of the DSB meeting of 27 August
2018 (WT/DSB/M/417), para. 4.5.
257 See infra, text at fn. 353.
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nor at any later DSB meeting. In fact, there have been occasions where the US
not only explicitly acknowledged that power of the Appellate Body,258 but even
praised the balance struck and the restraint exercised by the Appellate Body in
its review of findings of fact under Art. 11 of the DSU.259 This lack of criticism is
confirmed by the fact that in its statement at the DSB meeting of 27 August
2018, the US does not mention any earlier criticisms of this practice, neither by
itself nor by other member states.260 In addition, in various cases in the past
the US has challenged the fact finding of panels on appeal by invoking Art. 11 of
258 See, for instance, the statement of the US in the DSB meeting of 1 February 2001 (WT/
DSB/M/119) on the Appellate Body report in US – Section 211 Appropriations Act, para. 27:
„The meaning and operation of municipal law fell within the panel’s role as finder of fact,
and was outside the scope of appellate review unless the finding was inconsistent with the
obligation to make an objective assessment of the facts, in accordance with Article 11 of the
DSU.“
259 See, for instance, the statement of the US in the minutes of the DSB meeting of 28 July
2011 (WT/DSB/M/301) on the Appellate Body report EC – Fastener (China), para. 10: „The
United States said that it would also like to draw Members’ attention to the Appellate Body’s
articulation of the standard of review for a claim of error under Article 11 of the DSU. … The
United States agreed with these statements and believed that they were a useful reminder to
Members regarding the proper scope of Article 11, as well as reflecting the limited scope of
appellate review under Article 17.6 of the DSU.“ See also the statement of the US in the
minutes of the DSB meeting of 22 April 2015 (WT/DSB/M/360) on the Appellate Body
report in US – Shrimp II (Viet Nam), para. 8.6.
260 In the DSB meeting of 26 September 2018 the US rejected the allegation that it had raised
its concern regarding appellate review of factual findings for the first time at the DSB
meeting of 27 August 2018. In response to Mexico’s comment at the DSB meeting of 26
September 2018 „that this was the first time, after more than 500 disputes and more than 20
years, that the United States took the view that there had been ,an invention of an authority
to review fact-finding‘“ (minutes [WT/DSB/M/417], para. 4.23), the US stated: „One Member
had suggested that US concerns with appellate review of panel fact-finding were new and
had been only recently raised by the United States. In its statement made at the 27 August
2018 DSB meeting, the United States had quoted from a statement it had made in 2002 that
expressed concerns on this issue. That Member’s assertion therefore did not reflect reality.“
(minutes [WT/DSB/M/417], para. 4.26). The US refers here to a quote from a statement it
had made at the DSB meeting of 1 February 2002 on the Appellate Body report in US –
Section 211 Appropriation Act (see minutes of the DSB meeting of 27 August 2018 [WT/
DSB/M/417], para. 4.12). However, in that statement the US had only criticized the
Appellate Body’s qualification of municipal law as an legal issue for purposes of Art. 17.6
of the DSU, and not the Appellate Body’s power to review factual findings under Art. 11 of
the DSU. Indeed, in that statement the US had explicitly acknowledged that power (see
the quote from that statement in fn. 258 above).
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the DSU, without questioning the legal validity of such a claim.261 The relative
weakness of its legal arguments combined with the fact that the US made its
allegations for the first time 20 years after the establishment of the practice at
issue and after it had blocked appointments to the Appellate Body for more
than a year, raises serious doubts as to whether the position of the US is the
result of good faith interpretation.
b. Review of municipal law
The second accusation the US makes concerning Art. 17.6 of the DSU refers to
the Appellate Body’s review of panel findings on municipal (domestic) law of
the member states. The US argues that for purposes of the distinction between
issues of law and issues of fact under Art. 17.6 of the DSU, municipal law
should be treated as an issue of fact, and, accordingly, a panel’s findings on the
meaning of municipal should not be subject to review by the Appellate Body.
This raises the question as to what kind of law Art. 17.6 of the DSU refers to in
its term „issues of law covered in the panel report and legal interpretations
developed by the panel.“ The US asserts that legal issues in the sense of Art. 17.6
of the DSU are only issues of WTO law, i.e., excluding municipal law. As textual
DSU basis for this assertion, the US cites Arts. 6.2, 11 and 12.7.262 The first of
these, Art. 6.2 of the DSU, refers to the request for the establishment of a panel
and requires that this request must „identify the specific measure at issue“,
which is usually a measure of municipal law, and „provide a summary of the
legal basis of the complaint“, the legal basis being some provision(s) of WTO
law which are alleged to be violated by the measure of municipal law. Art. 11 of
the DSU calls on panels to make an objective assessment of the matter before
it, and distinguishes in that respect an objective assessment of, on the one
hand, „the facts of the case“, and, on the other hand, „the applicability of and
261 This was pointed out by China in the DSB meeting of 26 September 2018, with reference
to various examples (minutes [WT/DSB/M/417], para. 4.4). In response, the US stated, not
unreasonably, that even if it disagreed with the Appellate Body’s review of factual fin-
dings, the US could not be expected, once the Appellate Body had established this
practice, „not [to] avail itself of that opportunity even if other Members had been making
use of that second bite at the apple“ (minutes [WT/DSB/M/417], para. 4.10). However, if
opportunism had been the only reason why the US had appealed factual findings in
reliance on Art. 11 of the DSU, then one would have expected the US to express its
reservations in some other way or at other occasions, which it never did before the start
of the appointment crisis.
262 Minutes of the DSB meeting of 27 August 2018 (WT/DSB/M/417), para. 4.8.
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conformity with the relevant covered agreements“, i.e., the WTO agreements.
This juxtaposition of facts and of issues of WTO law implies that issues of
municipal law are considered to be factual issues. Finally, Art. 12.7 of the DSU
states that in its written report a panel has to set out „the findings of fact“ and
„the applicability of the relevant provisions“, which, when read together with
Art. 11 of the DSU, in particular, again implies that legal issues only include
issues of WTO law. Based on these three provisions, the US concludes that „the
DSU made clear that the measure at issue was the core fact to be established by a
complaining party, and the WTO consistency of that measure was the issue of
law.“263 In addition, the US claims that the proposition that municipal law is to
be qualified as fact rather than law is not only recognized by WTO law, but
also by international law in general.264 Finally, the US quotes statements from
10 WTO panels and statements made by members as parties in 15 WTO cases,
all in favor of viewing municipal law as fact rather than law.265
The Appellate Body first addressed this question in 1997, in the case India –
Patents (US). At issue in that case was whether certain provisions of Indian law
were compliant with Art. 70.8(a) of the TRIPS Agreement, i.e., with WTO law.
India had asserted that the panel should have treated Indian municipal law as
a fact to be established by the party relying on it, in this case the US, rather
than as law to be interpreted by the panel, and should have given India the
benefit of the doubt as to the meaning it ascribed to its own laws before the
panel.266 In response, the Appellate Body stated: „In public international law, an
international tribunal may treat municipal law in several ways. Municipal law
may serve as evidence of facts and may provide evidence of state practice.
However, municipal law may also constitute evidence of compliance or non-
compliance with international obligations.“267 In support of these statements, it
then quoted from a judgment of the Permanent Court of International Justice
concerning whether a Polish law had violated international law: „From the
standpoint of International Law and of the Court which is its organ, municipal
laws are merely facts which express the will and constitute the activities of States
… The Court is certainly not called upon to interpret the Polish law as such; but
there is nothing to prevent the Court’s giving judgment on the question whether
263 Minutes of the DSB meeting of 27 August 2018 (WT/DSB/M/417), para. 4.8.
264 Minutes of the DSB meeting of 27 August 2018 (WT/DSB/M/417), para. 4.9.
265 Minutes of the DSB meeting of 27 August 2018 (WT/DSB/M/417), paras. 4.9 – 4.10.
266 Appellate Body report, India – Patents (US), para. 64.
267 India – Patents (US), para. 65.
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or not, in applying that law, Poland is acting in conformity with its obligations …
under [international law].“268 From this the Appellate Body followed that the
panel in this case had been right to examine the Indian law at issue in detail
because without an understanding of the meaning of that law it could not
have determined whether India had complied with its obligations under WTO
law.269 As to its own role in reviewing the panel’s findings on India’s municipal
law, the Appellate Body stated: „And, just as it was necessary for the Panel in
this case to seek a detailed understanding of the operation of [the Indian mu-
nicipal law at issue] in order to assess whether India had complied with Article
70.8(a) [of the TRIPS Agreement], so, too, is it necessary for us in this appeal to
review the Panel’s examination of the same Indian domestic law.“270
Two points are noteworthy in this argument of the Appellate Body. First, the
Appellate Body seems to agree with the notion that within the WTO system
issues of law are, at least in principle, issues of WTO law. Municipal law is only
relevant insofar as its understanding it necessary for a proper application of
WTO law, and in particular for determining whether a member state complied
with WTO law. In that sense, municipal law is no different than ordinary facts,
such as, for instance, the exact increase of imports in a given period (issue of
fact), an understanding of which is required for a determination of whether a
member state fulfills the conditions for taking a safeguard action against such
imports under the WTO Agreement on Safeguards (issue of law). Second, the
Appellate Body claims that there is no difference between itself and the panel
as far as the examination of municipal law is concerned, i.e., that it, like the
panel, has to examine municipal on its own in order to get a detailed un-
derstanding of it, rather than just to take the panel’s finding on the meaning of
municipal law as given. However, if one accepts, as the Appellate Body seems
to do, that issues of law within the WTO system are issues of WTO law only,
then the Appellate Body’s equalization of its role and that of the panel with
regard to the review of municipal law disregards the different roles of Ap-
pellate Body and panels under Art. 17.6 of the DSU, which limits the power of
the Appellate Body to reviewing issues of law. As the US correctly observes,
„many factual issues in WTO dispute settlement required ,detailed understan-
268 India – Patents (US), para. 65, quoting from the judgment on the merits in Case con-
cerning certain interests in Polish Upper Silesia, 1926, Publications of the Permanent Court
of International Justice, Series A, No. 7, p. 19.
269 India – Patents (US), para. 66
270 India – Patents (US), para. 68.
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ding.‘ But that provided no basis for treating those factual issues as issues of law
to be decided de novo by the Appellate Body on appeal.“271
It has to be added that in India – Patents (US), neither the parties nor the
Appellate Body had referred to Art. 17.6 of the DSU and the relevance of that
provision for the question of reviewing findings on municipal law on appeal.272
That changed with the case US – Section 211 Appropriations Act in 2002. In
dispute in that case was whether Section 211 of the US Appropriation Act
violated certain provision of the TRIPS Agreements. Obviously, an answer to
that question required an understanding of the meaning of Section 211. Ac-
cordingly, the panel determined the meaning of Section 211, and then rejected
most of the EC claims. On appeal, the EC argued that the panel had read
Section 211 erroneously, and asked the Appellate Body to reverse that reading
of Section 211.273 In response, the US contended that the Appellate Body was
bound by the panel’s reading of the measure at issue, i.e., Section 211, since a
panel’s review of municipal law was an issue of fact and thus under Art. 17.6 of
the DSU outside the scope of appellate review.274 In its analysis, the Appellate
Body quoted at length the relevant passage from India – Patents (US) dis-
cussed above.275 From that it followed that „[u]nder the DSU, a panel may
examine the municipal law of a WTO Member for the purpose of determining
whether that Member has complied with its obligations under the WTO Agree-
ment. Such an assessment is a legal characterization by a panel. And, therefore,
a panel’s assessment of municipal law as to its consistency with WTO obligations
is subject to appellate review under Article 17.6 of the DSU.“276 Applying this
reasoning to the question at hand, it found that the panel’s assessment of
Section 211 was „an interpretation of the meaning of Section 211 solely for the
purpose of determining whether the United States has fulfilled its obligations
under the TRIPS Agreement. The meaning given by the Panel to Section 211 is,
271 Minutes of the DSB meeting of 27 August 2018 (WT/DSB/M/417), para. 4.12.
272 The same was true for the 2001 Appellate Body report in US – Hot-Rolled Steel, para. 200,
in which the Appellate Body repeated, in essence, its statement that not only the panels,
but also the Appellate Body has „to conduct a detailed examination of [domestic] legis-
lation in assessing its consistency with WTO law“ (with reference to its earlier statement in
India – Patents (US), paras. 66 – 67).
273 Appellate Body report, US – Section 211 Appropriation Act, para. 102.
274 Appellate Body report, US – Section 211 Appropriation Act, para. 101.
275 US – Section 211 Appropriation Act, para. 104.
276 US – Section 211 Appropriation Act, para. 105.
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thus, clearly within the scope of our review as set out in Article 17.6 of the DSU.“277
However, as in India – Patents (US), the reasoning of the Appellate Body was
based, as the US stated in the DSB meeting at which Appellate Body report in
this case was adopted, on a „logical misstep“.278 While it is true that a panel’s
finding on whether a measure of municipal law complies with WTO law is an
issue of WTO law, that does not make the meaning of municipal law itself an
issue of WTO law because otherwise any finding of fact a panel makes in order
to determine whether a member state complied with WTO law (and why else
would a panel make a finding of fact in WTO dispute settlement?) would, ipso
facto, become an issue of WTO law, thereby completely eradicating the dis-
tinction between issues of law and issues of fact in Art. 17.6 of the DSU.
In its subsequent case law, the Appellate Body has consistently confirmed its
view that findings on municipal law made for the purpose of determining
compliance with WTO law are issues of law under Art. 17.6 of the DSU, always
relying on the logic first set out in India – Patents (US).279 However, in China –
Auto Parts, the Appellate Body seemed to say that this logic applied only to the
text of the municipal legal instrument, but not to other elements relevant for
the determination of its meaning. It stated „that there may be instances in
which a panel’s assessment of municipal law will go beyond the text of an in-
strument on its face, in which case further examination may be required, and
may involve factual elements.“280 As to what these factual elements were, it
referred to its reports in US – Carbon Steel and US – Corrosion-Resistant Steel
Sunset Review, which described them „as evidence of the consistent application
of such laws, the pronouncements of domestic courts on the meaning of such
laws, the opinions of legal experts and the writings of recognized scholars.“281
Concerning the review of finding on such factual elements, the Appellate Body
explained: „With respect to such elements, the Appellate Body will not lightly
277 US – Section 211 Appropriation Act, para. 106.
278 Minutes of the DSB meeting of 1 February 2002 (WT/DSB/M/119), para. 27.
279 See the following Appellate Body reports: China – Auto Parts, para. 225; China – Publi-
cations and Audiovisual Products, para. 177; EC – Fasteners (China), para. 295; US –
Countervailing and Anti-Dumping Measures (China), para. 4.99; and EU – Biodiesel (Ar-
gentina), para. 6.155.
280 China – Auto Parts, para. 225; confirmed by the Appellate Body in EC – Fasteners (China),
para. 296.
281 US – Carbon Steel, para. 157; US – Corrosion-Resistant Steel Sunset Review, para. 168.
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interfere with a panel’s finding on appeal.“282 By declaring that it would not
lightly interfere with a panel’s findings on these factual elements, it indicated
that it would review them like other factual findings under Art. 11 of the DSU,
without, though, mentioning Art. 11 explicitly. To distinguish for purposes of
the scope of appellate review between one element of interpretation, the text
of a legal instrument, and other elements, such as application by adminis-
trative agencies or interpretations by domestic courts, might have some
practical value, in that the text is usually the most easily available fact, but it
lacks any discernible basis in Art. 17.6 of the DSU. And, indeed, the Appellate
Body gave up this distinction in US – Countervailing and Anti-Dumping Me-
asures (China). There it emphasized that all elements of interpretation can
have both factual and legal aspects for purposes of Art. 17.6 of the DSU. In
particular, the text of an instrument, like the other elements, may have factual
elements, e.g., „the individuation of the text and of some associated circum-
stances“, „[f]or example, whether the text is official in more than one language,
its date of enactment, publication and enforcement, the issuing authority, etc.“,
and the other elements may not only include factual elements (such as, for
instance, „whether or when a domestic court ruling has been rendered and fi-
nalized, or what a writing by a recognized scholar contains“), but also legal
elements, in particular „the examination of the legal interpretation given by a
domestic court or by a domestic administering agency as to the meaning of
municipal law with respect to the measure being reviewed for consistency with
the covered agreements [i.e., WTO law]“.283 In short, whether a certain element
of interpretation, like the text of a measure, the practice of an administrative
agencies or the ruling of a court, actually exists and what it consists of (e.g.,
which words it contains) is an issue of fact, but the meaning of such an ele-
ment is an issue of law.
The weakness of the Appellate Body’s basic argument in India – Patents (US)
has also been pointed out in academic literature.284 And, unlike in the case of
282 US – Auto Parts, para. 225; confirmed by the Appellate Body in China – Publications and
Audiovisual Products, para. 177, and EC – Fasteners (China), para. 296.
283 US – Countervailing and Anti-Dumping Measures (China), para. 4.101; confirmed by the
Appellate Body in EU – Biodiesel (Argentina), para. 6.156.
284 See Lester (2018) („Most people I talk to about this agree that the Appellate Body got it
wrong.“); Lester (2012), pp. 142 – 144 and 148 – 149 (p. 149: „Arguably, the Appellate Body’s
decision to consider the panel’s construction of the challenged measures, outside the context
of WTO obligations, as a law application issue stretches the boundaries of [Art. 17.6 of the
DSU].“); Bohanes/Lockhart (2009), pp. 416 – 421 (p. 421: „[T]he logic of the Appellate Body’s
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the limited review of factual findings under Art. 11 of the DSU, the US has
criticized the Appellate Body’s review of municipal law not merely in the
context of the appointment crisis, but it had done so early on, starting with US
– Section 211 Appropriations Act in 2002,285 and it has been consistent in its
criticism ever since.286
If the Appellate Body’s position on appellate review of municipal law is indeed
so weak, what might explain it? Of course, one can only speculate, but one
reason might be that, as a judicial body, the Appellate Body feels qualified not
only to interpret WTO law, but other law as well.287 However, although the
Appellate Body’s qualification as a judicial body might be a good policy reason
for appellate review of municipal law, it is not enough to overcome the legal
arguments against it under the DSU.
If one agrees that the Appellate Body went beyond the limits of Art. 17.6 of the
DSU by reviewing on appeal findings on municipal law, in effect, as an issue of
law rather than fact, the follow-up question in the context of our examination
is whether by doing so the Appellate Body committed a breach of the DSU so
serious that it would justify blocking all appointments to the Appellate Body.
The answer is no, for at least three reasons.
finding [in India – Patents (US) and US – Section 211 Appropriations Act] is difficult to
understand.“).
285 See statement of the US in the minutes of the DSB meeting of 1 February 2002 (WT/DSB/
M/119), para. 27.
286 See statements of the US in the minutes of the DSB meetings of 12 January 2009 (WT/
DSB/M/261), para. 5, on the Appellate Body report in China – Auto Parts; 10 July 2014
(WT/DSB/M/347), paras. 7.7 – 7.8, on the Appellate Body report in US – Countervailing
and Anti-Dumping Measures (China); and 26 October 2016 (WT/DSB/M/387), paras. 8.9 –
8.15, on the Appellate Body report in EU – Biodiesel (Argentina).
287 Cf. the statement of China in the DSB meeting of 12 January 2009 (at which the Appellate
Body report in China – Auto Parts was adopted) in defense of the Appellate Body’s review
of municipal law: „The process of interpreting municipal law was not materially different
than the process of interpreting the covered agreements, at least where municipal law was
interpreted on its face. The Appellate Body was, of course, eminently qualified in matters of
legal interpretation. Therefore, the general principle that the Appellate Body should give
some degree of deference to the factual determinations of a panel was not implicated by a
panel’s interpretation of a Member’s municipal law.“ (minutes [WT/DSB/M/262], para. 9);
see also Bohanes/Lockhart (2009), p. 421: „A possible explanation for this finding is that the
Appellate Body would like to retain the ability to review a panel’s finding on municipal law
even in the absence of errors that rise to the level of an Article 11 DSU violation. Although
formally a factual matter, municipal law nevertheless remains law, and judges intuitively
want to assess the meaning of law, whether it is municipal or international.“
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First, the question of whether and, if so, to what extent findings on municipal
law are reviewable on appeal is not an easy one, and one that it is not explicitly
answered in the DSU. Art. 17.6 of the DSU merely states that only issues of law
can be reviewed by the Appellate Body, but the DSU does not say anything
explicit on how municipal law has to be treated for purposes of Art. 17.6 of the
DSU. Another indication of the difficulty of the question is the very textbook
on international law on which the US relies in support of the proposition that
municipal is always to be considered an issue of fact in international law,
namely Ian Brownlie’s Principles of Public International Law.288 That textbook
not only quotes, like the Appellate Body in India – Patents (US), the statement
of the Permanent Court of Justice that „municipal laws are merely facts which
express the will and constitute the activities of States“, but also qualifies this
statement with the assertion that „the general proposition that international
tribunals take account of municipal laws only as facts ’is, at most, a debatable
proposition the validity and wisdom of which are subject to, and call for, further
discussion and review’.“289 Similarly, while the Appellate Body’s approach to
municipal law has been criticized in academic literature,290 there are also
scholars who support the Appellate Body on this point,291 again indicating that
this is not a clear-cut issue.
Second, the US view that the Appellate Body’s case law on municipal law is a
clear breach of the DSU finds little resonance with other WTO members.
Before August 2018, the US had criticized the Appellate Body on this issue on
four occasions in the DSB, at the adoptions of the Appellate Body reports in US
– Section 211 Appropriations Act, China – Auto Parts, US – Countervailing and
Anti-Dumping Measures (China), and EU – Biodiesel (Argentina).292 The review
of municipal law in these four reports garnered altogether only four comments
by other members in the DSB, two by China and one each by Japan and Korea,
and each of them supported the Appellate Body.293 The extended statement of
288 Minutes of the DSB meeting of 27 August 2018 (WT/DSB/M/417), statement of the US,
para. 4.9, quoting Brownlie (1998), p. 39.
289 Brownlie (1998), p. 38, quoting Jenks (1964), p. 552.
290 See supra, fn. 284.
291 See, for instance, Howse (2003), pp. 21 – 22.
292 See supra, fn. 285 and 286.
293 Minutes of the DSB meetings of 12 January 2009 (WT/DSB/M/262), para. 9 (statement of
China on the Appellate Body report in China – Auto Parts [„China welcomed the finding of
the Appellate Body that a panel’s interpretation of a Member’s municipal law was a matter
of legal interpretation to be reviewed by the Appellate Body under Article 17.6 of the DSU“]);
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the US at the DSB meeting of 27 August 2018 prompted comments by nine
members, immediately at the meeting of 27 August 2018294 and at the following
regular DSB meeting of 26 September 2018.295 Of these nine members, four
rejected the US allegations against the Appellate Body regarding municipal
law (Brazil, China, the EU, and Mexico), three did not take a position on the
issue (Canada, Chile, and the Philippines), and only two raised doubts as to
the approach of the Appellate Body, and that only cautiously (Australia and
Japan). This lukewarm reception of the US criticism by other members both
before and after the start of the appointment crisis hardly suggests an eg-
regious misinterpretation of the DSU by the Appellate Body.
Third, the consequences of, on the one hand, reviewing municipal law on
appeal in (arguable) breach of Art. 17.6 of the DSU and, on the other hand,
blocking all appointments to the Appellate Body in (clear) breach of Art. 17.2
of the DSU are vastly disproportionate. According to the US, the main practical
disadvantage of the Appellate Body’s review of findings of municipal law is
that it „represents a serious waste of the limited resources of the WTO dispute
settlement system, adding complexity and delay to the process“296 because issues
of municipal law have to be argued and decided twice, first by a panel and
then by the Appellate Body. The US also contends that „no purpose [is] served“
by such a review on appeal.297 Of course, any review of first instance findings
by a second instance adds time and costs to legal proceedings, and the review
22 July 2014 (WT/DSB/M/348), paras. 7.3 and 7.10 (statements on the Appellate Body
report in US – Countervailing and Anti-Dumping Measures (China) by China [„China
welcomed, in particular, the Appellate Body’s recognition that the baseline of prior mu-
nicipal law was to be determined in accordance with the standard that the Appellate Body
had previously articulated in its Report in the ,US – Carbon Steel‘ dispute.‘“] and Japan
[„Japan agreed with the Appellate Body’s previous findings [on municipal law] which were
also reaffirmed in the present report.“]); and 22 June 2016 (WT/DSB/M/380), para. 11.8
(statement of Korea on US – Countervailing and Anti-Dumping Measures (China) [„Korea
believed that this approach [of the Appellate Body on municipal law] was no less valid than
the one argued by a Member [i.e., the US]“]).
294 See minutes of the DSB meeting of 27 August 2018 (WT/DSB/M/417), paras. 4.18 (Chile),
4.19 – 4.21 (Japan), 4.22 (Australia), 4.23 (Canada), 4.24 – 4.30 (Brazil), 4.31 – 4.32 (China),
4.33 – 4.36 (Philippines), 4.36 (Mexico) and 4.37 (EU).
295 See minutes of the DSB meeting of 26 September 2018 (WT/DSB/M/419), paras. 4.2 – 4.6
(China), 4.12 (Japan), 4.13 – 4.21 (Brazil), 4.22 (Canada), 4.23 (Mexico), 4.24 (EU), and 4.25
(Chile).
296 Minutes of the DSB meeting of 27 August 2018 (WT/DSB/M/417), para. 4.16.
297 Minutes of the DSB meeting of 27 August 2018 (WT/DSB/M/417), para. 4.16.
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of panel findings on municipal law by the Appellate Body is no exception.
However, usually, a review by an appeal instance also produces benefits in
terms of an increased likelihood of a correct outcome, and one may safely
assume that this applies to the Appellate Body, too. Therefore, the US asser-
tion that „no purpose [is] served“ by reviewing findings of municipal law on
appeal is somewhat overstated. Be that as it may, the consequence of adding
some time and costs to proceedings in which a party appeals panel findings on
municipal law pales in comparison to the consequences of blocking all ap-
pointments to the Appellate Body. The resulting reduction of the number of
Appellate Body members has already prolonged appellate proceedings to an
unprecedented degree, exceeding any delays caused by appellate review of
municipal law, and will soon, in December 2019, when the number of Ap-
pellate Body members will fall below three, freeze all work on new appeals.
Summarizing, there is a case to be made that by reviewing panel findings on
municipal law the Appellate Body has gone beyond what is permissible under
Art. 17.6 of the DSU. However, such misinterpretation cannot justify blocking
all appointments to the Appellate Body because, first, given the difficulty of
the legal question it is not an obvious breach of the DSU, second, no other
member apart from the US considers it a serious breach, and, third, the
consequences of a breach of Art. 17.6 of the DSU by reviewing municipal law
are far less serious than those of a breach of Art. 17.2 of the DSU by blocking all
appointments to the Appellate Body.
5. Precedential effect of Appellate Body reports
The US accuses the Appellate Body of illegitimately claiming precedential
effect for its own reports and rulings.298 Precedential effect of an adjudicatory
body’s ruling on a legal issue means299 that this ruling is binding for a later
decision on the same legal issue, i.e., that the legal issue in the later case has to
298 The issue of precedential effect in WTO dispute settlement has generated a substantial
amount of discussion in academic literature; see, for instance, Gao (2018), pp. 523 – 528;
Beshkar/Chilton (2016), pp. 385 – 388; Pauwelyn (2016); Pelc (2016); Kucik/Pelc (2016);
Hsiang/Nyarko (2015); Piérola (2014); Luanratan/Roman (2014); Pelc (2014); Brewster
(2011); Bhala (1999a), (1999b), and (2001); and Chua (1998).
299 On the definition of precedential effect, see, for instance, Brewster (2011), p. 193, and
Murrill (2018), p. 4.
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be decided in the same way than in the earlier ruling. Such precedential effect
is also called stare decisis. One can distinguish between horizontal and vertical
precedential effect. Horizontal precedential effect means that an adjudicatory
body is bound by its own earlier rulings. Vertical horizontal effect refers to a
hierarchical adjudicatory system in which a lower adjudicatory body is bound
by rulings of a higher adjudicatory body within that system. Another relevant
distinction for our purpose is that between de jure and de facto precedential
effect. In the former case there is an legal obligation to follow prior rulings,
whereas in the latter there is no such obligation, but prior rulings are followed
nevertheless, as a matter of practice.
The US is particularly concerned about claims that panels should be bound by
Appellate Body rulings (horizontal direct effect), but it is also opposed to any
binding effect of earlier Appellate Body rulings on later Appellate Body de-
cisions (vertical horizontal effect). In a lengthy statement at the DSB of 18
December 2018 „on the precedential value of panel or Appellate Body reports
under the WTO Agreement and DSU“, the US gave its most detailed account so
far of its views on this subject.300 In that statement the US criticized „the
Appellate Body’s misguided insistence that its reports had to serve as precedent
,absent cogent reasons‘“301 and set out a number of reasons why it believes that
WTO law, and the DSU in particular, accords no precedential effect to Ap-
pellate Body rulings (and not to panel rulings, either). To evaluate this criti-
cism, we will first look at what the Appellate Body has said on the issue, and to
what extent panels and the Appellate Body actually rely on existing Appellate
Body case law. Based on that, we will describe and analyze the arguments of
the US.
The most important statements of the Appellate Body on precedential effect
are to be found in its reports in the cases Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II (1996),
US – Shrimp (Article 21.5 – Malaysia) (2001), US – Oil Country Tubular Goods
Sunset Reviews (2004), US – Stainless Steel (Mexico) (2008), and US – Continued
Zeroing (2009).
300 Minutes of the DSB meeting of 18 December 2018 (WT/DSB/M/423), paras. 4.2 – 4.25
(statement by the US) and 4.26 – 4.38 (discussion of the statement within the DSB); see
for an earlier US statement on the issue minutes of the DSB meeting of 20 May 2008
(WT/DSB/M/250), paras. 50 – 55 (criticism of the Appellate Body’s views on precedent in
its report in US – Stainless Steel (Mexico), paras. 154 – 162).
301 Minutes of the DSB meeting of 18 December 2018 (WT/DSB/M/423), para. 4.2.
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In Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II, the panel, after declaring that interpretation
of theWTO provision at issue in the case was governed by Arts. 31 and 32 of the
VCLT,302 had found that adopted GATT panel reports were subsequent prac-
tice of the GATT contracting parties in the sense of Art. 31(3)(c) of the VCLT
and thus had to be taken into account, and, furthermore, that they were
decisions of the GATT contracting parties in the sense of Art. 1(b)(iv) GATT
1994 and therefore part of GATT 1994.303 The Appellate Body rejected both of
these findings.304 It argued that under the GATT 1947 panels were not „legally
bound by the details and reasoning of a previous panel report“ and that such
reports did not „constitute a definitive interpretation of the relevant provisions of
GATT 1947“.305 That this understanding also prevails under the GATT 1994
followed for the Appellate Body in particular from the power of the Ministerial
Conference and the General Council to adopt exclusive interpretation
pursuant to Art. IX:2 of the WTO Agreement and the confirmation of that
power in Art. 3.9 of the DSU. Still, the Appellate Body also emphasized that
adopted panels reports are not meaningless, since they belong to the „legal
history and experience under the GATT 1947“,306 which was incorporated into
the WTO by Art. XVI:1 of the WTO Agreement (according to which „the WTO
shall be guided by the decisions, procedures and customary practices“ under
GATT 1947). From all of this the Appellate Body concluded: „Adopted panel
reports are an important part of the GATT acquis. They are often considered by
subsequent panels. They create legitimate expectations among WTO Members,
and, therefore, should be taken into account where they are relevant to any
dispute. However, they are not binding, except with respect to resolving the
particular dispute between the parties to that dispute.“ 307
In US – Shrimp (Article 21.5 – Malaysia) the complainant, Malaysia, had ob-
jected to the fact that the panel in that case had relied heavily on the earlier
Appellate Body report US – Shrimp. In response, the Appellate Body not only
endorsed the right of the panel to rely on Appellate Body rulings, but added
that it „would have expected the Panel to do so.“308 Furthermore, it quoted its
passage from Japan – Alcohol Beverages II that adopted panel rulings create
302 Panel report, Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II, para. 6.8.
303 Panel report, Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II, para. 6.10.
304 Appellate Body report, Japan – Alcohol Beverages II, pp. 106 – 108.
305 Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II, p. 107.
306 Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II, p. 108.
307 Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II, p. 108.
308 US – Shrimp (Article 21.5 – Malaysia), para. 107.
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legitimate expectations and should be taken into account, and stated that
„[t]his reasoning applies to adopted Appellate Body Reports as well.“309 The
thrust of US – Shrimp (Article 21.5 – Malaysia) was affirmed and strengthened
in US – Oil Country Tubular Goods Sunset Reviews, in which again reliance of
the panel on an earlier Appellate Body case on a similar issue was before the
Appellate Body. It declared that „following the Appellate Body’s conclusions in
earlier disputes is not only appropriate, but is what would be expected from
panels, especially where the issues are the same.“310
The Appellate Body’s most detailed and arguably most relevant statement to
date on precedential effect was made in the case US – Stainless Steel (Mexico).
At issue in this case was the US practice of „zeroing“ in anti-dumping pro-
ceedings, an issue that has spawned more WTO disputes than any other single
practice of a member state.311 The panel in this dispute had, after careful
consideration, explicitly rejected and disregarded the reasoning of the Ap-
pellate Body in two earlier cases, US – Zeroing (EC) and US – Zeroing (Japan),
on the same type of zeroing that was before the panel.312 On appeal, the
claimant Mexico had argued that by refusing to follow these Appellate Body
precedents the panel had violated its obligations under Art. 11 of the DSU,
which describes the function of panels. In its analysis, the Appellate Body
considered that the function of panels pursuant to Art. 11 of the DSU is in-
formed by Art. 3 of the DSU, which states, among other things, that „[t]he
dispute settlement system of the WTO is a central element in providing security
and predictability to the multilateral trading system“ (first sentence of Art. 3.2 of
the DSU) and that it serves „to clarify the existing provisions of those agreements
in accordance with customary rules of interpretation of public international law“
(second sentence of Art. 3.2 of the DSU).313 The Appellate Body then sum-
marized its earlier statements on precedential effect in Japan – Alcoholic
Beverages II, US – Shrimp (Article 21.5 – Malaysia) and US – Oil Country Tubular
Goods Sunset Reviews.314 As to the practical effect of existing case law, it said
that „[d]ispute settlement practice demonstrates that WTO Members attach
significance to reasoning provided in previous panel and Appellate Body re-
309 US – Shrimp (Article 21.5 – Malaysia), paras. 108 – 109.
310 US – Oil Country Tubular Goods Sunset Reviews, para. 188.
311 For an overview of the zeroing disputes, see, for instance, Mavroidis/Prusa (2018),
pp. 244 – 247, Nedumpara (2012), and Bown/Prusa (2011).
312 Panel report, US – Stainless Steel (Mexico), para. 7.106.
313 US – Stainless Steel (Mexico), para. 157.
314 US – Stainless Steel (Mexico), paras. 158 – 159.
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ports.“315 Relying on the first sentence of Art. 3.2 of the DSU, it then made its
core statement on horizontal stare decisis: „Ensuring ,security and predicta-
bility‘ in the dispute settlement system, as contemplated in Article 3.2 of the DSU,
implies that, absent cogent reasons, an adjudicatory body will resolve the same
legal question in the same way in a subsequent case.“316 The Appellate Body
drew further support for precedential effect from the „[c]larification … envi-
saged in [the second sentence of] Article 3.2 of the DSU“: „[T]he relevance of
clarification contained in adopted Appellate Body reports is not limited to the
application of a particular provision in a specific case.“317 Regarding the relati-
onship between the Appellate Body and the panels, that is, the issue of vertical
stare decisis, the Appellate Body explained that „[i]n the hierarchical structure
contemplated in the DSU, panels and the Appellate Body have distinct roles to
play.“318 It pointed out that the Appellate Body is a standing body (whereas the
panels are ad-hoc bodies), and that it has the power on appeal to overturn
legal interpretations by the panels (Arts. 17.6 and 17.13 of the DSU), from which
it followed that „[t]he creation of the Appellate Body by WTO Members to review
legal interpretations developed by panels shows that Members recognized the
importance of consistency and stability in the interpretation of their rights and
obligations“ and that a panel’s disregard of applicable Appellate Body prece-
dent „undermines the development of a coherent and predictable body of ju-
risprudence … as contemplated under the DSU.“319 In conclusion, the Appellate
Body declared that it was „deeply concerned about the Panel’s decision to depart
from well-established Appellate Body jurisprudence clarifying the interpretation
of the same legal issues“, but, since it had overturned the panel’s finding on
zeroing anyway, it did not make an additional finding on whether the panel
had violated Art. 11 of the DSU.320
Finally, in US – Continued Zeroing, the Appellate Body was presented with the
question whether its statement in US – Stainless Steel (Mexico) that „absent
cogent reasons, an adjudicatory body will resolve the same legal question in the
same way in a subsequent case“ meant that only the Appellate Body or also
panels could deviate from earlier Appellate Body rulings if there were „cogent
315 US – Stainless Steel (Mexico), para. 160.
316 US – Stainless Steel (Mexico), para. 160; on the genesis of the term „cogent reasons“, see
Lester (2019) (attributing the first use of the term to the EU).
317 US – Stainless Steel (Mexico), para. 161.
318 US – Stainless Steel (Mexico), para. 161.
319 US – Stainless Steel (Mexico), para. 161.
320 US – Stainless Steel (Mexico), para. 162.
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reasons“ for such deviation. The panel in that dispute had to decide a legal
issue – again zeroing in anti-dumping proceedings – on which it agreed with
the respondent, the US, and earlier panels who had addressed the same issue,
but on which the Appellate Body had repeatedly ruled to the contrary.321 After
reviewing the case law of the Appellate Body on precedential effect,322 the
panel indicated that a panel had the power and indeed the obligation to
disregard Appellate Body precedent if that was warranted.323 However, in the
end the panel nevertheless followed the Appellate Body, in particular because
refusing to do so in the face of repeated and consistent Appellate Body rulings
on an issue, like in the case before it, would run contrary to the DSU’s objective
of prompt settlement of disputes (Art. 3.3 of the DSU).324 On appeal, the EC
argued „that, if the Panel Report is construed as finding that a panel can invoke
,cogent reasons‘ for departing from previous Appellate Body rulings on the same
issue of legal interpretation,“ then the Appellate Body should reverse that
finding.325 The Appellate Body noted that since the panel had, despite its re-
servations, followed Appellate Body precedent, it did „appear to have acceded
to the hierarchical structure contemplated in the DSU.“326 Therefore, the Ap-
pellate Body saw no need to address the EC’s appeal, i.e., it left the issue
open.327 Since then, several panels have declared with regard to specific Ap-
pellate Body rulings that they would follow them because there were no
321 Panel report, US – Continued Zeroing, paras. 7.162 – 7.169.
322 Panel report, US – Continued Zeroing, paras. 7.170 – 7.177.
323 Panel report, US – Continued Zeroing, paras. 7.180: „In our view, … a panel cannot simply
follow the adopted report of another panel, or of the Appellate Body, without careful
consideration of the facts and arguments made by the parties in the dispute before it. To do
so would be to abdicate its responsibilities under Article 11. By the same token, however,
neither should a panel make a finding different from that in an adopted earlier panel or
Appellate Body report on similar facts and arguments without careful consideration and
explanation of why a different result is warranted, and assuring itself that its finding does
not undermine the goals of the system.“
324 Panel report, US – Continued Zeroing, paras. 7.182.
325 Appellate Body report, US – Continued Zeroing, para. 358. Notably, in the earlier US –
Stainless Steel (Mexico) case, the EC as third party had made the opposite argument,
namely that a „rule whereby panels must follow Appellate Body findings on legal questions
would not prevent panels from departing from earlier decisions, provided there are ,cogent
reasons‘ for doing so“ (Appellate Body report, US – Stainless Steel [Mexico], para. 51 [from
the summary of the position of the EC as third party]).
326 US – Continued Zeroing, para. 365.
327 US – Continued Zeroing, para. 365.
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„cogent reasons“ to do otherwise,328 thereby, on the one hand, accepting pre-
cedential effect as the general rule, but, on the other hand, implying that they
have the power to deviate from Appellate Body rulings should „cogent reasons“
exist. So far, the Appellate Body has not had the opportunity to finally settle
that question.
After having established what the precedential value of the Appellate Body
rulings should be according to the Appellate Body, we will also briefly look at
the empirical record, i.e., to what extent panels and the Appellate Body ac-
tually consider and follow earlier Appellate Body rulings. Concerning refe-
rences by the Appellate Body to its own earlier reports (i.e., horizontal pre-
cedential effect), Jost Pauwelyn conducted a comprehensive citation analysis
of all Appellate Body reports issued until the end of 2013.329 He found that
„[f]rom its creation, the Appellate Body has opted for a strong de facto rule of
precedent: in 108 reports [up to the end of 2013], the Appellate Body has dropped
a total of 2,957 cross-references to earlier reports for an average of 27.4 cross‐
references per report … (indeed, this trend began with the second report …); …
this strong de facto rule of precedent has continued unabated over time and, if
anything, an upward trend can be detected“.330 This confirms the anecdotal
evidence from reading Appellate Body reports and the results of qualitative
studies.331 There are no comparable empirical studies for citations of panels to
Appellate Body reports.332 However, not only is every regular reader of panel
328 See the following panel reports: China – Rare Earths, paras. 7.61, 7.72, 7.99, 7.104 and
7.114 – 7.115; US – Countervailing and Anti-Dumping Measures (China), paras. 7.316 – 7.317,
7.326, 7.342, and 7.351 – 7.352; EU – Biodiesel (Argentina), para. 7.276; Canada – Welded
Pipe, paras. 7.22 and 7.37; EU – Biodiesel (Indonesia), para. 7.26; US – Supercalendered
Paper, para. 7.306; and EU – Energy Package, para. 7.1350.
329 Pauwelyn (2016).
330 Pauwelyn (2016), p. 143.
331 See, for instance, the early qualitative study Bhala (1999b) (analyzing the Appellate Body’s
case law on procedural issues inaugurated in US – Wool Shirts and Blouses and EC –
Bananas III and on substantive issues in the areas of Art. XX of the GATT, like product
determinations, and Art. XIII of the GATT).
332 There are at least two empirical studies on citation of precedent by WTO panels, namely
Pelc (2014) and Hsiang/Nyarko (2015), but both have a different focus. Pelc is interested in
the commercial value a dispute has as precedent for the complaining party in that
dispute. Hsiang/Nyarko analyze how the background of the panel chairs (lawyer vs. non-
lawyer and common law vs. civil law) influences the extent to which a panel cites to
precedents. Neither study distinguishes between panel reports and Appellate Body re-
ports.
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reports aware of the prevalence of Appellate Body precedents in these reports,
it is also noteworthy that panels almost never depart from applicable Ap-
pellate Body rulings. Indeed, in the more than 250 panel reports issued up to
date, there are, as far as one can tell, only three instances of an outright refusal
to follow the Appellate Body, all concerning the Appellate Body’s controversial
zeroing jurisprudence.333
Summarizing the Appellate Body’s position and practice, the Appellate Body
has, on the one hand, never claimed that either itself or panels are legally
bound by earlier Appellate Body (or panel) rulings, i.e., according to the Ap-
pellate Body, there is no de jure precedential effect. Indeed, building on its
case law, starting with Japan – Alcoholic Beverage II, the Appellate Body in its
crucial US – Stainless Steel (Mexico) report explicitly confirmed that „[i]t is well
settled that Appellate Body reports are not binding, except with respect to re-
solving the particular dispute between the parties.“334 On the other hand,
however, it is obvious that there is substantial de facto precedential effect. The
Appellate Body expects panels to follow Appellate Body precedent (US – Oil
Country Tubular Goods Sunset Reviews) and finds it deeply troubling if a panel
fails to do so (US – Stainless Steel (Mexico)). Moreover, only (but at least)
„cogent reasons“ can justify departure from precedent (US – Stainless Steel
(Mexico)). As explained, it is not yet clear whether the Appellate Body deems
such deviation from precedent for „cogent reasons“ permissible only for itself
(limitation of horizontal precedential effect), or also for panels (limitation of
vertical precedential effect). In any event, in practice both the Appellate Body
and panels rely heavily on past Appellate Body rulings.
In contrast to the Appellate Body, the US argues that, under the DSU and the
WTO Agreement, Appellate Body and panel rulings have no precedential ef-
fect whatsoever. In other words, each panel and each division of the Appellate
333 First, panel report in US – Zeroing (Japan), paras. 7.99 (refusal to follow Appellate Body
precedent) and 7.143 (conclusion), reversed by the Appellate Body report in US – Zeroing
(Japan), para. 138 (reversing the panel’s finding in para. 7.143; however, the Appellate
Body did not comment on the panel’s refusal to follow Appellate Body precedent);
second, panel report in US – Stainless Steel (Mexico), paras. 7.106 (refusal to follow
Appellate Body precedent) and 7.43 (conclusion), reversed by the Appellate Body report
in US – Stainless Steel (Mexico), paras. 134 (reversing the panel’s finding in para. 7.43) and
162 (expressing deep concern about the panel’s refusal to follow Appellate Body prece-
dent) (discussed above); third, panel report in US – Differential Pricing Methodology
(appealed by Canada on 4 June 2019, appeal still pending), para. 7.107.
334 US – Stainless Steel (Mexico), para. 158.
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Body should decide any legal issue de novo, without any deference to prior
rulings on the same issue. According to the US, panels and the Appellate Body
may refer to prior panel or Appellate Body rulings only for their persuasive
value, but not because of any precedential value.335 That would mean that
panel and Appellate Body reports would be no different in that respect than,
for instance, „persuasive“ academic literature. Furthermore, and consistent
with that, the US strenuously objects to the notion that deviation from prior
rulings should only be allowed for „cogent reasons“, rather than whenever a
later panel or Appellate Body has a different view on an issue.336 As an em-
pirical matter, the US also claims that parties to dispute settlement procee-
dings indeed refer to prior rulings for their persuasive value only, contending
that „there was no support for the proposition that parties cited to reports be-
cause they considered them somehow binding on or precedential for subsequent
panels and the Appellate Body“.337
What are the legal arguments of the US for this complete rejection of any
precedential effect? Three arguments stand out. First, the US posits that the
function of panels and the Appellate Body is solely to assist the DSB in re-
solving specific disputes between member states, but not to provide guidance
for the future through any system of precedent. It derives this in particular
from Art. 3.7 of the DSU on the overall objective of the DSU, Arts. 11, 7.1, 19.1 and
3.2 of the DSU on the function of panels, and, finally, Arts. 17.6 and 17.13 of the
DSU on the function of the Appellate Body.338 Second, and complementary to
the first, the task of adopting abstract interpretations that provide guidance
for the future has been assigned by the member states to different bodies
within the WTO, namely the Ministerial Conference and the General Council,
335 Minutes of the DSB meeting of 18 December 2018 (WT/DSB/M/423), paras. 4.7, 4.10 and
4.19.
336 See minutes of the DSB meeting of 18 December 2018 (WT/DSB/M/423), paras. 4.9 and
4.24; in addition, in recent dispute settlement proceedings the US has objected to the use
of the notion of „cogent reasons“ in panel reports, and has asked panels to strike that term
and references to the relevant Appellate Body jurisprudence on precedential effect; see
panel report in US – Pipe and Tube Products (Turkey), paras. 2.45 – 2.48 and 2.51 – 5.52
(panel acceded to the request, but followed Appellate Body precedent), and panel report
in US – Differential Pricing Methodology, paras. 7.106 – 7.107 and Annex A-5 (Interim
Review), paras. 2.13 – 2.14 (panel rejected the request, but refused to follow Appellate
Body precedent).
337 Minutes of the DSB meeting of 18 December 2018 (WT/DSB/M/423), para. 4.19.
338 See, in particular, minutes of the DSB meeting of 18 December 2018 (WT/DSB/M/423),
para. 4.5 („function of panels and the Appellate Body under the DSU“).
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which, pursuant to Art. IX:2 of the WTO Agreement, have the exclusive au-
thority to adopt interpretations of the WTO agreements, an authority expli-
citly acknowledged in Art. 3.9 of the DSU.339 Third, since the Appellate Body
can make mistakes, and in particular may engage in interpretations that,
contrary to Arts. 3.2 and 19.2 of the DSU, „add to or diminish the rights and
obligations provided in the covered agreements“, attributing precedential effect
to Appellate Body rulings would make it impossible (or at least more difficult)
to correct such mistakes and thus increase the likelihood of violations of Arts.
3.2 and 19.2 of the DSU.340
Turning to the evaluation of the US criticism and its arguments, the first point
to note is that the US position of rejecting any precedential value of panel and
Appellate Body reports is rather extreme. This becomes especially apparent if
one compares the WTO disputes settlement system with the International
Court of Justice (ICJ). The founding instrument of the ICJ, the Statute of the
ICJ, contains, unlike the DSU, an explicit prohibition of de jure precedential
effect. Art. 59 of the Statute stipulates that „[t]he decision of the Court has no
binding force except between the parties and in respect of that particular case.“
Nevertheless, in practice the ICJ usually follows its own settled jurisprud-
ence,341 and, indeed, has described its approach to precedent in terms stri-
339 See, in particular, minutes of the DSB meeting of 18 December 2018 (WT/DSB/M/423),
paras. 4.3 – 4.4, 4.6 – 4.7, 4.10, 4.14 – 4.15, 4.21, and 4.25.
340 See minutes of the DSB meeting of 18 December 2018 (WT/DSB/M/423), paras. 4.6, 4.19,
and 4.25.
341 On the treatment of precedent by the International Court of Justice, see Alschner/
Charlotin (2018); Haynes (2014), pp. 515 – 518; Guillaume (2011), pp. 7 – 12; Shahabuddeen
(1996) (see p. 239: „[A] decision [of the ICJ] which cannot be distinguished on valid grounds
will be followed in a latter case unless it is shown to have been clearly wrong“); and Clemons
(1996), pp. 1503 – 1504. Already in 1944, a United Nations Report of the Informal Inter-
Allied Committee on the Future of the Permanent Court of International Justice pointed
out that there is no necessary conflict between the prohibition of de jure stare decisis in
Art. 59 of the then Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice, which would
become Art. 59 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, and the practice of
following precedent: „The effect of [Art. 59] has, in our opinion, sometimes been misin-
terpreted. What it means is not that the decisions of the Court have no effect as precedents
for the Court or for international law in general, but that they do not possess the binding
force of particular decisions in the relations between the countries who are parties to the
Statute. The provision in question in no way prevents the Court from treating its own
judgments as precedents, and indeed it follows from Article 38 … that the Court’s decisions
are themselves ,subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law.‘“ (American Journal
of International Law 39 [1945], Supplement: Official Documents, pp. 1 – 15, p. 20, para. 63).
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kingly similar to those of the Appellate Body: „[W]hile [its prior] decisions are
in no way binding on the Court, it will not depart from its settled jurisprudence
unless it finds very particular reasons to do so.“342 More generally, Gilbert
Guillaume concludes after a review of how various international courts use
their own precedents that although „all the international jurisdictions distance
themselves in principle from the rule of stare decisis …[,] they construct an entire
jurisprudence based on their own precedent.“343 On the national level, even civil
law systems which reject, like the Statute of the ICJ, de jure stare decisis, still
attribute a certain degree of weight to precedent through doctrines such as
jurisprudence constante.344 This ubiquity of at least some sort of de facto
precedential effect is not surprising. Following precedent, at least as the ge-
neral rule (unless there are „very particular“ [ICJ] or „cogent“ [Appellate Body]
reasons to do otherwise), and thereby being consistent, serves important
goals, notably, first, the rule-of-law principle of treating like cases alike, and,
342 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide
(Croatia v. Serbia), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, 18 November 2008, ICJ Reports
(2008), para. 53; confirmed in Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Pu-
nishment of the Crime of Genocide (Croatia v. Serbia), Merits, Judgment, 3 February 2015,
ICJ Reports (2015), para. 125.
343 Guillaume (2011), p. 14; for similar statements, see Bederman (2016), p. 50: „The decisions
of these [international] tribunals are not, strictly speaking, binding precedent (or stare
decisis), not even for the institution which issued the decision. … Happily, the reality of
judicial precedent does not coincide with the theory. The truth is that international tribunals
almost invariably follow their precedents, especially on procedural issues, and it is very
routine for international lawyers to rely heavily on judicial decisions to support their ar-
guments.“; Cohen (2015), p. 269: „International law today, like international law a century
ago, generally denies international precedents doctrinal force. … And yet …, the invocation
of international decisions as precedent is ubiquitous. … Across international law, practi-
tioners invoke it and tribunals apply it.“ The only international court which is bound by its
founding instrument to de jure precedential effect is the Caribbean Court of Justice, see
Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas Establishing the Caribbean Community including the
CARICOM Single Market and Economy (signed on 5 July 2001 and entered into force on 4
February 2002), Art. 221 („Judgments of the Court shall constitute legally binding precedents
for parties in proceedings before the Court unless such judgments have been revised in
accordance with Article 219“); see on that Haynes (2014).
344 For the relevance of stare decisis and jurisprudence constante on the level of national
constitutional law, see Lundmark (2017), p. 353 („Stare decisis is not limited to the common
law world. Convincing evidence of a similar process can be found in civil law jurisdictions
like Germany.“) and Camarena González (2016) (case study of Mexico and Columbia); for
a broad comparative study of the role of precedent in different jurisdictions see Mac-
Cormick/Summers (1997) (with contributions on the role of precedent in Germany,
Finland, France, Italy, Norway, Poland, Spain, Sweden, UK, US and the law of the EU).
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second, the related objectives of stability, predictability, and clarity.345 The
objectives of stability, predictability, and clarity are particularly important in
the area of economics and trade. Knowing clearly and in advance about a rule,
which allows planning, is often more important for economic actors than the
actual content of the rule.346 Therefore, it is no accident that the DSU – unlike,
for instance, the Statute of the ICJ – expressly emphasizes the values of sta-
bility, predictability and clarity. According to Art. 3.2 of the DSU, as high-
lighted by the Appellate Body in US – Stainless Steel (Mexico),347 „[t]he dispute
settlement system of the WTO is a central element in providing security and
predictability to the multilateral trading system“, and „[t]he Members recognize
that it serves (..) to clarify the existing provisions“ of the WTO agreements. In
sum, given the importance of consistency in judicial decision-making, as re-
flected in the prevalence of some form of de facto stare decision in interna-
tional judicial fora, and the DSU’s explicit emphasis on „security and predic-
tability“ and „clarif[ication] of the existing provisions“, one would and should,
contrary to the US position, expect panels and the Appellate Body to accord
prior rulings a substantial degree of precedential value.348
Moreover, the empirical claim of the US that parties to dispute settlement
proceedings cite to reports only because of their persuasive value lacks
plausibility. Of course, and hopefully, persuasive value will be one reason, and
an important reason, for referring to prior panel and Appellate Body reports.349
345 On rationales for following precedent, see, for instance, Cohen (2015), pp. 281 – 285.
346 Cf. Piérola (2014), p. 428.
347 US – Stainless Steel (Mexico), para. 157.
348 Cf. the view on precedent in the influential Sutherland report on the future of the WTO
(Sutherland et al. [2004]), para. 231: „It is generally agreed that the strictest type of
precedent … is not applicable in international proceedings … However, it is quite clear that
some degree of ,precedent‘ concepts motivates the WTO dispute settlement processes (as well
as most other international law tribunals process). This reliance on prior cases, while not
always determinative, and certainly not totally binding on subsequent panel cases, never-
theless provides a degree of consistency which, in turn, enhances the predictability of the
whole system. That is called for by the DSU, when it stresses the goal of providing ,security
and predictability.‘“
349 On the importance of persuasive value, see former Appellate Body member Unterhalter
(2015), pp. 471 – 473 („[L]et us turn to a consideration of the decisions of the Appellate Body
as a source of its authority. All the trappings of authority and the most thorough adherence
to proper procedure will never salvage the reputation of a court or tribunal if its decisions,
and the reasons that support them, do not command respect. Respect is not the same as
agreement. Think about it this way: in every dispute, the party that does not prevail may not
be expected to agree with the decision, but the question is whether the reasoning that is
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But persuasive value alone could never explain the dominance of citations to
case law, as compared to, for instance, academic literature, in WTO dispute
settlement proceedings.350 Only persuasive value in combination with prece-
dential value can do that, especially considering that many rulings of the
Appellate Body have been quite controversial, that is, have not been per-
suasive to everyone.
After these general remark on the position of the US, we will now address the
first of the three main US arguments against precedential effect, namely that
the function of panels and the Appellate Body is only to resolve specific dis-
putes, but not to provide guidance for the future through any system of
precedent. We will examine the three DSU bases invoked by the US in support
of this argument, namely Art. 3.7 on the aim of the DSU, Arts. 11, 7.1, 19.1 and 3.2
on the function of the panels, and Arts. 17.6 and 17.13 on the function of the
Appellate Body.
Starting with the first basis, in support of its claim that „fundamentally, the
purpose of the WTO dispute settlement system was to resolve trade disputes
between Members“, the US quotes the second sentence of Art. 3.7 of the DSU,
which reads: „The aim of the dispute settlement mechanism is to secure a positive
solution to a dispute“.351 Now, no one would deny that the core function of the
WTO disputes settlement system, including panels and the Appellate Body, is
to settle disputes between member states. However, contrary to the assertions
of the US, it does not follow from this core function that the adjudicatory
bodies should not give any precedential weight to their earlier rulings. This
offered nevertheless meets a threshold of persuasive reasonableness. … I would suggest that
the law developed by the Appellate Body exceeds this threshold.“), and current Appellate
Body member Graham (2014), p. 322 („Why do [governments] comply with our decisions? …
I would suggest there is a more fundamental reason why governments comply with Ap-
pellate Body decisions: Because our decisions are respected.“).
350 Apparently, there are no empirical studies yet on the use of academic literature and case
law by the parties to WTO dispute settlement proceedings. However, the dominance of
case law seems uncontested; see, for instance Unterhalter (2015), p. 473: „[N]o observer of
the practices of the dispute settlement system could fail to conclude that past decisions of the
Appellate Body and the panels are central to the legal reasoning relied upon by litigants“. As
to the Appellate Body itself, references to academic literature are insignificant compared
to references to its own reports; between 1996 and 2013, the Appellate Body has made on
average only 1.4 citations per report to academic literature (Helmersen [2016], p. 344),
compared to 27.4 citations per report to its own reports (Pauwelyn [2016], p. 143).
351 Minutes of the DSB meeting of 18 December 2018 (WT/DSB/M/423), para. 4.5.
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can be illustrated by Art. 3.7 of the DSU itself. The US quotes only its second
sentence. To understand the meaning of that sentence its context is impor-
tant, though. Here, relevant context are the two sentences directly preceding
and following it. The first sentence of Art. 3.7 of the DSU states that „[b]efore
bringing a case, a Member shall exercise its judgement as to whether action
under these procedures would be fruitful“, and the third sentence adds that „[a]
solution mutually acceptable to the parties to a dispute and consistent with the
covered agreements is clearly to be preferred.“ In other words, the emphasis of
the first three sentences of Art. 3.7 of the DSU is on finding amicable solutions
to disputes as opposed to needless litigation. However, if panels and the
Appellate Body would accord prior rulings no precedential effect whatsoever,
as demanded by the US, then litigation would become more likely, contrary to
the objective of Art. 3.7 of the DSU, because even if a legal issue had already
been settled in prior reports, a party that is not happy with that outcome
would have an incentive to relitigate the issue.352 In summary, the objectives of
securing „a positive solution to a dispute“ (Art. 3.7 of the DSU) and providing
„security and predictability“ (Art. 3.2 of the DSU) through following precedent
are not in tension with each other, but usually go hand in hand.
Concerning the second element of the first main US argument, the function of
the panels, the US states that, pursuant to the first sentence of Art. 11 of the
DSU, the „function of the panels is to assist the DSB in discharging its res-
ponsibilities“ under the DSU, to which end, according to the standard terms of
reference for panels in Art. 7.1 of the DSU and the second sentence of Art. 11 of
the DSU, a panel is entrusted with (only) two tasks, namely, first, to examine
the matter before it and, second, to make findings assisting the DSB in making
the recommendations pursuant to Art. 19.1 of the DSU, i.e., the recommen-
dation to the member state concerned, in case of a finding of breach of WTO
law, to come into compliance.353 The first task of the panel, the examination of
the matter before it, includes, according to Art. 11 of the DSU, „an objective
assessment of … the applicability of and conformity with the relevant covered
agreements“. In order to determine how a panel is to undertake such „objective
352 See, to the same effect, statement of Brazil in the minutes of the DSB meeting of 19
December 2018 (WT/DSB/M/423), para. 4.29: „Brazil could foresee a scenario where greater
uncertainty in the dispute settlement system could provoke an increase in the number of
cases brought to the dispute settlement system and a decrease in the willingness of Members
to have recourse to mutually agreed solutions. This would undermine the clear preference
for amicable settlement reflected in Article 3.7 of the DSU.“
353 Minutes of the DSB meeting of 18 December 2018 (WT/DSB/M/423), para. 4.5.
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assessment“ of the relevant WTO agreements, the US looks to Art. 3.2 of the
DSU, which, according to the US, „further informed the function of a panel
established by the DSB to assist it.“354 From the statement in Art. 3.2 of the DSU
that „[t]he Members recognize that [the dispute settlement system of the WTO]
serves … to clarify the existing provisions of those agreements in accordance with
customary rules of interpretation of public international law“ the US follows that
„the DSU directed WTO adjudicators to apply „customary rules of interpretation
of public international law“, reflected in Articles 31 to 33 of the Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties“,355 and asserts that „[t]hose rules of interpretation did not
assign to interpretations given as part of dispute settlement a precedential value
for purposes of discerning the meaning of agreement text.“356 The US concludes
that „were a panel to decide to simply apply the reasoning in prior Appellate
Body reports alone, it would fail to carry out its function, as established by the
DSB, under Articles 7.1, 11, and 3.2 of the DSU to make findings on the applicability
of existing provisions of the covered agreements, as understood objectively
through customary rules of interpretation.“357
The problem with this argument of the US is that it paints only part of the
picture. The US itself points out that Art. 3.2 of the DSU „further informs the
function of a panel established by the DSB to assist it“, very similar to the Ap-
pellate Body, which considers that „the meaning of ,[t]he function of panels‘ in
the first sentence of Article 11 is informed by the general provisions contained in
Article 3 of the DSU, which sets out the basic principles of the WTO dispute
settlement system.“358 Of course, Art. 3.2 does not only refer, in its second
sentence, to „customary rules of interpretation“, the focus of the US in the
reasoning above, but also, in its very first sentence, to „security and predic-
tability“, which calls for, as explained above, some degree of precedential ef-
fect. There is no reason to assume that only the second, but not the first
sentence of Art. 3.2 „informs the function of a panel“. In an attempt to negate
the importance of the first sentence, the US claims that the Appellate Body’s
reliance on this provision „rests on a misunderstanding of the text of Article
3.2.“359 It argues that because „[t]here is no ,shall‘ or ,may‘ in this text“, the „text
354 Minutes of the DSB meeting of 18 December 2018 (WT/DSB/M/423), para. 4.5.
355 Minutes of the DSB meeting of 18 December 2018 (WT/DSB/M/423), para. 4.5.
356 Minutes of the DSB meeting of 18 December 2018 (WT/DSB/M/423), para. 4.4.
357 Minutes of the DSB meeting of 18 December 2018 (WT/DSB/M/423), para. 4.6.
358 Appellate Body report, US – Stainless Steel (Mexico), para. 157.
359 Minutes of the DSB meeting of 18 December 2018 (WT/DSB/M/423), para. 4.15.
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of Article 3.2 is neither a directive to panels or the Appellate Body nor an aut-
horization for them“, but rather „a statement of what Members have agreed flows
from the system when it operates in accordance with the provisions agreed by
Members in the DSU.“360 And since the US contends that the other provisions of
the DSU do not permit any precedential effect, it considers that Art. 3.2 has no
bearing on the issue. However, to deduce from the absence of „shall“ or „may“
that the first sentence of Art. 3.2 has, in essence, no normative force, is not only
unconvincing, but also in contradiction to the US’s own reliance on the second
sentence of Art. 3.2, which does not contain „shall“ or „may“ either. Moreover,
there are further provisions in Art. 3 of the DSU, informing the function of the
panels, which back precedential effect. First, as mentioned above, the pre-
ference expressed by Art. 3.7 of the DSU of amicable settlements over litiga-
tion, increases the need for „security and predictability“ and „clarif[ication] of
the existing provisions“ which settled jurisprudence provides. Second, Art. 3.3
of the DSU stipulates that „[t]he prompt settlement [of disputes] is essential to
the effective functioning of the WTO and the maintenance of a proper balance
between the rights and obligations of Members“. However, if a panel refuses to
follow clearly established Appellate Body precedent, the most likely result is
that the losing party will appeal and that the Appellate Body will then overrule
the panel, causing unnecessary delay, contrary to the objective of Art. 3.3 of the
DSU.361
As to the „customary rules of interpretation of public international law“, it is
indeed true that Arts. 31 – 33 of the VCLT do not refer to precedent. However,
that does not mean that they prohibit the use of precedent. This is indicated
by the fact that, as described above, international adjudicatory bodies almost
universally rely on precedent. It is difficult to argue that such a widespread
practice in public international law violates the „customary rules“ in that area.
360 Minutes of the DSB meeting of 18 December 2018 (WT/DSB/M/423), para. 4.15.
361 On Art. 3.3 of the DSU as support for precedential effect, see the position of Mexico as
summarized in the Appellate Body report in US – Stainless Steel (Mexico), para. 21, and
the panel report in US – Continued Zeroing, para. 7.182 („In addition to the goal of
providing security and predictability to the multilateral trading system, we recall … Article
3.3 of the DSU … Given the consistent adopted jurisprudence on the legal issues that are
before us …, we consider that providing prompt resolution to this dispute in this manner will
best serve the multiple goals of the DSU, and, on balance, is furthered by following the
Appellate Body’s adopted findings in this case.“). The Appellate Body in its jurisprudence
on prudential effect has, so far, mentioned „prompt settlement“ only once in passing, and
without explicit reference to Art. 3.3 of the DSU (US – Stainless Steel [Mexico], para. 161).
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Moreover, applying precedent does not mean that a panel could not or would
not apply the interpretative criteria set out in Arts. 31 – 33 of the VCLT, es-
pecially the basic rule of Art. 31(1) that „[a] treaty shall be interpreted in good
faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the
treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose“ because legi-
timate precedent is itself the result of an interpretation using these criteria.
Therefore, if a panel follows precedent rather than to adopt a possibly different
interpretation it might have reached through applying the criteria of Arts. 31 –
33 of the VCLT without such precedent, it does not ignore Arts. 31 – 33, but
rather choses the precedent’s application of these interpretative rules, in
consideration of the DSU’s objectives of „security and predictability“ and
„prompt settlement“, which it has to take into account in its „objective assess-
ment“ under Art. 11 of the DSU. Additionally, following precedent does not
necessarily prevent a panel from a searching examination of the legal ques-
tions before it, not at least, as the panel in the case China – Rare Earths re-
marked, because „where a party asks a panel to deviate from a prior Appellate
Body finding on a question of law on the basis of novel legal arguments, a full
exploration of those arguments may assist the Appellate Body in the event of an
appeal, particularly where those arguments raise complex legal issues.“362
On the third and final element of the first main argument of the US, the
function of the Appellate Body, the US maintains that „[t]he Appellate Body’s
task under the DSU was similarly [i.e., similar to that of the panels] limited to
assisting the DSB in discharging its functions under the DSU, albeit more so than
panels.“363 In substantiation of that claim the US quotes Art. 17.6 of the DSU
(„An appeal shall be limited to issues of law covered in the panel report and legal
interpretations developed by the panel“) and Art. 17.13 of the DSU („The Ap-
pellate Body may uphold, modify or reverse the legal findings and conclusions of
the panel“). The US later repeats its emphasis on the limits of the Appellate
Body’s power in response to the Appellate Body’s defense of vertical prece-
dential effect. As set out above, in US – Stainless Steel (Mexico), the Appellate
Body justified vertical precedential effect with the „hierarchical structure
contemplated in the DSU“, i.e., the fact that the Appellate Body has the power
on appeal to overturn legal interpretations of the panels (Arts. 17.6 and 17.13 of
the DSU), and that a panel’s failure to follow Appellate Body precedent „un-
dermines the development of a coherent and predictable body of jurisprud-
362 Panel report, China – Rare Earths, para. 7.58.
363 Minutes of the DSB meeting of 18 December 2018 (WT/DSB/M/423), para. 4.5.
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ence“.364 The US rejects the notion of a hierarchical structure and claims that
„[a]rticles 17.6 and 17.13 of the DSU do not ,vest‘ the Appellate Body with broad
authority to develop ,a coherent and predictable body of jurisprudence.‘ … In fact,
those articles are limitations on the parameters of appellate review and on the
permissible actions of the Appellate Body.“365 It is indeed the case that Arts. 17.6
and 17.13 of the DSU limit the Appellate Body to reviewing and, if necessary,
overturning panels on legal issues only. However, as far as precedential effect
is concerned, this is clearly the decisive power. If one wants to WTO dispute
settlement system to develop „a coherent and predictable body of jurisprud-
ence“ (which, of course, the US refuses to acknowledge as an objective of the
DSU), the main responsibility for that has to lay with the body that has, within
the system, the final word on legal interpretation, namely the Appellate Bo-
dy.366 This is reinforced by the fact that the Appellate Body, in contrast to the
panels, is a standing body, which facilitates a greater degree of continuity and
consistency on the level of the Appellate Body than on that of the panels.367 A
second, but equally important argument in favor of vertical stare decisis is, as
already mentioned, the DSU’s objective of „prompt settlement“ of disputes
(Art. 3.3 of the DSU).368
364 US – Stainless Steel (Mexico), para. 161.
365 Minutes of the DSB meeting of 18 December 2018 (WT/DSB/M/423), para. 4.21.
366 Formally, of course, it is the DSB who has the final word, since it has to adopt panel and
Appellate Body reports (Arts. 16 and 17.14 of the DSU). However, since a report is adopted
unless the DSB decides by consensus not to adopt it (Arts. 16.4 and 17.14 of the DSU),
meaning that the consent of just one member, including the one that won the dispute, is
enough for adoption, it is virtually impossible for the DSB to prevent adoption, and
indeed has never happened yet. See also infra, fn. 436-437 and accompanying text.
367 China argues that the dissatisfaction with the lack of coherence in the pre-WTO case law
of panels had been one of the reasons for creating the Appellate Body in the first place;
see statement of China in the minutes of the DSB meeting of 18 December 2018 (WT/
DSB/M/423), para. 4.35: „During the GATT-era, Panels had issued reports with conflicting
interpretations, and that had been seen as problematic. … The Appellate Body had been, in
part, a deliberate response to the problem of inconsistent panel interpretations.“
368 Adjudicatory systems with more than one instance, like the WTO dispute settlement
system, are rare in international law. One such example is the Court of Justice of the
European Union, which is comprised of the General Court and the Court of Justice
(Art. 19(1) of the TEU). Decisions of the former can be appealed to the latter (Art. 256(1) of
the TFEU). Similar to the WTO dispute settlement system, there is no explicit rule on
whether the General Court is bound by decisions of the Court of Justice. Nevertheless, in
practice the General Court follows rulings of the Court of Justice, even if it disagrees with
those rulings. See Bradley (2014) and the judgment of the General Court of 30 September
2010 in Case T-85/09 Kadi v Commission, paras. 112 – 121, in particular para. 121: „[T]he
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Moving on to the second main argument of the US, concerning Art. IX:2 of the
WTO Agreement and Art. 3.9 of the DSU, does the exclusive power of the
Ministerial Conference and the General Council to adopt authoritative in-
terpretations prevent the Appellate Body from treating its prior rulings as
precedent? According to the US, the answer is yes because „[t]o say that an
Appellate Body interpretation in one dispute was precedent or controlling for
later disputes would effectively convert that interpretation into an authoritative
interpretation of the covered agreement“, which would „directly contradict“ Art.
IX:2 of the WTO Agreement.369 There would indeed be a direct contradiction if
the Appellate Body claimed a power equivalent to that granted under Art. IX:2
of the WTO Agreement. As pointed out approvingly by the US,370 the Appellate
Body itself acknowledged as much when it said in its very first case on pre-
cedential effect, Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II, that „[t]he fact that such an
,exclusive authority‘ in interpreting the treaty has been established so specifically
in the WTO Agreement is reason enough to conclude that such authority does not
exist by implication or by inadvertence elsewhere.“371 However, the assertion that
the Appellate Body has usurped a power that under Art. IX:2 of the WTO
Agreement belongs to the Ministerial Conference and the General Council is
wrong on two levels. First, as already mentioned above in the section on
advisory opinions, neither the Appellate Body nor anyone else has ever clai-
med that panels or the Appellate Body would not be bound by an authori-
tative interpretation adopted pursuant to Art. IX:2 of the WTO Agreement.
Hence, the Appellate Body accepts that such an authoritative interpretation
would trump any prior Appellate Body ruling to the contrary. Second, only
legally binding precedents, or de jure stare decisis, would be a true equivalent
to the legally binding interpretations adopted under Art. IX:2 of the WTO
Agreement, whereas, as explained above, the Appellate Body has consistently
held that its precedents are not legally binding. Of course, it is also true that,
while it rejects de jure stare decisis, the Appellate Body stands for substantial
de facto precedential effect, i.e., as stated in US – Stainless Steel (Mexico),
„absent cogent reasons“, the Appellate Body „will resolve the same legal question
appellate principle itself and the hierarchical judicial structure which is its corollary ge-
nerally advise against the General Court revisiting points of law which have been decided by
the Court of Justice.“
369 Minutes of the DSB meeting of 18 December 2018 (WT/DSB/M/423), para. 4.6.
370 See minutes of the DSB meeting of 18 December 2018 (WT/DSB/M/423), para. 4.10.
371 Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II, p. 107.
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in the same way in a subsequent case.“372 However, there is little reason to
believe that by reserving the final word on interpretation for the Ministerial
Conference and the General Council, the member states wanted to prevent the
Appellate Body from deciding consistently and predictably, in particular since
the same member states had declared, in Art. 3.2 of the DSU, that the dispute
settlement system should be central in providing „security and predictability“.
Contrary to the US allegation that „the Appellate Body asserted a very different
approach in the „US – Stainless Steel (Mexico)“ dispute [than in its report in
Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II] (..), without explaining the basis for that changed
approach“,373 this line of reasoning is entirely consistent with the argument of
the Appellate Body in Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II. In that case, the Appellate
Body concluded that prior panel reports, on the one hand, „are not binding“
(i.e., no de jure stare decisis), but, on the other hand, „create legitimate ex-
pectations among WTO Members, and, therefore, should be taken into account
where they are relevant to any dispute“ (i.e., some degree of de facto stare
decisis).374 The US tries to deny the second part of the Appellate Body’s
conclusion by rephrasing the Appellate Body’s words of „should be taken into
account“ as „could be taken into account“, and stressing that a panel may only
rely on prior reports „to the extent a panel finds the reasoning persuasive“,375 but
this is simply a distortion of what the Appellate Body has said.
The third argument of the US is based on Arts. 3.2 and 19.2 of the DSU, ac-
cording to which rulings and recommendations of panels and the Appellate
Body „cannot add to or diminish the rights and obligations provided in the
covered agreements.“ The US claims that the Appellate Body’s approach on
precedent „would set the system on a path of departing from the agreed rights
and obligations of Members under the WTO Agreement“376 because „given the
probability that some interpretations [of the Appellate Body] might be in error“377
and disregard rights and obligations of members in violation of Arts. 3.2 and
19.2, such errors could not be corrected, and, moreover, „would accumulate
over time, and where the Appellate Body in a subsequent appeal built its in-
terpretation on a flawed interpretation, the interpretations and resulting findings
372 US – Stainless Steel (Mexico), para. 160.
373 Minutes of the DSB meeting of 18 December 2018 (WT/DSB/M/423), para. 4.9; see also
paras. 4.10 and 4.15.
374 Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II, p. 108.
375 Minutes of the DSB meeting of 18 December 2018 (WT/DSB/M/423), para. 4.10.
376 Minutes of the DSB meeting of 18 December 2018 (WT/DSB/M/423), para. 4.25.
377 Minutes of the DSB meeting of 18 December 2018 (WT/DSB/M/423), para. 4.19.
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would become more and more removed from what Members had agreed.“378 It is
certainly true that, first, the Appellate Body, like any adjudicative body, can
and sometimes will make mistakes, and, second, attributing any precedential
weight to prior rulings will make it more difficult to reverse such mistakes.
There is, indeed, in any system of precedential effect a trade-off between the
goals pursued by following precedent, such as, in the WTO context, in par-
ticular „security and predictability“, and the objective of getting the „correct“
answer in each individual case. Because of this, few, if any, legal systems follow
a system of strict stare decisis, whether de jure or de facto, but rather allow
deviations from past rulings under certain conditions, for example, when an
earlier ruling has come to be considered as clearly erroneous.379 As we have
seen, the Appellate Body, too, allows such deviations for „cogent reasons“.
However, since the DSU puts such emphasis on not adding to or diminishing
rights and obligation provided in the WTO agreements, why not be on the safe
side and, as the US demands, remove any precedential effect and thereby
allow unencumbered corrections of any past interpretive mistakes? The
problem with such an approach is not only that it would ignore the com-
mitment to „security and predictability“ of Art. 3.2 of the DSU, but also that it
implicitly assumes that it is easy to determine when an interpretation has
been erroneous and in violation of Arts. 3.2 and 19.2 of the DSU. Obviously,
that assumption is false. Many legal questions before panels and the Appellate
Body are difficult and controversial, with good arguments on both sides, and
on which reasonable people (and adjudicators) can reasonably reach different
conclusions. And, even though members from time to time claim that inter-
pretations by panels or the Appellate Body violate Arts. 3.2 and 19.2,380 there is
rarely anything even close to a consensus among members on such allegati-
378 Minutes of the DSB meeting of 18 December 2018 (WT/DSB/M/423), para. 4.25; see also
para. 4.6.
379 For an example from national law, see the US Supreme Court, which will not overrule its
own constitutional precedent unless justification is provided by „some special reason“
(Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 [1992], 864) or „strong grounds“ (Janus v. Am.
Fed. of State, County, & Mun. Employees, 585 U.S. __ [2018], slip opinion, at 34); one factor
in deciding whether to overrule is the quality of the precedent’s reasoning (Franchise Tax
Board of California v. Gilbert, 587 U.S. __ [2019], slip opinion, at 17); see more generally
Murrill (2018).
380 For a list of examples of such claims, see Stewart/McDonough/Smith/Jorgensen (2013),
pp. 393 – 394 („Examples of Statements by WTO Members Expressing Concern That the
Appellate Body Is Creating Rights or Obligations by Overreaching“).
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ons.381 All too often, one member’s clear example of a breach of Arts. 3.2 and
19.2 is another member’s clearly correct interpretation.382 In such a situation,
denying any precedential effect to prior rulings simply risks a back-and-forth
in the decisions of different panels and Appellate Body divisions with different
compositions at different times, endangering „security and predictability“ and
„prompt settlement“, without any guarantee that one interpretation is better or
more faithful to Arts. 3.2 and 19.2 of the DSU than the other.
In conclusion, the problem with the US position on precedential effect is not
that it does not raise noteworthy points, or that the practice of the Appellate
Body is beyond criticism, far from it. The main problem is the extremism of the
US position, which the US takes in order to be able to depict the Appellate
Body’s stance on precedential effect as „yet another example of a failure by the
Appellate Body to follow the rules agreed by Members“.383 This extremism lies in
the fact that the US argues that panels and the Appellate Body should decide
legal questions always de novo, without any deference to prior rulings, and
therefore without trying to decide consistently and predictably over time. This
is not only contrary to the common practice of courts and other adjudicatory
bodies on the national and international level, but, importantly, it also ignores
the DSU’s explicit focus on „security and predictability“ and „clarif[ication] of
the existing provisions“ (Art. 3.2 of the DSU). As explained above, none of the
381 There is probably only one instance where almost all member states agreed that the
Appellate Body had gone beyond its mandate, namely when it allowed the submission of
amicus curiae briefs by private parties in dispute settlement proceedings (see, in parti-
cular, the minutes of the special meeting of the General Council of 22 November 2000 on
that issue [WT/GC/M/60]; see more generally on the amicus curia dispute Lim [2005]).
Notably, in that instance it was the US that, more or less alone, defended the inter-
pretation of the Appellate Body as proper (see minutes of the General Council meeting of
22 November 2000 [WT/GC/M/60], paras. 74 – 77).
382 For instance, while the US considers the Appellate Body’s practice on precedential effect
a clear example of overreach, Costa Rica made the opposite claim already in 1997,
accusing the Appellate Body of violating Arts. 3.2 and 19.2 of the DSU by not following
precedent without good reasons; see minutes of the DSB meeting of 25 June 1997,
statement of Costa Rica, p. 12: „Even in legal systems not based on common law, precedents
had an undeniable value. They clarified the interpretation of the rules and provided security
and predictability to the relations governed by those rules. In Costa Rica’s view any di-
vergence from the GATT and WTO precedents had to be supported by sound and convincing
legal reasoning. This had not been so in this case [i.e. US – Wool Shirt and Blouses]. The
observations of the Panel and the Appellate Body had diverged from past practice and had
modified the balance of rights and obligations which they claimed to be seeking to protect.“
383 Minutes of the DSB meeting of 18 December 2018 (WT/DSB/M/423), para. 4.25.
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provisions invoked by the US prohibit panels and the Appellate Body from
attributing a certain degree of de facto precedential weight to prior decisions
and thus serving the DSU’s objectives of „security and predictability“ and
„clarif[ication] of the existing provisions“, neither a panel’s obligation to make
an objective examination (Art. 11 of the DSU), nor the power of the Ministerial
Conference and the General Council to adopt authoritative interpretations
(Art. IX:2 of the WTO Agreement), or the prohibition to add to or diminish the
rights and obligations of member states (Arts. 3.2 and 19.2 of the DSU).
That the position of the Appellate Body on precedential effect is closer to „the
rules agreed by Members“ than that of the US is also indicated by the reactions
of the other members to statements of the US on the issue. Both at the DSB
meeting of May 2008, in which the US criticized the Appellate Body’s views on
precedential effect in US – Stainless Steel (Mexico) harshly, and at the DSB
meeting of December 2018, in which the US gave its extended statement on
precedential effect, the majority of members commenting on the issue sup-
ported the Appellate Body’s approach.384 Moreover, even those critical of the
Appellate Body’s practice and supportive of the US position did not go as far as
the US in its statement of December 2018. For instance, Colombia, which was
probably closest to the US in both these meetings,385 stating that it „understood
and shared the concerns [of the US] regarding the use of precedent at the WTO“,
still „recogniz[ed] the need to provide security and predictability to the multi-
lateral trading system through the development of a consistent line of juris-
prudence“ and „believed that prior appellate and panel reports constituted im-
portant doctrine for clarifying and interpreting the legal standards established in
WTO agreements.“ Furthermore, Colombia added „that these concerns, while
valid, were not enough to justify blocking of the appointments of the AB mem-
bers.“ Notably, in the early years of WTO dispute settlement even the US itself
had claimed that the DSU requires panels to follow Appellate Body rulings. In
2001, in the panel proceedings in the case US – Shrimps (Article 21.5 – Ma-
laysia), in which Malaysia had criticized an earlier ruling of the Appellate
Body, the US had argued „that Malaysia makes the rather extraordinary ar-
384 See minutes of the DSB meeting of 1 July 2008 (WT/DSB/M/250), paras. 46 – 73 (dis-
cussion of the Appellate Body report in US – Stainless Steel (Mexico)), and of 18 December
2018 (WT/DSB/M/23), paras. 4.26 – 4.37 (discussion of the US statement on precedential
effect).
385 Minutes of the DSB meetings of 20 May 2008 (WT/DSB/M/250), para. 72, and 18 De-
cember 2018 (WT/DSB/M/423), para. 4.26; all statements from Colombia quoted in the
main text are taken from para. 4.26 of the latter minutes.
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gument that the Appellate Body was wrong and the Panel should ignore the
Appellate Body finding. Nowhere does the DSU grant dispute settlement panels
the authority to overrule the Appellate Body.“386
Its extreme position of denying any form of de facto precedential effect pre-
vents the US from engaging with the Appellate Body’s practice in a more
meaningful and productive way. It is not the basic question of whether an
adjudicatory body should follow its own precedents at all that is interesting
and challenging, but rather the details of how such precedential effect should
work. For example, in the same way as it would be unreasonable to completely
disregard any past decision (zero precedential effect), it would equally make
little sense to bind oneself to never changing prior rulings (absolute prece-
dential effect), in particular if there are no other readily available means of
correction (e.g., by a legislature). In that vein, Harlan Grant Cohen remarks in
a study of precedential effect in international law that the fact „that few (if any)
regimes explicitly provide for precedential effect … suggests that for the states
designing those regimes, the optimal level of clarity and predictability is greater
than a system of de novo review but less than one of stare decisis.“387 Transferring
that to the WTO dispute settlement system, it is not especially fruitful to argue
about whether „absent cogent reasons“, the Appellate Body should „resolve the
same legal question in the same way in a subsequent case“ (clearly, it should),
but rather what constitutes „cogent reasons“ that could justify or even require
departure from prior rulings, something the Appellate Body has not yet ad-
dressed.388 Similarly, should the Appellate Body pursue quite a rigid approach
386 Panel report, US – Shrimps (Article 21.5 – Malaysia), para. 3.14, concerning the admissi-
bility of amicus curiae briefs.
387 Cohen (2015), p. 282.
388 On the panel level, a first attempt at explaining what such „cogent reasons“ could be has
been made by the panel in the dispute US – Countervailing and Anti-Dumping Measures
(China): „To our minds, ,cogent‘ reasons, i.e. reasons that could in appropriate cases justify a
panel in adopting a different interpretation [than that of the Appellate Body], would
encompass, inter alia: (i) a multilateral interpretation of a provision of the covered
agreements under Article IX:2 of the WTO Agreement that departs from a prior Appellate
Body interpretation; (ii) a demonstration that a prior Appellate Body interpretation proved
to be unworkable in a particular set of circumstances falling within the scope of the relevant
obligation at issue; (iii) a demonstration that the Appellate Body’s prior interpretation leads
to a conflict with another provision of a covered agreement that was not raised before the
Appellate Body; or (iv) a demonstration that the Appellate Body’s interpretation was based
on a factually incorrect premise.“ (panel report, para. 7.317). This passage was later quoted
approvingly by the panel in the dispute EC and certain member States – Large Civil
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to stare decisis and change course only under extraordinary circumstances, or
should it be more open to new arguments or to admitting mistakes?389 Equally
worth discussing is the level of transparency about changes of case law that do
take place, e.g., whether the Appellate Body should explicitly acknowledge
overruling precedent.390 In that respect, after an examination of three areas in
which the Appellate Body has changed its case law over time, Frieder Roessler
concludes critically that in all these areas the Appellate Body has failed to
„acknowledge and cogently explain the change“, thereby creating legal un-
certainty.391 Finding answers to these and other important questions concer-
ning the role of precedent in the WTO is hindered rather than furthered by the
absolutist position taken by the US.
Aircraft (Article 21.5 – US) (panel report, para. 6.1143). In other legal systems, detailed
criteria for changing jurisprudence exist, for instance in the US legal system regarding
changes by the US Supreme Court of its own precedents on constitutional law; see for a
recent example Knick v. Township of Scott, Pennsylvania, et al., 587 U.S. ___ (2019) (slip
opinion), opinion of the Court, pp. 20 – 23, and for an overview Murrill (2018).
389 For an argument to that effect, see the dissenting opinion (most likely by Thomas R.
Graham) in the recent Appellate Body report in US – Countervailing Measures (China)
(Article 21.5 – China), paras. 5.242 – 5.281, e.g., para. 5.244 („I believe the continuing lack of
clarity as to what is a ,public body‘ represents an instance of undue emphasis on ,precedent‘,
which has locked in a flawed interpretation that has grown more confusing with each
iteration, as litigants and Appellate Body Divisions repeated the original flaw while trying to
navigate around it. That is what I believe the majority has done here.“).
390 On that question, the current chairman of the Appellate Body, Ujal Singh Bhatia, re-
marked in 2018: „[T]hroughout more than two decades of case law, the Appellate Body has
never overtly overruled its prior decisions. This, of course, does not mean that one cannot
discern certain shifts in the Appellate Body’’s orientation and sensibility. … An examination
of our jurisprudence should convince you that Appellate Body jurisprudence is not always
monolithic and, indeed, leaves ample room for the accommodation of future changes of
direction. Yet, in my view, change best occurs at a piecemeal pace, rather than through
abrupt ruptures of well-established jurisprudential trends. The physiological evolution of
case law should, in my view, look more like a slow tectonic shift than a sudden earthquake.“
(Bhatia [2018], pp. 126 – 127).
391 Roessler (2015), p. 142; the three areas of law analyzed by him are judicial economy
(pp. 132 – 134), the measure to be examined under Art. XX of the GATT (pp. 134 – 140) and
other duties and charges on importation under Art. II:1(b) of the GATT (pp. 140 – 142).
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C. CONCLUSIONS
After having analyzed in some detail the six areas of US concern on issues of
procedure and interpretative approach (Rule 15, 90-day deadline, advisory
opinions, appellate review of facts and of municipal law, precedential effect),
what is the picture that emerges? We have found that on five of those (Rule 15,
90-day deadline, advisory opinions, appellate review of facts, precedential
effect) no case can be made for a clear breach of the DSU or other WTO
agreements. What is more, the legal arguments of the Appellate Body on all of
these issues are stronger than those of the US. Only with regard to one issue
(appellate review of municipal law), the Appellate Body has arguably gone
beyond what is permissible under the DSU, namely Art. 17.6 of the DSU. But
even that one issue does not reach the level of a breach that would justify the
blockage of all appointments to the Appellate Body because the legal question
is a difficult one without an obvious answer, no other member has supported
the US allegation of a clear breach (indeed, almost all members who took a
position on that issue in the DSB agreed with the Appellate Body), and, finally,
the consequences of blocking all appointments to the Appellate Body in
breach of Art. 17.2 of the DSU are vastly disproportionate to the consequences
of a misinterpretation of Art. 17.6 of the DSU through appellate review of
findings on municipal law.
As stated at the outset of our analysis, the US and the Appellate Body agree on
the proper interpretative approach to the extent that they both put most
emphasis on the wording of the relevant WTO provisions (grammatical in-
terpretation).392 However, they reach opposite conclusions in the application
of this interpretative approach to the six issues discussed here. According to
the US, „the Appellate Body had been acting contrary to the unambiguous text of
the DSU.“393 Our analysis has demonstrated, though, that only with regard to
one of the six issues, the 90-day deadline, the Appellate Body has clearly
disregarded the wording of the DSU, namely Art. 17.5 of the DSU, and it was
forced to do so for reasons mainly beyond its control, a fact repeatedly ac-
knowledged by the membership, including, at least until the appointment
crisis, the US. As far as the other five issues are concerned, the text of the DSU
is simply not as unambiguous as the US asserts, and certainly not un-
ambiguously in favor of the US allegations of Appellate Body overreach.
392 See supra, fn. 105 and accompanying text.
393 Minutes of the General Council meeting of 7 May 2019 (WT/GC/M/177), para. 4.154.
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In an attempt to strengthen its credibility and to portray its blocking of ap-
pointments to the Appellate Body as an ultima ratio, the US has repeatedly
emphasized that its complaints are not new, stating „that for more than
15 years, across multiple US Administrations, the United States had been raising
serious concerns with the Appellate Body’s disregard for the rules set by WTO
Members.“394 Our examination has shown, however, that this is only partly true
for the six issues of interest here. Regarding three of these (Rule 15, 90-day
deadline, review of facts), the US voiced its criticism for the first time after it
had begun to block the appointments. Before the blockage, the US had for
decades acquiesced in the practices it now contests, at times even explicitly
supporting them. This contradictory behavior makes it doubtful whether the
US argues in good faith on these three issues.
In summary, a close analysis of the six issues on procedure and interpretative
approach presented by the US as prime evidence of its case against the Ap-
pellate Body simply does not bear out its claim that the Appellate Body is as a
„rule-breaking“ runaway institution that has „felt free to depart from what WTO
Members agreed to“.395 Consequently, from a legal point of view these six is-
sues, whether viewed individually or as a whole, do not even come close to
justifying the US blockage of all appointments to the Appellate Body.
394 DSB meeting of 27 August 2018 (WT/DSB/M/417), para. 12.2; see similar or identical US
statements in the DSB meetings of 29 October 2018 (WT/DSB/M/420), para. 20.5; 21
November 2011 (WT/DSB/M/421), para. 21.4; 18 December 2018 (WT/DSB/M/423), para.
9.4; 28 January 2019 (WT/DSB/M425), para. 7.5; 25 February 2019 (WT/DSB/M/426), para.
5.6; 26 April 2019 (WT/DSB/M428), para. 11.3; 28 May 2019 (WT/DSB/M/429), para. 8.3;
and 24 June 2019 (WT/DSB7M/430), para. 8.4.
395 Minutes of the General Council meeting of 12 December 2018 (WT/GC/M/175), statement
of the US, para. 6.169.
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V. A broader explanatory
framework for the US
blockage
If our analysis of the issues of procedure and interpretative approach is cor-
rect, i.e., that these issues fall far short of legally justifying the blockage of
appointments to the Appellate Body, what does that tell us about the US
motives for the continued blockage? Are the US concerns regarding these
issues genuine, despite the weakness of the legal arguments of the US, or have
they just been contrived for political purposes? Furthermore, is it plausible
that the US would be willing to bring down the Appellate Body, and thereby
potentially the whole dispute settlement system, just because of complaints
about these issues of procedure and interpretative approach?
The position taken here is that, on the one hand, some of the allegations do
indeed appear to be contrived, most notably the Rule 15 issue, and, in addition,
it is hard to imagine that these issues of procedure and interpretative ap-
proach are really as important to the US as it has made out in its statements in
the DSB since the start of the appointment crisis. But, on the other hand, it is
also difficult to deny that the concerns and even frustrations of many on the
US side with the Appellate Body are authentic and long-running, especially on
issues of substantive law. As John Magnus, a US trade remedy lawyer and long-
time critic of the Appellate Body, put it in a colloquium on the appointment
crisis at the end of 2017: „[W]hile the specific tactics that are being deployed [by
the US] might surprise some observers, the depth of feeling underneath those
tactics cannot surprise anyone.“396 More specifically, many US critics believe
that the Appellate Body has prevented the US from getting what it had
bargained for in 1995. Jennifer Hillman, US-appointed Appellate Body member
from 2007 to 2011, expressed this notion in the just-mentioned colloquium by
stating that „we got here [i.e., to the appointment crisis] because, in the end of the
day, I think the system has not worked out how the United States anticipated that
it would.“397 In the following we will discuss some of the ways in which the
396 Magnus (2017), p. 1.
397 Hillman (2017), p. 1.
WTO dispute settlement system, and in particular the Appellate Body, has
developed differently than the US, and indeed most other members, had ex-
pected at the end of the Uruguay Round in 1995, leading to growing dissa-
tisfaction of the US with that system. We will then ask what, if anything, has
changed under the Trump administration, which has brought the festering
conflict between the US and the WTO to a head.
A. UNFULFILLED EXPECTATIONS
In at least three respects the WTO dispute settlement and the Appellate Body
have developed differently than expected by the US in 1995, at the end of the
Uruguay Round: first, the role the Appellate Body within the dispute settle-
ment system, both quantitatively and qualitatively; second, the track record of
the US as litigant before the Appellate Body; and, third, the relationship
between the judicial and the legislative branches of the WTO, that is, between
dispute settlement by panels and the Appellate Body, on the one hand, and
treaty-making by WTO members, on the other. Together, these unfulfilled
expectations go a long way towards explaining the dissatisfaction of the US
with the system, and, ultimately, the current appointment crisis.
Starting with the first point, the role the Appellate Body within the dispute
settlement system, the negotiating history of the Uruguay Round shows that,
at the time, the negotiators had a far more limited role in mind for the Ap-
pellate Body than what later emerged, or, as Peter Van den Bossche has fa-
mously written, that the Appellate Body changed „[f]rom afterthought to
centrepiece“ in the world trading system.398 The idea of a „standing review
tribunal“ was first proposed in December 1989,399 appeared in a first draft of
398 Van den Bossche (2006).
399 Negotiating Group on Dispute Settlement, Meeting of 7 December 1989, Note by the
Secretariat (MTN.GNG/NG13/17), p. 3 („One delegation proposed that the Group consider
various options for possible appellate review of panel reports. … the delegation indicated
that it was assessing the following … options: … the establishment of a standing review
tribunal …“). Elsig/Eckhardt (2015), p. s25, attribute this proposal to Canada; however,
according to a news bulletin issued by the GATT on 11 January 1990 (NUR 33), p. 14, the
proposal was made by the US („The United States [at the meeting of 7 December] put
forward some tentative ideas on … the creation of an appellate body to review panel
reports“).
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revised provisions on dispute settlement in September 1990,400 and was in-
cluded, already in its more or less final form, in the draft Dispute Settlement
Understanding that was part of the comprehensive „Dunkel Draft“ of the re-
sults of the Uruguay Round negotiations of December 1991.401 In a proposal of
April 1990 the US stated that such „a review process could be established for
extraordinary cases where a panel report contains legal interpretations that are
questioned formally by one of the parties.“402 This notion that the proposed
review process should be limited to „extraordinary cases“, „truly exceptional
cases“403 or „rare cases“404 was widely shared among the negotiators. However,
that is not what happened. From the very beginning appeals to the Appellate
Body were the rule rather than the exception. Between 1996 and 2018, about
two thirds (67 %) of all panel reports were appealed, oscillating between a low
of 40 % in 2007 and a high of 100 % in 2008.405
Moreover, the Appellate Body assumed a different role than expected not only
in quantitative but also in qualitative terms. Debra Steger, first Director of the
Appellate Body Secretariat and senior negotiator for Canada of dispute sett-
400 Negotiating Group on Dispute Settlement, Draft text on dispute settlement, 21 September
1990 (MTN.GNG/NG13/W/45), pp. 3 – 4.
401 Trade Negotiations Committee, Draft Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay
Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, 20 December 1991 (MTN.TNC/W/FA), Section
S: Understanding on Rules and Procedures on Dispute Settlement, pp. S.12-S.14.
402 Communication from the United States of 6 April 1990 (MTN.GNG/NG13/W/40), p. 5; see
also p. 6: „There are a number of questions, however, that arise in considering an appellate
mechanism: How might we ensure that the review process is used only in extraordinary
cases, rather than affording an automatic opportunity to delay the dispute settlement
process?“.
403 Negotiating Group on Dispute Settlement, Meeting of 5 April 1990, Note by the Secre-
tariat (MTN.GNG/NG13/19), p. 4 („While some participants declared their opposition to any
such mechanism [of appellate review], others considered that it might be useful in specific
circumstances if appeals could be limited to truly exceptional cases.“); Negotiating Group
on Dispute Settlement, Profile on the Status of the Work in the Group, Report by the
Chairman, 18 July 1990 (MTN.GNG/NG13/W/43), p. 3 („There is concern that appeals
should be limited to only truly exceptional cases but work remains to be done on how this
would be achieved in practice“).
404 Communication from Canada of 28 June 1990 (MTN.GNG/NG13/W/41), p. 4 („In rare
cases, where a party to a dispute considered, despite the review by the panel, that a report
was so fundamentally flawed that it should not be accepted, the GATT dispute settlement
system should provide for a means of correcting errors. The addition of an appellate
mechanism would serve that purpose. The intent would not be to have appellate review
become a quasi-automatic step in the dispute settlement process“).
405 Appellate Body, Annual Report for 2018, March 2019 (WT/AB/29), p. 142.
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lement in the Uruguay Round, noted that „Uruguay Round negotiators did not
intend to create a court“,406 and certainly not one with wide-ranging powers
and influence. Similarly, Joseph H.H. Weiler observed in 2002, „[f]rom inter-
views with many delegations that I have conducted it is clear that … they saw the
logic of the Appellate Body as a kind of Super-Panel to give a losing party another
bite at the cherry, given that the losing party could no longer block adoption of
the Panel [report]. It is equally clear to me that they did not fully understand the
judicial … nature of the Appellate Body.“407 That negotiators perceived the
Appellate Body as more of a „Super-Panel“ than a traditional international
court, like the International Court of Justice, is reflected in many features of
the Appellate Body set out in the DSU, such as the names of the institution
(Appellate Body rather than court) and the persons sitting on it (Appellate
Body members rather than judges), the fact that Appellate Body rulings, like
those of panels, only become binding after formal adoption by a political body,
the DSB (albeit with negative consensus), the comparatively small number of
Appellate Body members (seven, only three of which sit on any given case),
and the relatively short tenure of Appellate Body members (only four years,
renewable once).408 But, while, in the words of one former Appellate Body
member, „[g]overnments didn’t want it to be really a judicial process“,409 the
Appellate Body „[f]rom the outset … has made the conscious choice to function
as if it were a court.“410 For instance, the first Working Procedure of Appellate
Review, which the first Appellate Body members drew up in early 1996, were
based on a careful analysis of the working procedures of a number of inter-
national courts and one national supreme court.411 The personalities and
backgrounds of the first seven Appellate Body members played a large part in
the transformation of the Appellate Body from a more panel-like institution,
406 Steger (2015), p. 447.
407 Weiler (2002), p. 201.
408 For a more detailed comparison of the Appellate Body with other international courts,
see Van den Bossche (2006), pp. 294 – 300.
409 Terris/Romano/Swigart (2007), p. 106 (quoting from an interview with an unnamed
Appellate Body member).
410 Van Damme (2009), p. 157.
411 The European Court of Justice, the European Court of Human Rights, the Central
American Court of Human Rights, and the Supreme Court of the Philippines (the latter
presumably because one of the first Appellate Body members, Florentino P. Feliciano,
had been a justice of that court before joining the Appellate Body), in addition the
International Centre for Settlement of lnvestment Disputes and the dispute settlement
system of the North American Free Trade Agreement; see Steger (2015), p. 451, fn. 13.
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still influenced by the diplomatic traditions of the old GATT, that many 
negotiators had in mind, to the fully-fledged court-like institution which the 
Appellate Body turned out to be. Unlike most panelists in the pre-WTO time, 
they were, with one exception, lawyers and not members of the close-knit 
GATT community.412 Tellingly, one of the first seven Appellate Body members, 
Claus-Dieter Ehlermann, published an account of his experiences as Appellate 
Body member under the title „Six Years on the Bench of the ,World Trade
Court‘“.413 This self-understanding of the Appellate Body has persisted, as 
expressed more recently by a current Appellate Body member, Thomas R. 
Graham, who remarked that „[f]or although they don’t call us that, we are in 
effect judges, on what is in effect the highest appeals court for the rules of global 
trade.“414 The basic difference between viewing the Appellate Body as merely 
another kind of panel or, alternatively, as an international court is the source 
of much of the US criticism on issues of procedure and interpretative ap-
proach, especially on advisory opinions and precedent. In that vein, Gregory 
Shaffer argues that „[t]he core U.S. complaint is the judicialization of WTO 
dispute settlement, where the AB has been operating as if it is an international 
court building a jurisprudence, rather than a modest body that issues ad hoc 
decisions to help WTO members resolve discrete disputes.“415
412 See Terris/Romano/Sigart (2007), p. 107: „Many also agree that had the first members of
the Appellate Body not been mostly lawyers, but instead diplomats, as in the GATT system,
the WTO process would have probably remained much closer to its diplomatic roots.“; on
the background of the first seven Appellate Body members, see their CVs on the WTO
website (https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/ab_members_descrp_e.htm) and
Appleton (2016), pp. 20 – 22. The one exception mentioned was Julio Lacarte-Muró from
Uruguay, a career diplomat and consummate GATT insider, who, among other things,
was Deputy Executive Secretary of the GATT in 1947 – 1948 and chairman of the Nego-
tiating Group on Dispute Settlement in the Uruguay Round. Terris/Romano/Sigart (2007),
p. 107, quote an unnamed Appellate Body member as saying „Lacarte underwent a
fundamental change of outlook and was won over by the lawyers’ side.“
413 Ehlermann (2002).
414 Graham (2014), p. 318.
415 Shaffer (2019), p. 7; see also McDougall (2018): „At issue is a disagreement about what in
fact WTO members expected from the Appellate Body when they founded the WTO. The US
has long argued that it agreed only to a limited mandate that focuses on resolving specific
disputes, avoiding unnecessarily sweeping interpretations of the trade rules, and deferring to
the decisions of governments in cases of ambiguously worded obligations – even if it means
leaving some trade restrictive measures in place. On the other hand, many other members,
and in some ways the institution itself, consider the Appellate Body to be an independent
world court charged with providing broad clarifications of the trade rules, even beyond what
is necessary to resolve specific disputes as well as updating the rules as required to reflect
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The second case of unfulfilled expectations is the track record of the US as a
litigant before the Appellate Body. The current United States Trade Repres-
entative (USTR), Robert E. Lighthizer, who had been Deputy USTR from 1983
to 1985 under President Reagan and had then worked in private practice as
trade remedy lawyer until his appointment as USTR in 2017 by President
Trump, said in 2000 that „I was at USTR in the early ’80s when the idea really
began to take on currency that, well, we have a problem, we need binding re-
solution if a country can lose a panel decision and then block it. And that the U.S.
at that time viewed itself as entirely the plaintiff, not really the defendant in any
case.“416 This view of the US as plaintiff rather than defendant was echoed in
2017 by former Appellate Body member Jennifer Hillman: „[W]hat were the
expectations of the United States when the system went into place? I think, first of
all, the expectation of the United States [was] that the vast majority of the time
the United States would be on offense and only relatively rarely, if ever, on de-
fense.“417 In line with these expectations, the US is the most active complainant
in the WTO, with 124 cases it filed from 1995 to August 2019, followed by the
EU with 102 and Canada with 39 complaints. But, contrary to US expectations,
by an even greater margin the US is also the country most often sued in the
WTO, with 154 cases brought against it, the next in rank being the EU with 85
and China with 43 times being a respondent.418 And, similar to the experience
of other WTO litigants, while the US wins most of its cases as complainant, it
loses most of its cases as respondent.419 Furthermore, not only has the US been
changing economic realities.“ These differences on the proper function of dispute settle-
ment even predate the WTO, as John H. Jackson has pointed out: „[T]hroughout the
history of the GATT, and now in the WTO, there has been some ambivalence about the
appropriate role of dispute settlement procedures. To over-generalize a bit, there were
roughly two viewpoints: one favours a ’negotiation’ or ’diplomacy’-oriented approach whe-
reby dispute settlement procedures should not be juridical or ’legalistic’, but should simply
assist negotiators to resolve differences through negotiation and compromise. Another ap-
proach views the dispute settlement procedure as a relatively disciplined juridical process by
which an impartial panel could make objective rulings about whether or not certain acti-
vities were consistent with GATT obligations.“ (Jackson [1998], p. 60).
416 Lighthizer (2000).
417 Hillman (2017), p. 1.
418 All figures from the WTO website, Disputes by member (https://www.wto.org/english/
tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_by_country_e.htm), including all disputes up to and including
DS586.
419 According to Daku/Pelc (2017), p. 4, in all WTO disputes between 1995 and 2013 claimants
prevailed on average with 74 % of their claims at the panel level and 69 % at the
appellate level; defining a win as finding that respondent’s measure is not in compliance
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sued successfully more often than expected, there is a widespread perception
among many in the US that it has been losing unjustly. To quote Appellate
Body critic John Magnus again: „The dissatisfaction [of the US] with the dispute
settlement system is a sort of a bundle of items … But, by far, the biggest item is
that when on defense, we lose cases and claims we shouldn’t lose.“420 The greatest
concern to the US are loses in the area of trade remedies (anti-dumping duties,
countervailing duties and safeguard measures),421 which are designed to
protect industries threatened by import competition.422
The third instance of unfulfilled expectations concerns the relationship bet-
ween the judicial and legislative branches of the WTO. Whereas the judicial
branch (i.e., the WTO dispute settlement system) has been, as described, very
active, the legislative branch (i.e., treaty-making by members) has failed to
produce significant results. Since the founding of the GATT in 1947 the world
trading system has been further developed and adapted in successive trade
rounds. The eighth and latest of these trade rounds was the Uruguay Round of
1986 – 1994. The expectation after the conclusion of the Uruguay Round was
that, like in the past, further trade negotiations and treaty amendments would
follow. To that effect, Art. III:2 of the WTO Agreement stipulates that „[t]he
WTO shall provide the forum for negotiations among its Members concerning
their multilateral trade relations“. Consistent with these expectations, in No-
vember 2001, the WTO members started the ninth trade round, the so-called
with WTO law, Colares (2009), p. 403, concludes that for all WTO disputes until Sep-
tember 2007 the average win rate for complainants amounts to 89 % in trade remedy
cases and 83 % in non-trade remedy cases; a study of the news agency Bloomberg of 2017
finds that the US success rates as WTO litigant as claimant as well as respondent are
similar to, but slightly better than the average success rates („America Wins Often With
Trade Referee That Trump Wants to Avoid“, 27 March 2017, https://www.bloomberg.com/
news/articles/2017-03-27/trump-isn-t-a-fan-of-the-wto-but-u-s-lawyers-often-win-there);
in the DSB meeting of 24 June 2019, China put the US success rate as complainant at 85.7
% compared with a total average of 84.4 %, and as respondent at 25 % compared with a
total average of 16.6 % (minutes [WT/DSB/M/430], para. 8.13).
420 Magnus (2017), p. 1.
421 See, e. g., former US trade diplomat and current WTO Deputy-Director General Wolff
(2018): „I can testify from interactions over an extended period of time with a number of
officials in U.S. government and with other U.S. practitioners that they share the belief that
the Appellate Body has narrowed the use of trade remedies, including antidumping, in a
manner that was not anticipated at the inception of WTO dispute settlement. This is not,
however, the view of many WTO Members.“
422 See for an in-depth discussion of the law and economics of trade remedies Mavroidis/
Messerlin/Wauters (2008).
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Doha Development Round, or Doha Round for short, with an ambitious
negotiating agenda covering almost all areas of WTO law.423 The aim was to
conclude the Doha Round until the end of 2005.424 However, apart from the
Trade Facilitation Agreement of 2013,425 no major new agreement or treaty
amendment was accomplished,426 and in 2015 the US declared that the Doha
Round should be abandoned and negotiations should take new directions.427
This lack of progress at the negotiating table meant that not only could the
WTO rules book not be adapted to new challenges and developments that had
emerged since 1995, such as digitalization or the rise of China’s state-led
economy, but also that members were unable to correct through amendments
any controversial interpretations of the existing rules by panels and the Ap-
pellate Body. Moreover, the failure of negotiations since 1995 has not only
prevented changes to substantive WTO law, but also changes to the DSU,
despite reform efforts from the very beginning.428 The Final Act of the Uruguay
Round of 1994 already contained a decision by the members to review the DSU
within four years of the entry into force of the WTO Agreement, i.e., by the
423 See WTO Ministerial Conference, Fourth Session, Doha, 9 – 14 November 2001, Ministerial
Declaration, adopted on 14 November 2001 (WT(MIN(01)/DEC/1) („Doha Declaration“).
424 Doha Declaration (fn. 423), para. 45.
425 Ministerial decision of 7 December 2013, Agreement on Trade Facilitation (WT/MIN(1)/36
and WT/L/911) (conclusion of negotiations); General Council decision of 27 November
2014, Protocol amending the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Orga-
nization (WT/L/940) (submission for acceptance); the Trade Facilitation Agreement
entered into force on 22 February 2017 after ratification by two-thirds of the WTO
membership (https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news17_e/fac_31jan17_e.htm); on the
negotiating history of the Trade Facilitation Agreement, see Hassan (2014), pp. 33 – 65;
Schott/Hufbauer (2014); and Kerr (2015).
426 In addition to the multilateral Trade Facilitation Agreement, there were since 1995 a few
negotiating successes on the plurilateral level (i.e., agreements with less than full parti-
cipation of the WTO membership), especially the Information Technology Agreement of
1995, the product coverage of which was substantially expanded in 2015, with currently 82
member states (see https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/inftec_e/inftec_e.htm), and the
Revised Agreement on Government Procurement of 2012 with currently 48 member states
(see https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/gproc_e/gp_gpa_e.htm).
427 See Froman (USTR at the time) (2015); statement of Froman at the Ministerial Conference
in December 2015 in Nairobi (WT/MIN(15)/ST/121); Nairobi Ministerial decision, adopted
on 19 December 2018 (WT/MIN(15)/DEC), para. 30.
428 See on the history of the DSU reform negotiations until 2004, Zimmermann (2006),
pp. 91 – 125.
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beginning of 1999.429 After the negotiators had missed that deadline, they set at
the start of the Doha Round in 2001 a new deadline, May 2003, for coming to
an agreement on improvements and clarifications of the DSU,430 but that
deadline was not met either. Today, these negotiations on DSU reform are still
ongoing, but without an end in sight.431 The resulting imbalance between the
judicial and the legislative branches of the WTO was highlighted by USTR
Robert Lighthizer in his opening statement at the 11th WTO Ministerial
Conference in 2017, in which he said, as cited previously, that „many are
concerned that the WTO is losing its essential focus on negotiation and becoming
a litigation-centered organization. Too often members seem to believe they can
gain concessions through lawsuits that they could never get at the negotiating
table.“432
In short, the US finds itself with an Appellate Body that has turned out to be
more powerful than anticipated, has ruled against the US, especially US in-
dustries threatened by import competition, far more frequently than expected,
and is not checked by members through treaty amendments, again contrary to
expectations. It is not any one of these unfulfilled expectations alone but
rather their combination that fuels to a large degree the current US opposition
to the Appellate Body. For instance, it is not much of a stretch to assume that
the US would be far less critical of the court-like approach of the Appellate
Body and its ambition to develop „a coherent and predictable body of juris-
prudence clarifying Member’s rights and obligations under the covered agree-
ments“433 through relying heavily on its own precedents if the rulings of Ap-
pellate Body had generally been more favorable to the US.434 Similarly, if the
429 Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotia-
tions, 15 April 1994 (UR-94-0083), p. 419: Decision on the application and review of the
Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes.
430 Doha declaration (supra, fn. 423), para. 30.
431 See for the latest state of the negotiations the report of 17 June 2019 of the chairman of
the DSB in Special Session (TN/DS/31).
432 Supra, fn. 74.
433 Appellate Body report, US – Stainless Steel (Mexico), para. 161.
434 Not surprisingly, for instance, the early US statement cited above (fn. 386) strongly in
favor of precedential effect of Appellate Body reports was made regarding an Appellate
Body ruling the US supported (on the admissibility of amicus curiae briefs), whereas the
later US condemnations of precedential effect typically concerned Appellate Body rulings
which the US vehemently opposed (in particular on zeroing, like in the crucial case US –
Stainless Steel (Mexico)). In the same vein, Bacchus/Lester (2019), p. 4, argue that the „true
concern“ of the US regarding precedent is that it „has long hoped that, in deciding new
A. Unfulfilled expectations
115
US had been more successful in treaty negotiations, including on issues on
which it lost before the Appellate Body, the potential for US frustration with
the Appellate Body would have been much reduced.
The link between these unfulfilled expectations and the current US opposition
to the Appellate Body raises the question as to what extent the Appellate Body
is to blame for the mismatch between what the US believed it had agreed to in
1995 and what happened afterwards.
As to the first point, the rise of the Appellate Body „from afterthought to
centrepiece“, the quantitative aspect of that rise, i.e., the use of the appeal
mechanism in the majority of cases right from the beginning, was, of course,
due to the members themselves. And, as VanGrasstek pointed out, „[i]n re-
trospect, it is clear that the expectation [that the Appellate Body „would be
called upon only in rare instances“] was unrealistic“ because, for political rea-
sons, governments usually have to demonstrate to their domestic constituents
that they have defended their interests with all available legal means, inclu-
ding an appeal. „That simple calculation seems to have evaded the DSU nego-
tiators during the round.“435
The qualitative aspect of the Appellate Body’s rise, meaning the self-percep-
tion of the Appellate Body as an international court rather than as a mere
settler of individual disputes, is, on closer inspection, similarly a case of un-
realistic expectations. Although, as described above, the Uruguay Round
negotiators did not intend to create a court, and indicated that in various ways
in the DSU, for example, by avoiding the words „court“ and „judges“, they
nevertheless invested the Appellate Body with the core power of a court,
especially of a highest court of appeal, namely the final word on interpreta-
tion. The fact that formally the DSB, i. e., the membership, adopts the reports
of the Appellate Body was due to the negative consensus rule never more than
a formality.436 Equally, the power of the Ministerial Conference and the Ge-
neral Council to adopt interpretations pursuant to Art. IX:2 of the WTO
Agreement, which figures so prominently in the arguments of the US regarding
appeals, new members of the Appellate Body would overrule the judgments of previous
members of the Appellate Body on an assortment of legal issues of political significance to
the United States, particularly on antidumping, subsidies, and safeguards. … Failing this, the
United States wants WTO panels to disregard these previous Appellate Body rulings on
trade remedies and rule differently in new disputes.“
435 VanGrasstek (2013), p. 242.
436 Cf. supra, fn. 366.
V. A broader explanatory framework for the US blockage
116
advisory opinions and precedential effect, and which would allow members to
overturn Appellate Body interpretations, has never been used by members.
This is no surprise either because such an authoritative interpretation would
require, according to Art. IX:2 of the WTO Agreement, a three-fourths majority
of the members, and, in reality, as a consequence of the WTO’s informal
consensus principle, a unanimous decision, like the unanimous decision ne-
cessary to prevent the adoption of an Appellate Body report.437 The late Julio
Lacarte-Muró, who as chairman of the group that negotiated the DSU in the
Uruguay Round and as one of the founding members of the Appellate Body
probably had more knowledge about the genesis of the Appellate Body than
anyone else, could therefore properly conclude that what the Uruguay Round
negotiators had devised, whether intentionally or not, „was, in effect, a new
international court for the settlement of [trade] disputes, irrespective of the name
given to it by WTO members“.438 And the members reinforced the judicial
nature of the Appellate Body in 1995 with the first appointments they made to
it, namely, as mentioned above, they chose primarily GATT outsiders with
legal or even judicial backgrounds rather than GATT insiders with diplomatic
credentials (with the single exception of Lacarte-Muró). Thus, even though the
Appellate Body’s self-perception as a court differed from what many nego-
437 See Weiler (2001), p. 201: „De jure the DSU leaves the final interpretation of the Agreements
in the hands of the General Council and Ministerial Conference. De facto, unless the
Organization is to break the hallowed principle of consensus, that power has shifted to the
Appellate Body. The circumstances would have to be utterly unique to envisage a consensus
in the General Council and/or Ministerial Conference to overturn an interpretation or
decision of the Appellate Body.“ These practical limits upon Art. IX:2 of the WTO
Agreement were well known at the time of the Uruguay Round, as indicated, for instance,
by an early scholarly review of the DSU in 1994: „Although the DSB is required to make
decisions by consensus, the same matters, if they were to involve interpretations, could be
referred to the WTO at the request of a disputing Member (paragraph 3. 9), and the relevant
decisions could be made by a three-fourths majority of the Members [under Art. IX.2 of the
WTO Agreement]. The general power of decision-making by consensus under Article IX.1 of
the WTO is consistent with past GATT practice. Given the history of the GATT, the complex
nature of international trade relations and the difficulties associated with implementing
majority decisions in the international plane, it is unlikely that decision-making by majority
vote would become a lightly used option for the WTO.“ (Kohona [1994], p. 31).
438 Lacarte-Muró (2015), p. 476; see further Weiler (2001), p. 201: „In interviews many dele-
gations would state, with some incredulity: ,We have created a Court ….‘“; on the difference
between the form and the substance of the Appellate Body, see also the founding
Appellate Body member Matsushita (2015), pp. 547 – 549 („Is the Appellate Body a court of
international trade?“).
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tiators had expected, it cannot be said that by behaving like a court the Ap-
pellate Body has acted contrary to the function it had been assigned to by
these negotiators.
Regarding the second instance of unfulfilled expectations, the higher than
expected loss rate of the US as respondent, the Appellate Body would indeed
bear a large part of the blame if, as the US claims, many of these losses were
caused by „the Appellate Body adding to or diminishing rights or obligations
under the WTO Agreement in areas as varied as subsidies, antidumping and
countervailing duties, standards under the TBT Agreement, and safeguards.“439
As mentioned earlier, analyzing whether these US allegations of judicial
overreach in the area of substantive law are justified would go far beyond the
scope of the present study. However, if the result of our analysis of the cor-
responding US allegations regarding the six issues of procedure and inter-
pretative approach is any guide, then one might assume that the performance
of the Appellate Body in the area of substantive law is at least not as dire as the
US proclaims.
Finally, as to the third case of unfulfilled expectations, the relationship bet-
ween the judicial and legislative branches of the WTO, there are indeed some,
especially among US trade remedy lawyers, who see a causal relationship
between alleged judicial overreach in the dispute settlement system and the
failure of WTO negotiators to conclude new agreements: „A runaway dispute
settlement system complicates – maybe even totally blocks – ongoing progress at
the negotiating table. And I would suggest that anyone who doesn’t see a link
between what’s been happening in dispute settlement since 1995 and what’s been
happening at the negotiating table, the paucity of negotiating outcomes during
that same period, isn’t looking very closely.“440 This view seems to be shared by
439 Minutes of the DSB meeting of 18 December 2018 (WT/DSB/M/423), statement of the US,
para. 9.4.
440 Magnus (2017), p. 3; see also Stewart/McDonough/Smith/Jorgensen (2013), p. 392:
„A[ppellate] B[ody] activism may chill the ability/willingness of WTO Members to reach new
agreements out of concern that any agreement will provide the opportunity for finding
obligations that were never agreed to. … The current Doha Round negotiations are mori-
bund, and A[ppellate] B[ody] decisions have already led many governments to decide not to
seek negotiations on issues that historically would have been subject to negotiation in the
hope that they can get through dispute settlement that which they never achieved through
negotiations.“; see for an early discussion of the issue Tarullo (2003), pp. 373 – 393 (from
the abstract, p. 373: „If important trading countries like the United States believe that the
Appellate Body will undermine provisions intended to preserve their ability to use trade
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USTR Lighthizer, who just recently said in a hearing before a US Senate
committee in March 2019: „[W]e’re not a negotiating body anymore, the WTO,
the litigation, these are all sort of link things. … It’s a major-major change from
what the WTO was supposed to do, and the result is we don’t have [negotiation]
rounds“.441 However, if there were such a negative impact of the dispute
settlement system on the progress of negotiations, it is at best a tangential one.
Almost all accounts of the reasons for the demise of the Doha Round and the
deadlock in the negotiations focus on fundamental political differences bet-
ween the major players, such as the US, the EU, China and India, and rarely
even mention the dispute settlement system as an explanatory factor, let alone
attribute any great weight to it. That is not only true of accounts given by
scholars,442 but also by former US Trade Representatives.443 And even the
current US administration has, when discussing the Doha Round outside the
context of the appointment crisis, explained its failure with basic political
disagreements.444 The dispute settlement system is better described as a victim
rather than a cause of the stalemate in negotiations because if controversial
issues cannot be resolved through negotiations, greater strain is put on that
system, as the current crisis exemplifies.
remedies, they may decline to negotiate further disciplines on the use of these remedies or,
possibly, to enter multilateral negotiations entirely.“).
441 Transcript of Senator James Lankford’s questions and Robert Lighthizer’s answers at the
hearing of 12 March 2019 of the Senate Finance Committee (https://www.lankford.se-
nate.gov/news/press-releases/senator-lankford-attends-finance-committee-hearing-on-
the-world-trade-organization).
442 See, for instance, Erixon (2014), Wolfe (2013), Kleinmann/Guinan (2011), and Evenett
(2011).
443 See Froman (USTR from 2013 to 2017) (2015), and Schwab (USTR from 2006 to 2009)
(2011).
444 See statement of the US at the General Council meeting of 24 July 2019, item 8: „The Doha
Round failed because the more advanced, wealthier, and most influential of the self-declared
developing countries refused to contribute in a meaningful way.“ (https://geneva.usmission.
gov/2019/07/24/statements-delivered-by-ambassador-dennis-shea-wto-general-council-
meeting-geneva-july-24-2019).
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B. CONTINUITY AND CHANGE UNDER THE TRUMP
ADMINISTRATION
The current Appellate Body crisis began shortly after the new US adminis-
tration under President Donald Trump had come into office in January 2017. In
this section, we will discuss to what extent the Trump administration’s policy
of blocking appointments to the Appellate Body is merely an extension and
logical consequence of policies of past US administrations regarding WTO
disputes settlement and the Appellate Body, or a sign of a fundamental policy
shift. As we will see, there are elements of both continuity and change, but the
latter dominates.
As to continuity, the US criticism of the Appellate Body certainly did not start
with the Trump administration. Although, as mentioned earlier, some of the
most recent criticisms are new, such as the Rule 15 issue or the claim that it is
only the Appellate Body’s fault that its reports are not issued within the 90-day
deadline of Art. 17.5 of the DSU, for many years various US administration
have, again and again, faulted the Appellate Body for overreach, for disre-
garding the text of the WTO agreements, and for adding to or diminishing the
rights and obligations negotiated by members, most notably in the area of
trade remedies. In all of this, the US has been the most outspoken and fre-
quent critic among the members. The prominent role of the US as challenger
of the Appellate Body is illustrated by a study by Terence P. Stewart, a US trade
remedy lawyer and long-time Appellate Body opponent, who analyzed all DSB
meetings up to 2017 for claims by WTO members of Appellate Body overre-
ach.445 He found that members raised such claims 55 times with respect to 45
of a total of 134 Appellate Body reports, ranging in time from 1997 to 2017. Of
these 55 claims of overreach, 30, that is, more than half of them, were made by
just one member, the US. The remaining 25 claims of overreach were spread
across 16 members, none of which made more than three such claims, i.e., only
one tenth of that of the US. Another indicator of continuity is a conversation in
September 2018 of six former US trade representatives (USTRs), who held
office between 1981 and 2013. In response to a question by the moderator as to
whether the allegations of Appellate Body overreach made by the Trump
administration were correct, there was general agreement among these former
445 Stewart (2018), pp. 5 – 6 and Attachment 1.
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USTRs that they were.446 Hostility toward the WTO dispute settlement system
and the Appellate Body has also been expressed in the past by the US Con-
gress. For example, in the Trade Act of 2002 Congress stated that „the recent
pattern of decisions by dispute settlement panels of the WTO and the Appellate
Body to impose obligations and restrictions on the use of antidumping, count-
ervailing, and safeguard measures by WTO members under the Antidumping
Agreement, the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, and the
Agreement on Safeguards has raised concerns“447 and demanded from the
executive branch „a report setting forth the strategy of the executive branch to
address concerns of the Congress regarding whether dispute settlement panels
and the Appellate Body of the WTO have added to obligations, or diminished
rights, of the United States.“448 Such concerns were repeated 13 years later in
another Congressional act on trade matters,449 combined with a similar re-
quest for a report by the executive branch.450 Moreover, like the Trump ad-
ministration, previous US administrations have not limited themselves to just
446 Center for Strategic and International Studies, transcript of „A Conversation with Six
Former USTRs“ (William Brock [1981 – 1985], Carla Hills [1989 – 1993], Michael Kantor
[1993 – 1996], Charlene Barshefsky [1996 – 2001], Susan Schwab [2006 – 2009], and Ro-
nald Kirk [2009 – 2013]) on 17 September 2018 in Washington, D.C. (https://csis-
prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/event/180917_Conversation_Former_USTRs.pdf),
pp. 19 – 21.
447 Sec. 2101(b)(3) of the Trade Act of 2002 (19 USC 3801(b)(3)).
448 Sec. 2105(b)(3) of the Trade Act of 2002 (19 USC 3805(b)(3)); on the fulfillment of this
obligation, see Executive Branch Strategy Regarding WTO Dispute Settlement Panels and
the Appellate Body, Report to Congress transmitted by the Secretary of Commerce on 30
December 2002.
449 Sec. 102(b)(16)(C)(i) of the Bipartisan Congressional Trade Priorities and Accountability
Act of 2015 (19 USC 4201(b)(16)(C)(i)): „The principal negotiating objectives of the United
States with respect to dispute settlement and enforcement of trade agreements are … to seek
adherence by panels convened under the Dispute Settlement Understanding and by the
Appellate Body to … the mandate of those panels and the Appellate Body to apply the WTO
Agreement as written, without adding to or diminishing rights and obligations under the
Agreement“.
450 Sec. 106(b)(5) of the Bipartisan Congressional Trade Priorities and Accountability Act of
2015 (19 USC 4205(b)(5): The executive branch „shall transmit to Congress a report setting
forth the strategy of the executive branch to address concerns of Congress regarding
whether dispute settlement panels and the Appellate Body of the World Trade Organization
have added to obligations, or diminished rights, of the United States“; on the fulfillment of
this obligation, see the 2015 Executive Branch Strategy Regarding WTO Dispute Settle-
ment Panels and the Appellate Body, Report to Congress transmitted by the Secretary of
Commerce.
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criticizing the Appellate Body, but also have taken actions aimed at changing
the course of the Appellate Body. As described above in Chapter II, from early
on the US has used the appointment process as a means to influence the
Appellate Body, culminating, during the Obama administration, in the
blocking of the reappointment of Appellate Body member Seung Wha Chang,
which directly preceded the current appointment crisis. In addition, as part of
the DSU reform negotiations, the US, mostly together with Chile, had already
between 2002 and 2007 made proposals for increasing member control of the
Appellate Body.451
With so much continuity, where is change? What has changed are the basic
assumptions underlying US trade policy. Since the end the Second World War,
the US, working from foundations that were laid in the wake of the Great
Depression by President Roosevelt and his Secretary of State Cordell Hull, has
been the main architect and defender of the multilateral trading system, a
system build on the rule of law, openness and non-discrimination, and on the
belief that trade promotes peace and prosperity. It is based on economic
theories in the tradition of Adam Smith and David Ricardo, according to
which free trade benefits all participating countries („win-win“), and, con-
versely, protectionism hurts not only the trading partners of a protectionist
country, but also that country itself. The central institutional pillars of this
system were first the GATT and then its successor, the WTO. This focus on free
trade and multilateralism does not mean that during this period the US did
not also engage in protectionism, far from it.452 Like almost all countries, the
US used, to a greater or lesser degree, protectionist instruments to shield
domestic industries from foreign competition, such as voluntary export rest-
raints, farm subsidies, and, most prominently, trade remedies. But these
protectionist measures were always perceived and applied as exceptions to
the general rule of free trade.453
451 Communication from 17 December 2002 from Chile and the US (TN/DS/W/28) (see
Zimmermann [2006], pp. 112 – 116, on the background of that proposal and reactions by
other members); communication of 11 March 2003 from Chile and the US (TN/DS/W/52);
communication of 15 March 2005 from the US (TN/DS/W/74); communication of 21
October 2005 from the US (TN/DS/W/82); communication from 30 May 2007 from Chile
and the US (TN/DS/W/89).
452 See Williams (2019); for protectionist measures imposed by the US on China since 1980,
see Bown (2019), pp. 6 – 11.
453 See Irvin (2017) for an in-depth treatment of the history of US trade policy and the
relative weight of free trade and protectionism.
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The trade policy of the Trump administration constitutes a sharp break with
this prevailing US trade paradigm of the post-war era.454 For a better under-
standing of the Appellate Body crisis, three closely related elements of this
break are of particular importance.
First, Trump views international trade not as a „win-win“ but, in the tradition
of mercantilism, as a „zero-sum“ game, where one country’s trade win is
another country’s trade loss. In this world view, protectionist measures are not
potentially dangerous, self-defeating exceptions, but crucial tools to further
national interest. Trump stated this belief forcefully in his Inaugural Address
of January 2017: „We must protect our borders from the ravages of other
countries making our products, stealing our companies, and destroying our jobs.
Protection will lead to great prosperity and strength.“455 Consistently, Trump is
also an ardent supporter of the traditionally most important protectionist
instrument, tariffs, which the GATT and the WTO successfully strove over
decades to reduce: „I am a Tariff Man. When people or countries come in to raid
the great wealth of our Nation, I want them to pay for the privilege of doing so.“456
Second, Trump prefers power-based over rule-based international trade re-
lations.457 This goes hand in hand with his mercantilist convictions. In the free
trade paradigm, a rule-based trading system makes sense because it provides
security and predictability for traders, and, importantly, serves as bulwark
against protectionist domestic interests, which would hurt the overall eco-
nomic welfare of a country. By contrast, in the mercantilist zero-sum world,
binding international rules prevent a powerful country such as the US from
using its power to the fullest extent possible in its economic struggles with
other countries.458
454 On this break, see Kerr (2018), Charnovitz (2018b), VanGrasstek (2017), and Fidler (2017).
455 https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/the-inaugural-address.
456 Tweet by Trump of 4 December 2018 (https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/
1069970500535902208); see also tweet by Trump of 10 May 2019: „Tariffs will make our
Country MUCH STRONGER, not weaker. Just sit back and watch!“ (https://twitter.com/
realdonaldtrump/status/1126816259851673601).
457 See, for instance, Charnovitz (2018b), pp. 228 – 229: „The Trump Administration sees power
rather than law as the most important principle of international relations. … Trump seems
to endorse raw power without any control by law. Nowhere can this been seen more clearly
than in Trump’s trade policy.“
458 See Kerr (2018), p. 77: „If one perceives international trade relations as a largely adversarial
zero sum game where a country can win only if benefits arise from concessions garnered
from trading partners by the exercise of superior economic power or guile, then trade policy
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Third, Trump is opposed to multilateral institutions and instead prefers bi-
lateral deals or unilateral actions. He made this clear right at the beginning of
his presidency, in January 2017, when he withdrew from the 12-country Trans-
Pacific Partnership (TPP) that had been negotiated by his predecessor Obama.
In his Withdrawal Memorandum he declared: „[I]t is the intention of my Ad-
ministration to deal directly with individual countries on a one-on-one (or bi-
lateral) basis in negotiating future trade deals.“459 Again, this ties in with his
mercantilist philosophy because in bilateral relations the US has a better
chance of bringing its power to bear than in large multilateral negotiations,
where even the US is only one party among many. The most important
multilateral institution in international trade is, of course, the WTO, for which
Trump has again and again expressed his disdain, calling it „a catastrophe“460
and „a disaster for this country“.461 He also showed his antipathy toward
multilateralism in a speech before the General Assembly of the United Nations
in September 2017: „For too long, the American people were told that mammoth
multinational trade deals, unaccountable international tribunals, and powerful
global bureaucracies were the best way to promote their success. But as those
promises flowed, millions of jobs vanished and thousands of factories disap-
peared.“462
The Trump administration’s new approach to trade is not limited to words,
but has also been translated into action. The withdrawal from the TPP has
making needs to be pro-active and unfettered.“; VanGrassteck (2017), pp. 60 – 61, describes
the logic of the Trump administration’s „mercantilist approach to international economic
relations“ as follows: „Governments should use their power to intervene in domestic and
international markets in order to maximize exports, minimize imports and promote a
positive trade balance, and the state should not restrict its freedom of action via agreements
that limit its sovereignty.“
459 https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/presidential-memorandum-regarding-
withdrawal-united-states-trans-pacific-partnership-negotiations-agreement.
460 Remarks by President Trump at the 2018 White House Business Session with Governors
on 26 February 2018, transcript available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-state
ments/remarks-president-trump-2018-white-house-business-session-governors.
461 Remarks by President Trump in Listening Session with Representatives from the Steel
and Aluminum Industry on 1 March 2018, transcript available at https://www.white-
house.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-listening-session-representati-
ves-steel-aluminum-industry.
462 https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-72nd-sessi-
on-united-nations-general-assembly.
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already been mentioned. Other noteworthy trade policy measures include,463
especially, first, in March 2018, the imposition of tariffs on steel and aluminum
imports, at rates of 25 % and 10 %, respectively,464 and, second, in successive
steps since July 2018, the levying of tariffs on Chinese imports, which, effective
as of December 2019, will cover Chinese imports in an amount in excess of
$500 billion, at rates between 15 % and 30 %.465 As a reaction to these tariffs, a
number of targeted states retaliated with tariffs of their own against the US,466
and initiated WTO dispute settlement proceedings.467 China, in particular,
imposed retaliatory tariffs on more than $100 billion worth of US imports, at
rates between 5 % and 25 %, and filed four WTO cases against the US.468
Under WTO law, the Trump administration justified the tariffs on steel and
aluminumwith the national security exception of Art. XXI(b) of the GATT, and
argued that under the terms of that exception such measures are not subject
to review by the WTO dispute settlement system.469 Since most observers
consider the national security justification of the US as merely pretextual,470
the implication of the US action is that any country can take purely protec-
463 For an overview of the various protectionist trade measures of the Trump administration,
see Bown/Kolb (2019) and Williams/Hammond (2019a) as well as (2019b).
464 See Lester/Zhu (2019), pp. 1457 – 1461; Bown/Kolb (2019), pp. 3 – 6; Williams/Hammond
(2019a), p. 3; and Williams/Hammond (2019b), p. 2 – 3.
465 For the official announcements in the US Federal Register of all these tariff actions
against China, see the USTR website at https://ustr.gov/issue-areas/enforcement/section-
301-investigations/tariff-action; see further Bown/Kolb (2019), pp. 7 – 12; Williams/Ham-
mond (2019a), p. 4 – 5; and Williams/Hammond (2019b), p. 2 – 4.
466 See Williams/Hammond (2019b), p. 3, and Bown/Kolb (2019), pp. 3 – 12.
467 With regard to the steel and aluminum tariffs, see DS544 (China), DS547 (India), DS548
(EU), DS550 (Canada), DS551 (Mexico), DS552 (Norway), DS554 (Russia), DS556 (Swit-
zerland), and DS564 (Turkey) (on the WTO consistency [or lack thereof] of these reta-
liatory measures, see Lee [2019], pp. 491 – 496 and 500 – 501); with regard to the tariffs
against China, see DS543, DS565, and DS587. The US, in turn, brought WTO cases against
a number of retaliatory tariffs, see DS557 (Canada), DS558 and DS565 (China), DS559
(EU), DS560 (Mexico), DS561 (Turkey), DS566 (Russia), and DS585 (India).
468 See supra, fn. 466 – 467.
469 See, for instance, statements of the US at the DSB meeting of 29 October 2018 (WT/DSB/
M/420), paras. 9.3, 10.3 – 10.4, 11.3, 12.3, 13.3, and 14.3. The first report of a WTO panel on
the national security exception was issued in April 2019 in the case Russia – Traffic in
Transit (see paras. 7.27 – 7.149 of that report). For detailed discussions of the exception,
see Lee (2018), Lester/Zhu (2019), and Voon (2019).
470 See Kho/Petersen (2019); Lester/Zhu (2019), p. 1458; Lee (2019), pp. 489 – 490 and 500; Lee
(2018), pp. 302 – 303; Anuradha (2018), pp. 318 – 319; and Alden (2018).
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tionist measures in breach of its WTO obligation without fear of legal con-
sequences as long as it invokes reasons of national security, no matter how
spurious such claims may be.471
The justification proffered by the Trump administration for its tariffs against
China, as far as WTO law is concerned, was even less convincing than that for
the tariffs on steel and aluminum. The tariffs against China are based on
Section 301 of the US Tariff Act of 1974, which allows unilateral US trade
sanctions against countries which violate trade agreements or otherwise un-
justifiably interfere with US trade.472 In 2018, the USTR had determined in a
Section 301 investigation that China was engaged in certain policies aimed at
illegitimate technology transfers from the US to China.473 With the tariffs the
US wanted to force China to change these policies.474 Section 301, described as
„the classic embodiment of unilateralism“,475 had been a major factor in the
Uruguay Round negotiations of the DSU.476 The threat of unilateral US trade
sanctions under Section 301, which had been significantly strengthened by
Congress during the Uruguay Round negotiations, had induced the other
negotiating countries to give in to US demands for a more effective multila-
teral enforcement system. In return, as mentioned in Chapter I,477 the US had
471 Furthermore, in a White House press briefing on 6 June 2018, the Director of the National
Economic Council, Lawrence Kudlow, indicated that the US would, in any case, refuse to
comply with WTO dispute settlement rulings against the US on these tariffs („Q … since a
lot of countries now are … taking their cases to the WTO, will this administration respect the
decisions that come out of the WTO on this? KUDLOW: You know, the United States – the
President has said this many times: We are bound by the national interests here more than
anything else. All right? … international multilateral organizations are not going to de-
termine American policy. I think the President has made that very clear.“ [https://
www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/press-briefing-nec-director-larry-kudlow-g7-
summit-060618]).
472 On the history of and practice under Section 301, see Claussen (2019).
473 See Office of the USTR, Findings of the investigation into China’s acts, policies, and
practices related to technology transfers, intellectual property, and innovation under
Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, 22 Mach 2018.
474 See US statements in the minutes of the DSB meetings of 27 March 2018 (WT/DSB/M/
410), paras. 11.2 – 11.3; 27 April 2018 (WT/DSB/M/412), paras. 5.5 – 5.11; 18 December 2018
(WT/DSB/M/413), paras. 8.3 – 8.7; and 28 January 2019 (WT/DSB/M/425), para. 5.3.
475 Silverman (1996), p. 235.
476 On the role of Section 301 in the Uruguay Round’s DSU negotiations, see Stewart (1993),
pp. 2760 – 2763, 2777 – 2779, 2786, 2788 – 2789, 2792, and 2795; Elsig/Eckhard (2015), pp.
s24-s25 and s30.
477 Supra, fn. 7 and accompanying text.
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to commit itself to abstaining from unilateral trade sanctions. This US com-
mitment was enshrined in Art. 23 of the DSU, which obligates members that
„seek the redress of a violation of obligations or other nullification or impairment
of benefits under“ the WTO agreements to resort to WTO dispute settlement
rather than to act unilaterally. In 1998, the EC had initiated WTO proceedings
against the US, claiming that the continued existence of Section 301 and re-
lated provisions of US law violated Art. 23 of the DSU. The panel rejected this
claim, but only after the US had affirmed before the panel that it would not
employ Section 301 against another WTO member it considered to be in
breach of WTO law without a prior finding in WTO dispute settlement pro-
ceedings confirming such a breach.478 Relying on this panel decision, China
argued that the US tariffs against it violated Art. 23 of the DSU.479 The US
retorted that it „had made no findings in the Section 301 investigation that China
had breached its WTO obligations“, and, „[a]ccordingly, China’s argument that
the United States had somehow acted inconsistently with Article 23 of the DSU
was completely lacking in foundation“, leaving it free to respond to such „unfair“
and „trade-distorting“, but WTO-compliant measures with unilateral trade
sanctions.480 The problem with that argument is that the tariffs undisputedly
violate the tariff commitments of the US (Art. II of the GATT) and the most-
favored national principle (Art. I of the GATT). If the tariffs are not retaliation
against breaches of WTO law, as the US claims, then another legal justification
is required for the violations of Arts. I and II of the GATT. However, until very
recently, the US offered no such justification,481 apart from calling the com-
plaints by China „hypocritical“ and „pointless“ because with its retaliatory ta-
478 Panel report, US – Section 301 Trade Act, paras. 7.114 – 7.126 and 7.131 – 7.136.
479 See statements of China in the minutes of the DSB meetings of 27 March 2018 (WT/DSB/
M/410), para. 11.1; 27 April 2018 (WT/DSB/M/412), para. 5.4; and 18 December 2018 (WT/
DSB/M/413), para. 8.2.
480 Minutes of the DSB meeting of 27 March 2018 (WT/DSB/M/410), para. 11.3; see also the US
statements in the minutes of the DSB meetings 27 April 2018 (WT/DSB/M/412), paras.
5.10 – 5.11; 18 December 2018 (WT/DSB/M/413), para. 8.5; and 28 January 2019 (WT/DSB/
M/425), para. 5.3. Only with regard to one aspect of its Section 301 allegations the US
considered that China had violated WTO law, and, indeed, brought a WTO case against
China (DS542, request for consultations filed on 23 March 2018 [WT/DS542/1]). By con-
trast, former Appellate Body member Hillman (2018b), pp. 3 – 6, argues that, beyond this
one WTO case filed by the US, many of the Chinese technology transfer policies ad-
dressed in the Section 301 investigation could be breaches of WTO law and should be
challenged through WTO dispute settlement.
481 See Charnovitz (2018a) and (2018b), p. 235 – 237 (e.g., p. 236: „To the author’s knowledge,
the Trump Administration has not offered any WTO law defence for its Section 301 actions.“).
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riffs China itself had disregarded Art. 23 of the DSU.482 Only in August 2019,
more than a year after it had started to impose the tariffs, the US belatedly
asserted that the Section 301 tariffs were justified by the public morals ex-
ception of Art. XX(a) of the GATT, stating that the Chinese policies offended
US public morals.483 If, though, disapproval of economic policies of another
country, however well-founded, were enough to justify protectionist measures
under Art. XX(a) of the GATT, then it is difficult to see where the limits of this
exception are.484 In sum, both the steel and aluminum tariffs and the tariffs
against China seriously threaten the rule-based order of the multilateral tra-
ding system.
The blocking of all appointments to the Appellate Body can be seen as another
way in which the Trump administration undermines the rule of law in in-
ternational trade. In order to put this measure in the context of the overall
trade policy of the Trump administration, it is helpful to take a closer look at
the current United States Trade Representative (USTR), Robert A. Lighthizer,
whom Trump appointed in January 2017, and who was confirmed by the
Senate in May 2017. As mentioned earlier, Lighthizer had been Deputy USTR
from 1983 to 1985 under President Reagan and had afterwards worked in
private practice as a trade remedy lawyer representing US industries against
foreign competitors.485 He has long been known as a harsh critic of the WTO
dispute settlement system and the Appellate Body.486 For instance, in a tes-
482 See statements of the US at the DSB meetings of 18 December 2018 (WT/DSB/M/423),
paras. 8.3 and 8.6 – 8.7; and 28 January 2019 (WT/DSB/M/425), para. 5.3.
483 First written submission of the US of 27 August 2018 in the dispute US – Tariff Measures
on Certain Goods from China (DS543), paras. 11 – 13 and 63 – 91. In addition, the US
claimed that by retaliating against the tariffs, China had forfeited its right to seek redress
through WTO dispute settlement, relying for that purpose on various general DSU
principles, such as the objective to achieve a prompt and satisfactory settlement of the
dispute (idem, paras. 35 – 62). For a first assessment of these arguments, see Qin (2019).
484 See Babu (2018) for a discussion of the WTO case law on the public moral exception and
the dangers inherent in its potentially broad scope (p. 351: „WTO Panel/AB have shown
considerable leeway to the Member’s determination of what constitutes a public moral in
their given setting. However, there is a danger that such lenient interpretation and
broadening scope of the public moral defence would pave the way for invoking the exception
as a defence for almost every government measure challenged at the WTO DSB.“).
485 Supra, fn. 416; on the biography and views of Lighthizer, see Peterson (2018); Hanke
(2018); and Slobodian (2018).
486 Perhaps ironically, Lighthizer himself had once, in 2003, been nominated to the Appellate
Body, together with Merit Janow (who was then chosen) (Office of the USTR, United
States Nominates WTO Appellate Body Candidates, 5 September 2003 [https://ustr.gov/ar
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timony before the US Senate in 2007 he stated: „Clearly, one of the biggest
threats to our trade laws is from the dispute settlement system at the WTO. The
system has fundamentally lost its way, and the decisions being issued by the
WTO are gutting our trade laws … Rogue WTO panel and Appellate Body de-
cisions have consistently undermined U.S. interests by inventing new legal re-
quirements that were never agreed to by the United States.“487 And even earlier,
in 2000, he proposed to replace binding dispute settlement with a pre-WTO,
more diplomatic type of dispute resolution: „I guess my prescription, really, is to
move back to more of a negotiating kind of a settlement. Something where you
have somebody make a decision but have it not be binding. Having moral
suasion and negotiation and the like. The thought was that binding dispute
resolution will eliminate problems and conflicts and controversies between
countries. And in fact the opposite is the case. It’s created more.“488 Once in office
as USTR, he echoed these earlier thoughts when he remarked in September
2017: „Back when [I was a Deputy USTR] there was a system, it was before 1995,
before the WTO, under the GATT, and there was a system where you would bring
panels and then you would have a negotiation. And, you know, trade grew and
we resolved issues eventually. And, you know, it’s a system that, you know, was
successful for a long period of time. Now, under this binding dispute-settlement
process, we have to figure out a way to have – from our point of view, to have it
work.“489 In a similar vein, Lighter commented in January 2018 on a WTO
dispute settlement case brought by Canada against the US.490 He described the
case as „a massive attack on all of our trade laws“ and added that „[i]t also
underscores why so many of us are concerned about binding dispute arbitration.
chive/Document_Library/Press_Releases/2003/September/United_States_Nominates_WTO_
Appellate_Body_Cidates.html]). Questioned at the time whether he had „the kind of 
judicial and diplomatic temperament that is usually associated with members of the WTO’s 
Appellate Body“, given his fierce criticism of the WTO dispute settlement system, he 
answered: „Your choices, in my view, are to do one of two things … Do you criticize the 
system and hope to kill it, or do you think it is worthwhile to go to Geneva and apply a strict 
constructionist’s perspective, and add a certain credibility?“ (Rushford [2003]).
487 Lighthizer (2007), p. 6.
488 Lighthizer (2000).
489 Center for Strategic and International Studies, U.S. Trade Policy Priorities: Robert Light-
hizer, United States Trade Representative, event in Washington on 18 September 2017,
transcript, p. 9.
490 US – Certain Systemic Trade Remedies Measures, request for consultations filed by Canada
on 10 January 2018 (WT/DS535/1).
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What sovereign nation would trust to arbitrators or the flip of a coin their entire
defense against unfair trade?“491 In light of these statements, the open-ended
blocking of all appointments to the Appellate Body seems a perfectly sensible
strategy because it achieves, in effect, what Lighthizer had already proposed in
2000, namely the elimination of binding dispute settlement and a return to a
pre-WTO diplomatic dispute resolution system. Lighthizer’s preference of
diplomatic power-play over binding legal decisions was also illustrated by an
exchange with a US senator in March 2019. The senator pointed out that the
US had just won an important case against China before a WTO panel,492 and
questioned what would happen if China appealed the decision, and the Ap-
pellate Body were unable to rule on the appeal, due to the blockage of ap-
pointments, thus preventing the decision from becoming legally binding.
Lighthizer showed no concern, suggesting enforcement through negotiations
instead: „[I]n the context of our discussion with China we are trying to resolve
this case in a way that we think achieves our goals and avoids the possibility of an
Appellate Body decision … So my hope with respect to that specific case that we
can work it out in the context of this negotiation.“493
A further indication that the current US administration is opposed to legally
binding dispute settlement, and therefore not really interested in a resolution
of the appointment crisis, is its reaction to specific proposals by other member
states on how to address the stated concerns of the US. Most instructive in this
respect is the US response to a communication of November 2018 by 16
members, including the EU and China, which proposes specific solutions for
five of the six issues of procedure and interpretative approach complained
about by the US, namely Rule 15, the 90-day deadline, appellate review of
municipal law, advisory opinions, and precedential effect.494 These proposals
were discussed at the General Council meeting of 12 December 2018.495 In that
491 Closing Statement of Lighthizer at the Sixth Round of NAFTA Negotiations, 29 January
2018 (https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/fact-sheets/2018/january/clo 
sing-statement-ustr-robert).
492 Panel report, China – Agricultural Producers.
493 And, indeed, that is what happened. Although China disagreed with the panel report, it
did not appeal it, and the report was adopted at the DSB meeting of 26 April 2019
(minutes [WT/DSB/M/428], paras. 7.1 – 7.5).
494 See supra, fn. 93.
495 Minutes of the General Council meeting of 12 December 2018 (WT/GC/M/175), paras.
6.1 – 6.257.
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meeting, the US did not comment in any way on the specifics of the proposals
but rather rejected them wholesale, with just two sentences: „[O]n a close
reading, the proposals would not effectively address the concerns that Members
have raised. … Rather than returning the WTO dispute settlement system to what
was agreed to by Members in the Dispute Settlement Understanding, the pro-
posals instead appear to endorse changing the rules to accommodate and au-
thorize the very approaches that have given rise to Members’ concerns.“496
However, looking at the proposals,497 the US claim that they „endorse changing
the rules to accommodate and authorize the very approaches that have given
rise to Members’ concerns“ (i.e., primarily the concerns of the US) is patently
wrong. Rather, the proposals go a long way toward changing current practices
and meeting US demands. First, on the 90-day deadline of Art. 17.5 of the DSU,
the November 2018 communication proposes to amend Art. 17.5 of the DSU to
the effect that if the Appellate Body believes that it will not be able to submit
its report within 90 days, it is obliged to seek the agreement of the parties to an
extension, and in case the parties fail to agree, the Appellate Body must in
consultation with parties propose measures that might enable it to meet the
deadline, such as limit the scope of the appeal or the length of parties’ sub-
missions. This proposal would force the Appellate Body, as long demanded by
the US, to return to its pre-2011 practice of seeking the consent of the parties
for a delay, and offers a practical approach to how the Appellate Body might
stay within the deadline despite the obvious workload problems.
Second, regarding advisory opinions, the communication proposes to amend
Art. 17.12 of the DSU, pursuant to which the „Appellate Body shall address each
of the issues raised“ by a party, by adding the phrase „to the extent necessary for
the resolution of the dispute.“ As discussed in detail earlier, the US demands
that the Appellate Body should address only issues which are necessary for the
resolution of the dispute, which is contrary to the wording of Art. 17.12 of the
DSU in its present form. The proposed amendment would allow and indeed
require the Appellate Body to comply with this US demand.
Third, concerning appellate review of municipal law, the communication
proposes to add to Art. 17.6 of the DSU, which limits appeals to issues of law, a
496 Minutes of the General Council meeting of 12 December 2018 (WT/GC/M/175), paras.
6.161 – 6.162.
497 In the communication (supra, fn. 93), all proposed DSU amendments are set out on p. 3,
preceded by explanations on pp. 1 – 2.
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clarifying footnote stating that these issues of law „do not include the panel
findings with regard to the meaning of the municipal measures of a party but do
include the panel findings with regard to their legal characterisation under the
covered agreements“. To recall, the question of the qualification of municipal
law under Art. 17.6 of the DSU is currently not explicitly answered in the DSU,
and the Appellate Body has, in effect, interpreted the DSU to allow the review
of municipal law on appeal, while the US is of the opinion that the DSU
prohibits such review. With the proposed clarifying footnote this interpretive
question would now be answered explicitly in the DSU, and, importantly, in
the direction demanded by the US (albeit not all the way).
Fourth, on precedential effect, it is proposed that the DSB meet once a year in
the presence of the Appellate Body and that members at that meeting may
express their views on the development of the jurisprudence of the Appellate
Body, in addition to the discussion of specific Appellate Body reports at the
time of their adoption in the DSB. Although this proposal would obviously fall
quite short of the (unreasonable) US demand that Appellate Body reports
should have no precedential effect whatsoever, at least it would potentially
increase the influence of the membership on the Appellate Body, which is one
of the overarching objectives of the US.
Fifth, and finally, with regard to Rule 15, the communication proposes to
amend Art. 17.2 of the DSU on appointments to the Appellate Body by adding
the following sentence: „The outgoing person shall complete the disposition of
an appeal in which the oral hearing has been held.“ This is the only one of the
five proposals which, indeed, seems to „endorse changing the rules to ac-
commodate and authorize the very approaches that have given rise to Members’
concerns“ because the proposed amendment would provide explicit aut-
horization in the DSU of the transitional rule contained in Rule 15. However,
whereas with regard to all other issues the US is opposed to the substance of
the Appellate Body approaches, the US complaint concerning Rule 15 is only
about the alleged lack of a legal basis in the DSU, but not the substance of the
rule, which the US explicitly supports.498 Therefore, the proposed amendment
remedies the very problem the US perceives, namely it provides a sound DSU
basis for a practice the US agrees with.
After having rejected all of these proposals, is there anything the US proposes
instead? According to the US, the answer is simple, namely „the WTO Appellate
498 See supra, fn. 63 and accompanying text.
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Body should follow the rules [WTO members] had agreed to in 1995. … And so,
the Appellate Body should circulate its reports within 90 days of an appeal. A
person who had ceased to be an Appellate Body member could not continue
deciding appeals as if his term had been extended by the Dispute Settlement
Body. … The Appellate Body could not make findings on issues of fact, including
but not limited to those relating to domestic law. … The Appellate Body could not
give advisory opinions on issues that would not assist the DSB in making a re-
commendation to bring a WTO-inconsistent measure into compliance with WTO
rules. … The Appellate Body could not assert that its reports served as precedent
or provide authoritative interpretations. … And the Appellate Body could not
change Members’ substantive rights or obligations as set out in the text of the
WTO agreements.“499 In other words, the US purports that the appointment
crisis could be resolved if only the Appellate Body complied with its demands.
However, even if one were to agree, contrary to the results of the present study,
that such compliance with the US demands would mean a return to what had
been agreed to in 1995, and, furthermore, the Appellate Body would be willing
to give in to these demands, it would be almost impossible to fulfill them in
the current situation created by the US blockage of appointments. This is most
obvious in the case of the 90-day deadline. With a significant backlog of ca-
ses500 and currently only three sitting Appellate Body members, there is just no
way that the Appellate Body could submit its reports within anything near
that deadline. And not allowing Appellate Body members whose terms have
expired to complete the work on appeals they have been assigned to would, of
course, make that situation even worse. On the other issues, i.e., appellate
review of facts and municipal law, advisory opinions, precedential effect and
various questions of substantive law, the Appellate Body can only make ru-
lings if and when it gets a case in which such an issue arises. In addition, since
the US is adamant that Appellate Body rulings have no precedential effect, it
would be difficult for the Appellate Body to announce a change of practice
with binding effect for the future that could satisfy the US, and the US has
never said what specific actions or announcements on the part of the Ap-
pellate Body would cause it to end its blockage. Finally, and most importantly,
499 Minutes of the General Council meeting of 12 December 2018 (WT/GC/M/175), statement
of the US, paras. 6.163 – 6.168. The US has since repeated this statement more or less
verbatim several times, see minutes of the DSB meeting of 25 February 2019 (WT/DSB/M/
426), para. 5.25; minutes of the General Council meeting of 7 May 2019 (WT/GC/M/177),
paras. 4.151 – 4.152.
500 As of 30 August 2019, there were 13 appeals pending before the Appellate Body.
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once the terms of two further Appellate Body members expire in December
2019, the Appellate Body will no longer have the necessary quorum to decide
appeals, and for that reason alone can no longer do anything to please the US.
In light of the above review of the five proposals of the November 2018
communication and the proposed alternative of the US, it is difficult not to
agree with the statement of China at the General Council meeting of 12 De-
cember 2018 that it „felt disappointed and confused, but not surprised“ by the US
reaction.501 Disappointed because the US did not in any way engage with the
proposals even though they meet many of its demands; confused because the
reason stated by the US for refusing them and, equally, the proposed US al-
ternative make little sense; and, nevertheless, not surprised because consen-
ting to changes that would address some of its concerns would make it more
difficult for the US to keep up the blockage and thereby to accomplish its
presumed objective of further undermining legally binding dispute settlement.
501 Minutes of the General Council meeting of 12 December 2018 (WT/GC/M/175), para.
6.245.
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VI. Conclusions
This concluding chapter will, first, briefly summarize the main results of the
study, and, second, address the question as to what extent legal analyses like
the present one could be relevant for the resolution of the appointment crisis
or for other practical purposes.
Following Chapter I’s introduction to the topic, Chapter II explained the legal
rules governing the appointment of Appellate Body members, and then de-
monstrated that the US had already used the appointment process in the past
as a means to influence the direction of the Appellate Body, starting with the
refusal to reappoint US Appellate Body members whom the US judged as
having not been sufficiently supportive of the US in appeals with US partici-
pation, and culminating 2016 in the vetoing of the reappointment of Appellate
Body member Seung Wha Chang.
Chapter III traced the development of the current appointment crisis, which
started in early 2017. At the beginning, the US only blocked the launch of one
appointment process, for a position that became vacant in December 2017,
stating that the launch would be premature. But then, in August 2017, it de-
clared that it would not consent to the launch of any new appointment
processes, invoking as reason the Appellate Body’s practice of allowing out-
going Appellate Body members to complete appeals they had already been
assigned to (the Rule 15 issue), which the US considered to be a breach of the
DSU. However, the Rule 15 issue as sole reason for the blockage was a mere
pretext, which was confirmed one year later, in August 2018, when the US cited
a much broader set of concerns as justification for its continued blockage. It
accused the Appellate Body of having violated the DSU and other WTO
agreements not only with regard to Rule 15, but concerning various issues of,
on the one hand, procedure and interpretative approach, and, on the other,
substantive law, notably trade remedy law. While the US mentioned the al-
leged Appellate Body violations in the area of substantive law only in passing,
without going into detail, it explained its concerns regarding the issues of
procedure and interpretative approach at great length before the DSB. Since
August 2018, the US has repeated these allegations whenever the appoint-
ments were tabled in the DSB or the General Council, and has stated that it
would not unblock the appointment process unless its concerns were ad-
dressed, without though, making any specific proposals on how to address
them.
Chapter IV, the core of the study, analyzed in detail the six issues of procedure
and interpretative approach that were the main focus of the reasons stated by
the US for its blockage, that is, Rule 15, the 90-day deadline of Art. 17.5 of the
DSU, advisory opinions, appellate review of facts and of municipal law, and
precedential effect of Appellate Body reports. The analysis showed that only
concerning one of these six issues, namely appellate review of municipal law,
there is a case to be made that the Appellate Body has disregarded the DSU,
but that this one breach is neither clear nor serious enough to legally justify
blocking all appointments to the Appellate Body, particularly since the blo-
ckage itself clearly violates the DSU, namely the requirement of Art. 17.2 of the
DSU that vacancies on the Appellate Body have to be filled when they arise.
Chapter V put the central legal findings of the study in a broader context. It
asked, first, whether the concerns of the US are genuine or were merely
contrived for political reasons, and, second, whether the current appointment
crisis, which started after the inauguration of President Trump, is a logical
extension of earlier US policies or a break with the past.
The answer to the first question was that although some arguments indeed
appear to be fabricated, overall there is genuine dissatisfaction and frustration
of many on the US side with the Appellate Body. This is due in large part to the
fact that the WTO dispute settlement system and the Appellate Body have
developed differently than expected by the US at the close of the Uruguay
Round in 1995. First, the Appellate Body has played a much more important
role in the dispute settlement system than expected, both in quantitative and
qualitative terms; second, the US has been sued more often and lost more
often as defendant before the Appellate Body than anticipated; and, third,
efforts to negotiate new or to amend existing agreements have largely failed,
contrary to expectations, so that Appellate Body interpretations disliked by
the US could not be overturned through negotiations.
On the second question, the Chapter revealed that even though many of the
US complaints about the Appellate Body are long-standing, and have been
voiced by various US administrations, the blockage of all appointments to the
Appellate Body is still an expression of a major shift of US trade policy under
the Trump administration. Whereas in the past the US had been a major
proponent of a rule-based multilateral trading system grounded in the belief
that free trade benefits all („win-win“), the Trump administration is driven by
the mercantilist view that international trade is a zero-sum game, in which
powerful countries like the US can gain most if they can exert their power
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unrestrained by law. In that view, legally binding dispute settlement is not in
the interest of the US, and, consequently, debilitating the WTO dispute sett-
lement system by blocking all appointments to the Appellate Bod makes sense
for the US.
After this summary, we will close with a few thoughts on whether legal
analyses like the present one, which seek a better understanding of the legal
concerns raised by the US, can actually be helpful in resolving the appoint-
ment crisis, or have any other practical value. According to the US, the answer
is yes. Given that many, if not most, members disagree with the US depiction
of the Appellate Body as a rogue rule-breaker, the US has uttered amazement
that other members can read the DSU differently than itself, and has called for
gaining a deeper understanding of the issues as a prerequisite for any solution:
„[I]t was striking that a few Members … would not acknowledge that the Ap-
pellate Body had been acting contrary to the unambiguous text of the DSU. The
United States would like to understand how it was that Members could suppo-
sedly understand the same, clear words in such disparate ways. … [I]t was vital
that Members understand how it is that they had come to that point where the
Appellate Body … was disregarding the clear rules that had been set by those
same Members. …. Equally important was the need to understand why the
Membership itself had been so reluctant over the course of so many years to take
corrective action in response to Appellate Body rule-breaking. … Members should
first have those understandings in order to determine how they could find ap-
propriate and effective solutions to prevent this from happening in the future“.502
So, is there a chance that the US and other members might reach common
ground on the evaluation of the Appellate Body’s record through the power of
legal reasoning and discourse, and on that basis find a way out of the ap-
pointment crisis? We do not think that this is likely. As to the members op-
posing the US, after having heard at great length the arguments of the US on
the alleged misconduct of the Appellate Body, they are apparently not con-
vinced, and, as Chapter IV of the present study has demonstrated, with good
502 Minutes of the General Council meeting of 7 May 2019 (WT/GC/M/177), statement of the
US, paras. 4.154 – 4.157; see also statements of the US at the General Council meeting of 23
July 2019, item 7 (https://geneva.usmission.gov/2019/07/23/statements-delivered-by-am-
bassador-dennis-shea-wto-general-council-meeting-july-23-2019), and at the General
Council meeting of 24 July 2019, item 4 (https://geneva.usmission.gov/2019/07/24/state-
ments-delivered-by-ambassador-dennis-shea-wto-general-council-meeting-geneva-july-
24-2019).
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reason. Indeed, since the US has begun to explain its concerns in more detail
in the DSB, from August 2018 onwards, not only has the US remained entirely
alone in blocking the appointment process, the number of members explicitly
supporting an immediate launch of that process has actually increased.503 As
to the US itself, it seems even less likely that further legal arguments will make
a difference and induce the US to change its position, regardless of the
strength of these arguments. After having denigrated the Appellate Body in the
harshest terms since the start of the crisis, it is difficult to see how the US could
retreat now and admit mistake without losing face. Moreover, given that, as
described in Section V.B, the current US administration is not in favor of le-
gally binding dispute settlement, it has no incentive to give up the politically
convenient argument that the Appellate Body has „broken [the rules] with
impunity“,504 no matter how far-fetched this claim may be. This pessimistic
view about the prospects of bringing the parties closer through the exchange
of legal arguments is shared by others, for example, by Alan Wolff, a former US
trade diplomat and currently a Deputy Director-General of the WTO, who said
in June 2018: „It had been my belief that a greater understanding shown of
respective legal interpretations would have assisted in resolving the current
impasse over the continued existence of the Appellate Body. I have recently come
to the conclusion that this may not be correct. … This is a political decision that is
highly unlikely to turn on legal merits.“505
Does it follow that analyses of whether the Appellate Body has complied with
the DSU and other WTO agreements are only of academic interest, and have
no practical value? The answer is no, for at least two reasons, one focusing on
the short term and the other on the long term.
In the short term, it is important to provide a clear counterweight to the
constantly repeated and morally charged US accusation that the Appellate
Body is a shameless rule-breaker, not in order to try to convince the US that its
accusations are wrong, let alone to get it to publicly acknowledge any such
thing, but to create a level playing field for a candid discussion of the und-
erlying political differences. It has to be established in the public forum that
the disputed legal issues are, as a rule, difficult questions of legal interpreta-
tion, which the Appellate Body has answered in good faith (whether one
503 See supra, fn. 90 – 91 and accompanying text.
504 Minutes of the General Council meeting of 7 May 2019 (WT/GC/M/177), statement of the
US, para. 4.154.
505 Wulff (2018).
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agrees with these answers or not), rather than easy questions answered by
unambiguous texts, which the Appellate Body has willfully distorted.506
Otherwise, there is the danger that the US might gain the moral high ground,
albeit without justification, in the mind of the public, and maybe even in that
of some negotiators, which might unfairly tilt any negotiations aimed at fin-
ding a way forward. Apart from rejecting the partisan US allegations of Ap-
pellate Body rule-breaking and moral misconduct, though, there is every
reason to engage constructively with the US on how to reform the dispute
settlement system (and the WTO more generally), even if one should firmly
believe that all Appellate Body interpretations are legally correct. If a WTO
member as important as the US is obviously no longer satisfied with the way
the dispute settlement system works, it is in the interest of the organization
and the membership as a whole to somehow accommodate that member and
find a new equilibrium.507
Looking at the long term, with December 2019, when the Appellate Body will
cease to be functional, fast approaching, it is quite uncertain what the future of
the Appellate Body will be, whether it will be able to continue in anything
similar to its present shape, whether it will be substantially overhauled, and if
so how, or whether it will wither and die. Whatever its future, there is much to
be learned from the unprecedented experience of more than 20 years of ap-
pellate decision-making at the WTO. That experience can continue to provide
valuable input for international trade law, international law more generally,
and the design and development of international courts and other interna-
tional dispute settlement systems. An important part of that experience is how
the Appellate Body has dealt with the perennial and difficult challenge of
506 See, for instance, the US-appointed Appellate Body member Graham (2016), p. 115: „We
work with the words on paper. But that is rarely as simple as it might sound. The Dispute
Settlement Understanding … states that findings of the dispute settlement system ,cannot
add to or diminish the rights and obligations provided in the covered agreements‘. But, in
almost every appeal that comes before the Appellate Body, the very heart of the question at
issue is whether an interpretation advocated by one of the participants would correctly
reflect the balance struck in the treaty provisions, or would add to or detract from the rights
and obligations of a WTO Member. Whether we have struck the balance correctly is often in
the eye of the beholder. … We try hard to discern and give meaning to that balance as
reflected in the treaty text and to get our interpretations right. We can’t expect all Members
always to agree with us. We don’t always agree even among ourselves. But we do bring to
these discussions respect for one another and our honest best efforts, by our own lights.“
507 For a proponent of such an approach and proposals on how it could be accomplished, see
McDougall (2018).
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judicial bodies which, on the one hand, are expected not to make political
decisions but simply to apply the law as written, and, on the other, un-
avoidably have to engage to some degree in (potentially controversial) value
judgments when they interpret legal texts.508 The contested interpretations of
the DSU at issue in the present appointment crisis are a perfect illustration of
this challenge.
508 On the indeterminacy of law and the unavoidability of value judgements in legal in-
terpretation, see, for instance, Lehne (2004), pp. 85 – 100.
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